THE SECOND WORLD WAR
1939–1945
ARMY

DISCIPLINE

THE WAR OFFICE
1950

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THE SECOND WORLD WAR

1939–1945

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DISCIPLINE

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THE WAR OFFICE

1950

FOREWORD

This book is one of a series of volumes, compiled by authority of the Army Council, the object of which is to preserve the experience gained during the Second World War, 1939–1945, in selected fields of military staff work and administration. The author has been given access to official sources of information, and every endeavour has been made to ensure the accuracy of the work as a historical record. Any views expressed and conclusions drawn are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Army Council, which, so far as they relate to current training, are to be found in the official manuals, training memoranda, etc., issued from time to time by the War Office.

For the operational background, the reader is referred to the Official History of the War.

THE WAR OFFICE
October 1950

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ABBREVIATIONS

A.B.C.A.	Army Bureau of Current Affairs.
A.R.P.	Air Raid Precautions.
A.S.C.	Army Selection Centre.
A.T.S.	Auxiliary Territorial Service
B.B.C.	British Broadcasting Corporation.
C.B.	Confined to Barracks.
C.M.P.	Corps of Military Police.
DCM	District Court-Martial.
FGCM	Field General Court-Martial.
G.H.Q.	General Headquarters.
K.R.	King's Regulations.
L.M.G.	Light Machine Gun.
L. of C.	Lines of Communication.
M.P.S.C.	Military Provost Staff Corps.
N.C.O.	Non-Commissioned Officer.
P.O.L.	Petrol, Oil and Lubricants.
P.T.	Physical Training.
V.P.	Vulnerable Point.

PREFACE

This history is a record of events affecting the Discipline of the Army during the Second World War from September, 1939 to August, 1945. For further information on the various subjects embodied in its contents, e.g. Courts-Martial, Military Prisons, Corps of Royal Military Police, Auxiliary Territorial Service, etc., the reader is invited to study the official manuals, and also the separate volumes in this series on these subjects where they have been written.

With a view to ensuring accuracy, considerable research has been carried out among official and unofficial records, personal reports, diaries, etc. So far as possible, the sources from which facts, figures, opinions, etc., have been drawn have been recorded.

PART I

DISCIPLINE

CHAPTER I.—ITS PURPOSE AND NATURE

Retrospective.

The *Pocket Oxford Dictionary*, 1939, gives the following definition of Discipline:—

> "training, especially of the kind that produces self-control, orderliness, obedience and capacity for co-operation; maintenance of proper subordination in the Army."

The implication contained in this definition is that Discipline is not a natural attribute; that it can be attained only by training, either self-imposed or through the medium of some outside agency.

Ever since the early days of history some degree of discipline has been found essential in the armies of the period. The foundations on which discipline has been based and the manner of its administration have undergone considerable changes in the course of the progress of civilization and methods of war, but its purpose and the need for it have remained constant and undisputed.

Earlier in the present century the views of two distinguished war leaders on this subject were expressed as under:—

Field-Marshal Lord Roberts (House of Lords—July, 1914).

> "Discipline is an artificial bond forged for the purpose of converting an unorganized collection of men into an organized body, amenable to authority.
>
> "It is in a sense a fetter which tends to gall the wearer and to repress his individuality at first, but which gradually becomes a source of pride and satisfaction as he realizes the necessity for it and the cumulative strength it affords."

Marshal Foch (Supreme Allied Commander, 1917–1918, in his *Principles of War*).

> "An Army is a delicate being, kept alive by its discipline. It is the very first condition of the existence of Armies. It alone permits a Commander to direct any action. . . . Discipline means that one frankly adopts the thoughts and views of the superior in Command and that one uses all humanly practicable means in order to give him satisfaction."

Even during the short period since these views were expressed, the face of war, its methods and its influence upon human reflexes have undergone considerable and important changes, perhaps more drastic than in any comparable period in its history.

In order therefore to understand clearly how the discipline of the Army

reacted to the conditions and influences of the Second World War, it is as well to examine more closely the nature of that discipline at the beginning of the war and how the changed conditions brought about by modern methods and weapons had affected it.

The currents and undercurrents which go to make or mar good discipline are numerous and not easy to classify. Discipline may be the result mainly of a single factor, e.g. the character and influence of a commander—or the combination of many factors resulting in its deterioration (or the reverse), perhaps over a period of time.

It is often supposed that a unit which drills well on parade must be well disciplined because it moves as one man on the orders of a single individual. This may be true in fact in many cases, and undoubtedly drill is a useful form of disciplinary training, especially in its initial stages, but there can be no true parallel drawn between drill and discipline, particularly in relation to war. Drill can be taught quickly under peace-time conditions in barracks and has no place as such on the modern battlefield. The best drilled unit on parade may be of little value in the field, unless it is also thoroughly imbued with a strong sense of discipline.

Nor must discipline be confused with morale.* The latter first became popularized in military phraseology by Napoleon's famous maxim, "In war, morale is to the physical as three is to one." It is not an easy word to apply or define in the English language. It must be clearly distinguished from "moral," which implies a sense of right or wrong in terms of conduct, whereas "morale," on the other hand, indicates a state of mind which embraces courage, confidence, co-operation, zeal and the will to win. For military purposes, morale may be conveniently defined as "the attitude of the soldier towards his employment," or as Field-Marshal Earl Wavell has described it† "the inward, spiritual side of discipline."

In the inculcation of "morale," discipline is an indispensable factor. Self-respect, self-control and obedience to authority, which go hand in hand in training in discipline, are sturdy elements also in the foundation of morale.

From the beginning of a soldier's career, discipline is instilled into him both in quarters and on the barrack square. He is taught to obey orders smartly and with a good grace; to take a pride in his appearance and turn-out; to respect his corps, his unit, his seniors; to have confidence in himself and in his proficiency with his weapons or at driving his vehicle.

In addition to this discipline as an individual, he is taught to "play for the side," to co-operate with others to further the common purpose, i.e. for the good of the unit.

The reaction of each individual to this training in discipline will depend mainly upon his own upbringing at home and at school, and the capacity for leadership and understanding shown by his instructors. As the word "discipline" implies, it is intended for a "disciple" or "willing follower," but military discipline has to be inculcated into all alike, the volunteer and the conscript. Methods have, therefore, to be adapted to suit each individual or type of individual in order to achieve the best and quickest results on a common standard suitable to the Army.

It is essential that the man should be made to understand from the very first the importance and purpose of discipline, especially in war; that indiscipline

* For fuller information on this subject *see* separate volume in this series entitled *Morale*.
† Article "The Good Soldier" (*The Times*, September, 1945).

has no place in the Army, and that in war it may have serious effects and even lead to disaster. In a well-disciplined Army or unit, an undisciplined man should feel an unhappy misfit. Experience has shown that the transformation of an undisciplined individual into a disciplined soldier is effected more efficiently and rapidly by intelligent and persuasive means than by rigid methods of force and punishment, and that a system which appeals to a man's honour, sense of duty and patriotism, will prove deeper and more lasting in effect than one based upon repression or threat of punishment, which is liable to collapse as soon as the threat is removed.

The distinction between these two systems of maintaining discipline was forcibly illustrated in the First World War, and the comparison between the "Prussian" method, based on fear and the use of force, as used in the German Army, and the system of persuasion by training into willing co-operation practised in the British Army, turned the scale very much in favour of the latter. Never before probably had the discipline of the British Army been more severely tested than it was during that war. Conditions of trench warfare in France and Belgium; the initiation of gas attacks by the Germans; the effects of air raids; the heavy casualties over considerable periods without material gain of ground; the reverses and final evacuation in Gallipoli; lack of medical provision in Mesopotamia and the subsequent surrender of Kut-al-Almara, were all factors in lowering the morale of the troops and putting a heavy strain on their discipline and confidence over a considerable period.

The Germans were superior in numbers, better equipped and gained numerous victories in the early years of the war. Yet it was an outstanding fact in all hand-to-hand fighting that the German soldier, left to his own devices, surrendered at once. He lacked confidence in himself and his weapon, if separated from his comrades. The British soldier never doubted his own superiority.

In the period between the end of the First World War and the beginning of the Second, considerable changes had been noticeable in the social life of the community, especially in the standard of conduct of members of the younger generation in their attitude towards constituted authority, e.g. the law, the church, family life, their elders, and marriage. There was also a tendency to exaggerate the rights of the individual over those of the community. This was no doubt due in part to influences arising out of the War, during which parents had been otherwise engaged outside the home, and in many cases killed or incapacitated.

Moreover, the wider spread of education with ability to read and write; the greater freedom from control conferred on young men and women; the wider scope for the acquisition of knowledge of all kinds of subjects available through the medium of broadcasting, cinemas, etc., and free access to a variety of literature previously withheld, had resulted in a more intellectual, thoughtful, perhaps more sensitive, type of individual being drafted into the Services. He was more capable, and more in the habit of thinking for himself than his earlier prototype, who had been more accustomed to look to his elders and seniors for guidance and leadership. Though not perhaps so readily amenable to discipline, owing to its virtual absence in many cases from their early upbringing and also because of their greater freedom of thought and action, these young men were nevertheless more capable, once converted to the doctrine of discipline, of benefiting from it and of giving proof of its lasting value, especially in war, than were the less educated type in 1914.

Lecturing at Cambridge University in 1939, General Sir Archibald Wavell (afterwards Field-Marshal Earl Wavell) said:—"With National Armies (as all Armies, even the British, will be in a future War) and general education, discipline will be a different matter from the old traditional discipline. It has changed greatly since I joined and is changing still."

Apart from the influences of different standards of education and home life, the attitude of the general public towards war itself had undergone certain changes. Through the influence of air attacks war had been brought closer to the community, and the man and woman in the street were becoming more interested. The wide publicity given, in certain unofficial accounts, to the causes of the reverses in the First World War in France, Gallipoli and Mesopotamia, with their imputations of incompetence among senior commanders; the graphic, often elaborated, stories related by parents, relatives, etc., of their experiences in captivity, particularly in Turkey, and other unfortunate incidents, had no doubt tended to create misgivings in the minds of the public about the efficiency of leadership and the conduct of operations. For the maintenance of morale among the people and in the young men entering the Army, confidence in their leaders is a very powerful factor, and the more critical the situation is, or is likely to become, the greater the importance attaching to this confidence. With the modernization of war, the mutual relationship between the ordinary citizen and the military leaders has attained an increased prominence, with still greater possibilities in the event of certain eventualities, e.g. enemy invasion.

Moreover, the progress in modernization in the period between the two World Wars had also brought about considerable changes within the Army itself, owing to new and more mobile methods of warfare. The increase in air-power and mechanization, and the introduction of more scientific and powerful weapons, had resulted in battles being planned and waged at greater distances, with longer periods of tension and waiting before troops were brought into direct and active combat. The psychological effects of unseen potential dangers had increased considerably as compared with those produced in the past by known weapons in the hands of the visible enemy.

In short, it may be said that the increased progress in the modernization of war in the twenty years preceding the Second World War had magnified the potential effects of outside influences upon the morale of troops in battle. This book will consider whether the discipline of the Army, which had always in the past served as one of the most powerful factors in the building and maintenance of morale, proved equal to the occasion under the increased stresses and demoralizing influences of the Second World War.

CHAPTER II—INFLUENCES AFFECTING DISCIPLINE DURING 1939–1945

Much of what has been said above about the influence of the modernization of warfare during the pre-war years upon the morale and discipline of troops applies with even greater force to the years after 1939.

The sudden realization of war, with small and only partially prepared forces available and the imminent threat to France, created much the same situation as in 1914.

June to August, 1940

The immediate crisis, which in the First World War had arrived within the first few weeks of the outbreak of war and was only evaded by something in the nature of a miracle, was postponed for several months in 1939, yet when it came in June, 1940, with the collapse of Belgium and France, it served as a supreme test of the morale, discipline and endurance of the small British Expeditionary Force. Again the word "miracle" came to be applied to the withdrawal from Dunkirk of a force of over 220,000 men (including 13,000 casualties) as well as 112,000 Allied troops across the Channel, under the bombing of a superior enemy Air Force. Although many of these men arrived back in England in a state of physical and mental deterioration, owing to the paralysing experiences through which they had come in the previous days and weeks, the discipline instilled into them as soldiers before the War had enabled them to fight and endure all that they encountered in the face of the enemy. Then, on relief from the strain and tension, and only then, their resistance at last broke down.

In his Despatch* on this operation, General (afterwards Field-Marshal) Viscount Gort, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, said: "Firm Discipline, physical fitness, efficiency in marching and digging, and skill-at-arms, old-fashioned virtues though they may be, are as important in modern warfare as ever they were in the past."

In *Third Class to Dunkirk*, written by Peter Hadley, an officer who went through the withdrawal from Dunkirk with an Infantry unit, the author comments: "In the last war, troops had an opportunity to grow used to bombardments during static periods of trench warfare, but this time it burst suddenly upon them and only the strictest discipline was capable of maintaining steadiness and preventing panic. Such discipline is not always insisted upon in training or is all too frequently allowed to relax on the field of battle, and, although there is much to be said for the democratization of the Army, I do realize that the unquestioning obedience, which comes from drill and other old-fashioned methods of war (now frequently disparaged) is essential to the success of any Army."

In a book entitled *Dunkirk*, by A. D. Divine, for which the author had access to official papers, this operation is described as follows:—

* Supplement to *London Gazette*, 17th October, 1941, 2nd Despatch, para. 69.

"It was a brutal, desperate adventure forced upon us by the most dire disaster, carried out under the eyes of an enemy flushed with success, elated with the certainty of conquest. It was carried out in defiance of time, of circumstance, of death itself. There was no secure perimeter in the days that led to it, but only an Army falling back, hot in battle, with its flanks open and its Allies broken upon either hand, an Army cut off from its bases, lacking the very essentials of modern war; an Army outclassed by its enemy, inferior in everything but courage and determination. It came to the beaches after desperate weeks, battered, bruised and infinitely weary. It marched to its evacuation over bitter miles and every yard of all those miles was challenged by the enemy and every hour made brutal by the enormous strength of the Luftwaffe in the air. The British Army had made its retreat to Dunkirk possible by the stubbornness of its defence and the splendour of its discipline."

The state of physical and mental deterioration in which the troops returned to England was the natural outcome of the privations and exhaustion through which they had passed, and this, added to the knowledge of failure in the operations, followed by the collapse of France, resulted in a very low state of morale among the troops *after* their evacuation. These troops constituted the bulk of the Regular fighting troops in the country and it was essential, in view of the possibility of a German invasion of England, that their lowered morale should be quickly re-established before it could possibly infect the raw and untried troops undergoing training.

Moreover, the enemy's superiority in the air enabled him to carry out heavy raids, especially at night, on cities and industrial targets, and this too tended to lower the morale of the public as a whole in its attitude towards the war, though not to the extent hoped for by the enemy.

The immediate need, therefore, was to build up and maintain the morale of the new troops who were required to be prepared to repel any possible enemy invasion by air or sea and to replenish the ranks of the units rescued from Dunkirk, and, eventually, to build up a new Expeditionary Force.

In an Army Training Memorandum issued in July, 1940, under the heading of *Morale and Fighting Efficiency* (which was subsequently issued as a pamphlet) the following passage occurred:—

"The decisive land battle of the war may one day be fought out in Great Britain. In that battle there will be no front line; any part of the country may find itself transformed into a battle-field over-night. It is therefore imperative that every soldier in the Army shall be forewarned of the nature of modern war. No amount of talking can enable raw troops to visualise or to sense the experience of coming under heavy bombardment for the first time; the experience is certain to impose a more than vigorous strain upon their morale.

"Nevertheless, the technique of war employed by the Germans in Poland and in Western Europe makes it the more imperative that no effort should be spared, by preliminary warning and advice, to fortify morale."

In enumerating the counter measures likely to prove of value against the enemy's war technique, the pamphlet included leadership of the highest order; and power of endurance and physical fitness. It then continued "mere individual determination to refuse to succumb to 'frightfulness' is not enough; a corporate sense of discipline will alone maintain the fighting value of a unit or sub-unit under the strain of the technique of demoralization as now practised

by the German Army and Air Force. Discipline in this context is not merely a question of blind and unquestioning obedience to orders, but a rhythmic and automatic surging of the cohesive spirit of a body of men in times of crisis, so that all can draw on the common fund of courage and endurance."

To give the new and untried soldier confidence in himself and in his ability to undergo the "frightfulness" of modern warfare, Battle School training was introduced. This training produced, as realistically as possible, within the narrowest safety limits, all the atmosphere of actual battle, e.g. live ammunition, bombs and air attacks.

Thus the object aimed at, with these theoretical and practical aids, was that the raw material of the Army at home should become forged into as hard a weapon as possible, with which to face the forthcoming struggle, destined to prove more bitter and exacting than any in the history of the past.

At the time of the return of the Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk, approximately two million young men had been registered, i.e. those up to the age of 27. The National Service Armed Forces Act of May, 1940, made all men between the ages of 19 and 37 liable for service. None of these had seen military service in the First World War and comparatively few had had any practical military training at all. Thus the initiation of these large numbers of new soldiers into the disciplinary methods required for modern war (in addition to the rehabilitation of those returned from Dunkirk) was the problem facing the Army in June, 1940.

The problem was further complicated by the war situation, which deteriorated in many ways while Britain remained alone. At the time of the fall of France, Italy joined the enemy. This added to the difficulties in the Mediterranean, where the loss of the French Navy and the accession to the enemy's strength of the Italian Navy considerably inclined the balance of naval power in the enemy's favour. The route to Egypt and the East *via* the Mediterranean had to be abandoned and this delayed reinforcement of our overseas commands. At the same time enemy submarine attacks increased. Malta was besieged. Further, as a sequel to the British withdrawal from the Continent and the fall of France, the campaign in Norway had had to be abandoned and the troops and ships withdrawn.

The public and the Army looked for guidance and leadership in this hour of darkness and, as so often happens, the hour produced the man. Shortly after becoming Prime Minister in May, 1940, Mr. Churchill made a historic call to the country, in which he made no pretence of concealing the gravity of the situation. Yet his answer was defiant:—"We shall fight on the beaches, the landing grounds, in the fields, in the streets, in the hills" and added that he had nothing to offer the nation except "blood, toil, tears and sweat."

Unquestionably, the inspiration of this defiant leadership had its influence throughout the country and the Army. The Government and the country became united, as perhaps never before. The determination of every man and woman was steeled to maximum effort to resist possible enemy invasion. The People and the Services became merged and inspired by one common purpose; the Local Defence Volunteers (afterwards the Home Guard) quickly recruited beyond the immediate capacity to arm and equip them; the Air-Raid Precaution Service found no lack of volunteer workers of both sexes and all ages. Pots and pans and iron railings were surrendered for the manufacture of aeroplanes and guns; shot-guns and field-glasses were pooled for use by the Home Guard; motor-car owners lifted others going to work, A.R.P. or Home Guard service.

In short, the whole nation was at war and the people realized, as much as did the Army, that only by self-discipline, determination and co-operation could they hope to win through.

September, 1940 to May, 1941

Slowly the Royal Air Force gained in strength and striking power and brought down increasingly large numbers of enemy planes with every major raid, until they finally established their ascendancy over the enemy by bringing down 185 planes in a single day and night (15th September, 1940). Gradually, too, the threat of enemy invasion receded, and the Army changed over from practical defence to training for the offensive, without any relaxation of effort or of wise precaution. It had been the enemy's object to disorganize the country's industrial resources and transport services and to demoralize her people before invasion. Although considerable material damage was done and in the first ten months of air attacks there were nearly 100,000 casualties, of which over 40,000 were killed, the spirit of the people remained unshaken. Two factors undoubtedly contributed to this moral victory over the enemy's object, viz. confidence in the Prime Minister's inspiring leadership and the self-determination of the people, who for the most part acted calmly as individuals and refused to be stampeded into panic.

In the House of Commons in September, 1940, Mr. Churchill said:—"We believe that the spirit and temperament bred under institutions of freedom will prove more enduring and resilient than anything that can be got out of the most efficiently enforced mechanical discipline."

Apart from the enemy's actual defeat in the air, his practice of attacking non-industrial targets and killing civilians was a psychological blunder, since nothing perhaps could have more strongly united the country in its determination to defeat so brutal an enemy, or more firmly strengthened the belief of the young soldier in the righteousness of his cause in waging war—a powerful factor in the fostering and maintenance of morale and discipline in an Army.

The ratio of casualties during this period as between the military and civilian elements of the population was one soldier to forty civilians. It was therefore very much a civilian war in this phase and undoubtedly the spirit of the people was reflected in the conduct of the men in the Services. Moreover, discipline, which is essential to the proper conduct of all military operations, was required in a similar degree from the civilian public. The mutual interdependence of the people and the Army was in fact specially noticeable during this year, and this might have been still more evident had an enemy invasion actually taken place. The publicity afforded by the British Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts to matters connected with the war, including those affecting loyal elements in Europe, and also to any action required by the general public as part of the war machine, proved a very powerful force. As the war progressed and was carried further afield, it was similarly possible, through the medium of British Broadcasting Corporation commentators accompanying the Headquarters of Forces overseas, to keep the public at home directly informed of events as they occurred. This close mutual relationship between the people and the Army at war remained an influential factor throughout. The public interest in the working and deeds of anti-aircraft units was particularly acute and the secrets of their methods of defence, as they developed and improved, were jealously guarded. People were enjoined not to talk indiscreetly either about the locality

of targets hit by enemy bombing or about new weapons or methods in use, their numbers or location.

Throughout 1940 and up to June, 1941, Britain stood alone; combating the enemy's efforts at sea to destroy her vital communications; bringing her munitions and food and reinforcements from overseas, and also taking reinforcements to the Middle East and India.

In the Middle East the British offensive against greatly superior strength was only partially successful and the ground gained had to be given up again. The decision, in May, 1941, to take away Imperial Troops from the Middle East (at a time when offensive operations were being undertaken there) for despatch to the assistance of Greece was forced upon the Cabinet for political reasons.

This expedition was described by the Commander-in-Chief Middle East (General Sir Archibald, afterwards Field-Marshal Earl Wavell) in his Despatch as "ill-starred from the first." The Greeks were deficient of modern arms and equipment and their ox-drawn transport was too slow for the *tempo* of modern warfare. The British troops were attacked while still concentrating. In the end, evacuation had to be carried out in difficult circumstances, the enemy holding complete superiority in the air. In the Commander-in-Chief's Despatch it was recorded that "out of 57,660 landed, roughly 43,000 were re-embarked, but all guns, transport and unit equipment were lost." The Despatch concludes:—

"In view of the enemy's complete air superiority, the re-embarkation of so many troops may be considered an extremely fine performance. It was due to the magnificent work of the Royal Navy, good staff arrangements and the discipline and endurance of the troops themselves."

Of the 43,000 evacuated from Greece, about 27,000, of whom approximately half were British and the remainder New Zealanders and Australian, were disembarked at Crete and left there, under command of Lieutenant-General Freyberg, V.C., for its defence. They were badly in need of rest and refitting after their experiences in Greece. Many were unarmed. Moreover, in addition to their duties connected with the defence of the island, they had to guard 16,000 Italian prisoners. The enemy again enjoyed the mastery of the air, especially after they had captured the Maleme aerodrome. They eventually landed approximately 35,000 troops, mainly from the air in gliders, and the anti-aircraft defences proved inadequate to cover all the possible landing places in this airborne invasion—until then a little-known operation. Again evacuation had to be resorted to, and in conditions worse than in Greece, as there were no port facilities and few beaches. Units became disorganized by enemy parachute landings and many stragglers became detached from their units in making their way to the beaches. Finally about half the force, approximately 15,000, were re-embarked and had to undergo a voyage of 360 miles to Egypt, during which they were subjected to enemy air attack. Until overwhelmed from the air, the garrison put up a stout defence and caused the enemy heavy casualties. The Commander-in-Chief Middle East in his Despatch (p. 20) said:—"This withdrawal of troops, who had already endured 6 days of the sternest fighting imaginable, was a magnificent performance. The only blot in the story of the defence of Crete was the indiscipline of a certain proportion of the disorganized and unarmed elements of the Force whom it had not been possible to evacuate before the attack. When the withdrawal of the Southern beaches began, they much hampered both the retirement and orderly embarkation."

An Inter-Services Committee, assembled by General Headquarters, Middle East, in June, 1941, to consider the lessons to be learnt from the evacuation of Crete, made the following comments (p. 31):—

"The preponderating factor in this operation was the overwhelming superiority of the German Air Force."

and later:—

"Lax discipline has permeated many units. Such discipline will not stand the acid test of hardship. Scenes were witnessed during the withdrawal, which could only be attributed to a low standard of discipline. The instinct of self-preservation outrode all else. Officers failed to exercise the control that might have been expected of them. The effect upon morale of enemy air superiority has been mentioned above. Up to a point this was inevitable but the effects should have been reduced by a higher standard of discipline. Although the above touches upon certain aspects of discipline only, discipline generally needs tightening. Drill still has its place in this and should not be, as it is by some, associated solely with bows and arrows."

June, 1941

The German invasion of Russia in June, 1941 put an end to Britain's lone fight, but the Russians were forced to fall back a long distance and lost many important towns in the opening months of the campaign in Eastern Europe. However, these operations did help to divert a considerable number of enemy divisions away from the possible invasion of Britain. Moreover, the vast potential resources of Russia raised high hopes that Germany would be kept fully occupied in the East long enough to enable Britain to replenish and develop her strength in men and material, until she was able to play her part again in the European struggle.

December, 1941, to March, 1942

Nevertheless, the situation was destined to get much worse before any hoped-for improvement could materialize. In December, 1941, deterioration set in and developed rapidly in the Far East with the sudden attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbour, followed by their invasion of Malaya, and only a few days later by the sinking of the battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle-cruiser *Repulse*. Hong Kong fell on Christmas Day, after a brief defence, and the final blow came with the surrender of Singapore in February, 1942.

The loss of Singapore was probably the greatest single military disaster in Britain's history and was a severe blow to her prestige and the morale of her people at home. No official account of the disaster was then available to the public. The island was believed to be heavily protected and there had been ample time to reinforce the garrison, if it was considered inadequate. Nevertheless, the garrison was overwhelmed in a few days and the entire force surrendered in order to avoid further useless casualties.

Perhaps at no period of the war was the outlook so dark for the Allies as at this stage. It was true that the Russians were resisting bravely but they were losing heavily in men and material; true also that the United States with its vast resources and supplies had joined the Allies, but it had suffered grievous

naval losses at Pearl Harbour which had changed at one stroke the whole naval balance in the Pacific.

There followed in March the Japanese invasion of Burma and their occupation of the Andaman Islands with the evident threat to India and Ceylon.

The Russians continued to retreat, losing heavily in men and material. In the Caucasus, the German offensive was particularly dangerous.

June, 1942

In Libya the enemy advance overran Tobruk, which capitulated on June 21st with the loss of 25,000 men. This was wholly unexpected and a serious setback after its previous siege, which had invested it with the reputation of being practically impregnable.

The causes of this unexpected disaster are comparable with those of Crete and Singapore—viz. the enemy's overwhelming strength at the vital point and local air superiority. During the previous siege of Tobruk, only once had tanks been used in an assault upon the defences. In June, 1942, however, the attack was preceded first by a heavy artillery barrage followed by heavy air bombing, to which the R.A.F. were unable to reply as they were out of range; the actual assault was then made by shock troops escorted by about 100 heavy tanks and assisted by parachute units. The British Tanks counter-attacked until not a single one remained in action.

With the loss of Tobruk went considerable stocks of supplies of all kinds, which had been assembled there for an advanced base for the British offensive. Valuable quantities of petrol were burnt and large amounts of ammunition, food, etc., fell into the enemy's hands, but perhaps the most severe loss was the Tank element of the garrison, so badly needed for the prosecution of the campaign.

As a consequence of the fall of Tobruk, the Eighth Army was reduced to half its original strength and was ordered to fall back immediately (125 miles) to Mersa Matruh. Later the troops were ordered to continue to withdraw a further 50 miles east to El Alamein. Here they established themselves by the last day of June, determined to save Egypt at all costs.

They were immediately subjected to heavy attacks from the air and by ground troops but they held firm and in fact gave back as much as they received.

It was obvious that the series of disasters and heavy reverses through which the Army had passed during the previous months could not go on indefinitely. Certain sections of the Press made the most of these disasters and, perhaps naturally, their reports gave rise to serious misgivings in the minds of the public about the outcome of the war. It is probable that only the firm belief in the justice of the cause for which Britain was fighting, together with the essentially British leadership and grim determination of the Prime Minister, tempered with his thorough understanding of the man, and woman, in the street, enabled the morale of the nation to be maintained during this dark period.

The man in the Forces was also swayed by much the same factors, but in his case he was more personally and intimately influenced by the effect of each military reverse as it occurred. His reactions (varying with each individual and circumstance) were bound to be stronger. He needed the additional stimuli of his training and discipline to carry him through the constant recurrence of setbacks and disasters, and to help him to overcome the mental suffering and humiliation experienced in persistent withdrawals; surrender of ground, men and material; heavy casualties; and the various other demoralizing factors

which contribute to the realization of reverse, and again reverse, at the hands of an enemy superior in numbers, equipment and perhaps also technique.

It has been recorded that, in spite of all that they had suffered, the fighting spirit of the men was in no way diminished, and that their discipline remained excellent. Nevertheless, something was evidently lacking to bring victory to this fine fighting material. A definite forward move, a decisive victory, was long overdue in reward for their magnificent efforts and to restore confidence in their leaders and their own fighting ability. Moreover, the influence of this lack of confidence upon the young untried soldiers arriving as reinforcements from home had to be considered.

August, 1942

It was decided to make a change of leadership forthwith, and in August General (afterwards Field-Marshal Viscount) Montgomery assumed command of Eighth Army and General (afterwards Field-Marshal Viscount) Alexander became Supreme Commander in the Middle East.

The effect produced by these changes upon the officer and man in the Middle East has been described as "electric." No further withdrawal was countenanced in Egypt and the planning of an early counter-offensive was immediately undertaken.

Moreover, the word "offensive" began to be echoed in other spheres of operations. The Russians halted the Germans at the threshold of Moscow and Stalingrad. The R.A.F. with the co-operation of American Air Squadrons carried out heavy raids on Europe. Cologne was attacked by 1,000 Allied planes and there were several sorties of 200–600 machines. In the Pacific, the United States began active operations in the Solomon Islands.

October, 1942, Onwards

Then arrived what was perhaps the turning point in the war. The Eighth Army, rested, reorganized and re-equipped, after nearly four months' active defence in the El Alamein position, went over to the counter-offensive, and a few days later the First Army, in co-operation with United States Forces, effected a landing in North Africa. In Burma, too, British and Indian troops started counter-offensive operations in December.

Nevertheless, the supreme effort and confident determination shown by the people in Great Britain could not be relaxed for a moment if the Army was to be given its due chance to defeat the enemy. In introducing his Budget estimates in February, 1943, the Secretary of State for War (Sir J. Grigg) made the following remarks:—

"The year which has passed has seen disaster turn into the beginnings of victory, but every ounce of our strength will be required before the evil things, against which we are fighting, are finally vanquished." Referring to the new Armies under training, Sir James Grigg said:—

"The soldier's duty is first and foremost to fight, and in order to make him into a first-class fighting man or an Army into a first-class instrument of war, two of the prime necessities are toughness and discipline. Discipline is absolutely essential for a modern Army, just as it has been through history, and we cannot afford to pass it by as something outmoded and undemocratic. When it is combined with good leadership, there is nothing degrading about discipline

nor need it involve any undue uniformity or loss of self-reliance. Discipline means unquestioning obedience to those set in authority over us and it is vital for the efficient and the harmonious working of an Army. It is the force which helps the good soldier to round the tightest corner and to go beyond even what seems to be the limit of human endurance. Discipline is, then, essential to a fighting Army."

These references to the importance of discipline to the fighting soldier were opportune, for although it seemed that, at long last, the tide had begun to turn in the Allies' favour, there was still much tough fighting ahead, not only in Europe but especially in the Far East, and not only attack on the ground but also in, and from, the air.

In North Africa, from the moment that the counter-offensive was launched, the morale of the men soared rapidly and was maintained at this high level throughout the campaign, which drove the enemy successively out of Africa, Sicily and Southern Italy. In his preparatory instructions for the opening of the counter-offensive, the Commander of the Eighth Army said:—"Morale is the big thing in war. We must raise the morale of our soldiers to the highest pitch. . . . I am not convinced that our men are really tough and hard. . . . Ordinary fitness is not enough, they must be made tough and hard." These words bore out strikingly the remarks of the Secretary of State for War (quoted above) a few months earlier.

Possibly no one understood better than Field-Marshal Montgomery the enormous influence of building up and maintaining morale prior to and during battle. It was an essential part of his plan that there should be heavy artillery bombardment and air support in any big operations that he was undertaking and, if practicable, naval support as well. In deciding this, he realized the tremendous effect upon the morale of the troops in the knowledge that they were well supported and that the enemy was being severely mauled as a preliminary to the actual combat between the ground troops.

The Field-Marshal's views on discipline are recorded by Major-General de Guingand in his book *Operation Victory* (p. 469):—"Montgomery understood this 'Civilian' Army as few before him. The rigid old type of discipline was not enforced. Human weaknesses were fully appreciated and the man's lot was made as easy for him as possible. This is why he was so lenient in the matter of dress and why a certain amount of 'personal commandeering' was winked at. All in all he realized that the Prussian type of discipline was not suited to the civilian soldier of the Empire."

In the introduction to his own book, *Normandy to the Baltic*, written immediately after his successful campaign in command of 21 Army Group in Europe, the Field-Marshal wrote:—"In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to the splendid fighting heroism and endurance of the ordinary soldier of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Once again he has proved himself second to none and if I were asked what is the greatest single factor which contributed to his success, I would say 'Morale.' I call morale the greatest single factor in war. A high morale is based on discipline, self-respect, confidence of the soldier in his Commanders, in his weapons and in himself. Without high morale, no success can be achieved, however good may be the strategical or tactical plan, or anything else. High morale is a pearl of great price and a sure way to obtain it is by success in battle."

There is no doubt from all available accounts that Field-Marshal Montgomery was a most inspiring commander, who succeeded in infusing his

confidence and enthusiasm into all those under him and welding them into a magnificent team with victory as their goal. In return he gave them the success which they so badly needed to raise their morale and maintain it at a high level. The combination was irresistible.

Finally, in a pamphlet issued to the troops of the British Army of the Rhine in 1946 entitled *Morale in Battle*, the Field-Marshal summed up the basic factors of morale as: Leadership, discipline, comradeship, and self-respect. Under the heading of discipline, he said:—"Discipline seeks to instil into all ranks a sense of unity by compelling them to obey orders as one man. This obedience to orders is the indispensable condition of good discipline. . . . Men must learn to obey orders when all their instincts cry out for them not to be obeyed. They must learn to obey in times of stress so that they will do so in times of danger. They must learn to carry out their tasks under any conditions and despite all difficulties. In this way the mass of loose individuals, with their fears and weaknesses, can be welded into a united whole, ready to act on the word of a leader. Individual fortitude and corporate courage are the twin products of discipline. . . . A certain type of training may induce men to go forward in an attack simply out of fear of the consequence of not doing so. This applies only to the weakest and most feeble of men who are of little value in battle. This type of training is an essential part of training but must not be mistaken for the whole. The type of training which implies a certain harshness and hardness has its value. Material comforts are now so insidious that there is some danger that this old-fashioned idea of discipline will be allowed to disappear. This must not happen. Soldiers will not win battles if their training has not been hard. The softening influence of civilian life must be replaced by the exacting demands of military training. Soldiers must forget the pleasures of peace and concentrate on the realities of war.

"In brief, discipline seeks to conquer fear by welding men into a cohesive whole, united by obedience to orders. It aims to create a body strong enough to carry each of its members through dangers and difficulties, which they themselves would be unable to face alone. In this way, it promotes comradeship, another factor in morale."

These are the views of Field-Marshal Montgomery on the value, and also the nature, of discipline in the ranks of a modern army in battle. As indicated above, these theories had been put into practice when taking command of the Eighth Army at the end of a long retreat and almost on the verge of defeat. He never lost a battle in North Africa thereafter, nor subsequently when leading 21 Army Group to final victory in Europe.

It may be that, as a leader, he sensed in a peculiar and remarkable manner the right moment at which to apply the right type of discipline to the requirements of the particular moment. No "softness" can be traced from recorded accounts of his methods during actual fighting, though he fully appreciated the need for reasonable relaxation and entertainment of troops outside the fighting area. His unwavering and infectious confidence and optimism, always borne out by subsequent events in the campaign, unquestionably made his troops willing "disciples" to his orders, however hard or difficult to understand the orders may have appeared at the time. This, as he himself stated, is the essence of good discipline.

Summary

It would appear from the history of the campaigns in North Africa and Europe that the principles of discipline have changed little in the past century and also that the basic national characteristics of the British soldier have remained constant.

Writing more than 50 years ago, Field-Marshal Lord Wolseley said, in *The Soldier's Pocket-book*:—

"No man can respond with greater alacrity than the British soldier when an officer, who understands him, makes an appeal to his honour, his love of Country, his loyalty and to all those subtle but powerful influences which alone convert mobs into Armies.

"To know where to relax, where to remain firm or where to tighten the reins requires the exercise of common sense aided by experience in the customs of War.

"Napoleon was above all a student of character and of the passions and feelings that influence men's conduct. By means of spirit-stirring proclamations, by appeals to their love of glory and all those points to which he knew Frenchmen to be susceptible, he was able to extract from his soldiers everything that they were capable of.

"It is not true that Britishers are devoid of such high sentiments, but it is only special nourishment and treatment that will develop feelings so long ignored.

"Let any General arise who knows how to do so and a new era of Victory will be arrived at in British history."

By a substitution of names, the above extracts might be applied to the conduct of the Commander of the Eighth Army and his troops after July, 1942, with the result foreshadowed in the last sub-paragraph.

CHAPTER III.—SPECIAL CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE DISCIPLINE OF TROOPS IN THE EASTERN CAMPAIGNS

Some special consideration must be given to the conditions under which British Troops served and fought during the campaigns in Malaya, China, India and Burma, compared with those in Europe and North Africa.

In the latter, the bulk of the troops belonged to English-speaking races imbued with the one common object—to defeat the enemy in order to ensure the survival of Great Britain, Europe and the United States.

In the Eastern campaigns, the great majority of the troops were Indians, whose customs, language and fighting qualities were unknown to the bulk of the British troops. In addition, there was an admixture of Australians, Americans, Chinese, and West and East Africans, most of whom were also unknown quantities to the British soldier, who found himself in a minority.

No doubt all had, to a greater or lesser degree, one object in view—the defeat of the Japanese—but some were swayed by different interests from others. For example, it is probable that, though both Indian and Chinese troops were fighting in defence of their respective countries, they had little interest in common and saw no special reason for going to one another's assistance in battle.

The British and Dominion troops were in Malaya and Burma to defend the Empire, and believed implicitly in the justice of their cause; the Indian and African troops were there as volunteer soldiers pledged to serve wherever ordered, with little or no knowledge of the causes for which they were fighting or the rights or wrongs of the participation by the Japanese in the war.

This feeling of being in a minority extended also to the soldier's periods of relaxation, such as they were, behind the battle-front, where he found himself in a strange country with extremes of climate and few amenities, among comparatively few of his own countrymen and practically none of his own countrywomen.

The influence of this heterogeneous admixture of races and of the local conditions upon the morale of the British soldiers fighting in these Eastern campaigns has to be taken into consideration in making a comparison with the conditions of his more fortunate comrades in North Africa and Europe, fighting alongside their own countrymen, or with men speaking their language and having the same interests, and moreover, in close touch with their own people.

As has been indicated above, in a "People's War," such as this had become since 1940 in Great Britain, the Army largely reflects the morale of the people at home and *vice versa*, but in the case of the men in the Far East there was the distance factor, which had the effect of relegating their own activities to the dim background, while events nearer home held the front of the public stage. The troops themselves considered that they had become members of a "Forgotten Army," a state of mind which in itself must have had an adverse influence upon their morale. Although relatives and friends received letters from troops out East, it was some time before sufficient aircraft could be made available for

their carriage by airmail; moreover, all these communications were censored, and people at home had only the vaguest conception of the geographical and climatic conditions obtaining in the terrain over which the Malayan and Burman campaigns were being fought.

The torrential rain of the south-west monsoon, bringing destruction on communications and a heavy incidence of malaria and dysentery, was enough in itself to lower the morale of the troops already damped by lack of success in operations, but there were also the hidden dangers of the jungle, e.g. snakes and leeches, which made operations in these areas a particularly unpleasant experience. Apart from the actual campaigning conditions, matters affecting welfare and leave were difficult to organize in the fighting areas and long and uncomfortable journeys had to be undergone in order to reach leave-camps and welfare-centres. Moreover, accommodation suitable for these purposes and capable of withstanding the climatic conditions was very short, and amenities and entertainments were not easy to arrange. At best, the facilities in the earlier stages of these campaigns were in no way comparable to those available to men in European theatres. In particular, the soldier's state of mind was seriously affected by his distance from his home and by the question as to what was happening to his family, especially in the case of married men.

Other contributory factors which affected the morale and gradually sapped the discipline of troops in these eastern campaigns were:—

(*a*) The comparative lack of training or experience in jungle warfare of both officers and men, which resulted to a certain extent in lack of confidence in themselves and their leaders in the earlier stages of the war when the Japanese held the initiative.

(*b*) The silent, stealthy infiltration tactics used by the Japanese, together with the novelty of jungle noises and cries, tended to mystify and demoralize inexperienced troops, as compared with the more orthodox methods adopted by British troops. There were also considerable fifth-column activities.

(*c*) Most of all, the impracticability, owing to shortage of manpower, to give the men adequate rest or any relief during long and indefinite periods and in adverse campaigning conditions.

During the constant and long withdrawals in Malaya and Burma in the face of an enemy superior in numbers on the ground and in the air, difficulty was experienced in maintaining a state of high morale and discipline over such long periods in the exhausting, enervating climatic and topographical conditions obtaining in those areas.

As regards Singapore, General Sir Archibald Wavell (afterwards Field-Marshal Earl Wavell), Supreme Commander South-West Pacific, who visited the island shortly before its capitulation, stated that "the morale of the troops there was very weak"; the War Office, after studying the reports of the various commanders concerned with the operations in Malaya, recorded the view that "the morale, discipline and fighting efficiency of some units had inevitably deteriorated by the time that they reached the island." The General Officer Commanding, Singapore (Lieutenant-General A. E. Percival) reported that his formation commanders unanimously expressed the view that counter-attack would have no chance of success, as their troops were too exhausted, physically

and mentally, for offensive action. The majority of these troops had been fighting a series of withdrawals incessantly for two months through dense jungle; the 18th Division, which had only recently arrived from England, was projected straight into the battle without time to become acclimatized or properly trained for local conditions. In the final stages, the Japanese had complete mastery of the air and had also seized the water-supply.

The troops in Singapore included an Australian Division whose Commander (Major-General Gordon-Bennett), expressed in *Why Singapore Fell*, the following view:—

"In regard to the discipline of the men, in jungle warfare owing to the difficulties of control beyond the area of a few yards, the importance of individual enterprise and initiative needs to be emphasized. This cannot be developed by barrack-square discipline."

Referring to the British withdrawal in Malaya, the Commander-in-Chief, Far East (Air Chief Marshal Sir R. Brooke-Popham) in his Despatch of 25th June, 1942 (p. 54) remarked:—"It is possible that the need for offensive action, even during a retreat, had not been so stressed during the training of officers and men as to become second nature."

The Despatch of the Supreme Commander, South-West Pacific, of 31st August, 1942, includes the following comment (p. 11):—"In Malaya, the Japanese troops undoubtedly outmanœuvred ours by their superior mobility, training and preparation. By the time Singapore Island was reached, these qualities, together with air superiority had established a moral ascendancy which made the resistance of the Singapore Garrison half-hearted and disappointing."

These two major factors—the excessive fatigue of the troops, owing to lack of relief and rest, and the effect upon morale and discipline of the continuous withdrawals—are dominant in all the official reports of these campaigns. The Commander Hong Kong Garrison (Major-General C. M. Maltby) recorded in his Despatch that his troops had had no relief and little sleep or rest for three weeks. In the early days of the Burma campaign, the General Officer Commanding (Lieutenant-General T. J. Hutton) reported that "Continued withdrawal and inevitable straggling in Jungle Warfare undoubtedly affected discipline to a considerable extent." After the fall of Rangoon in March, 1942, the Commander-in-Chief (General the Honourable Sir H. R. L. G., afterwards Field-Marshal Viscount Alexander) recorded that troops had been without relief and had had practically no rest for five months. Similarly, in summing up the lessons of the Arakan Campaign in 1943, the Commander-in-Chief 11th Army Group (General Sir George Giffard) wrote (p. 20):—"The relief of tired troops is most important and it was not solved satisfactorily owing to shortage of troops. Some of my Divisions had been in the forward areas for 28 months. I need not stress the mental and physical strain which jungle warfare, under adverse climatic conditions, imposes on a soldier."

Finally the Commander-in-Chief India (Field-Marshal Earl Wavell) in his Despatch on the "Operations in Burma in 1943," (p. 11) stated:—

"It was only in the latter stages of the fighting, after several months of continuous engagement in an unhealthy climate and under the discouragement of failure, that there was any deterioration in the endurance and fighting capacity of the troops." Nevertheless, he concluded (p. 12):—

"The British soldier has shown himself the finest all-round fighting man in the world. He has won so many victories that he never doubts of victory; he

has suffered so many disasters and defeats on his way to victory that defeat seldom depresses him. He has adapted himself to desert and to jungle; to open plains and to mountains; to new foes, new conditions, new weapons with the same courage and humorous endurance of difficulties and dangers as he has always shown. His staying power is a sure guarantee of final success.

"Whatever the qualities of the soldier, the value of the Army depends upon its leadership and, in the British Army, this still remains worthy of the men they lead. Whatever method may be adopted in future to officer the British Army, it must ensure the same standard of leadership and the same close relations with the soldier."

Later in the Burma Campaign, many of the administrative defects and difficulties which had beset the troops in the East were overcome or greatly minimized, e.g. by anti-malarial measures; increased and accelerated postal services; more liberal leave; increased welfare facilities and reduction in the period to be spent overseas. The consequent improvement in the morale of the troops by the end of 1943 is thus summed up in Sir George Giffard's second Despatch in November, 1944:—

"In the early days deficiencies in equipment, shortage of trained reinforcements; lack of welfare arrangements; long service overseas; inadequate leave due to lack of accommodation and transport; indifferent rations; much sickness; slow mails; apparent lack of interest at home in what was being done and endured on the Burma front; and an exaggerated opinion of the efficiency of the Japanese had combined to lower the morale and destroy the confidence of the Army. Without confidence and high morale, equipment and weapons, however good, are useless and the re-creation of these two qualities was the first task to which we had to address ourselves during the monsoon of 1943."

He was therefore able to record (at p. 30) that "The morale of the troops has reached a high level for they have shown their superiority over the Japanese," and also "The operations in this Despatch have emphasized the lessons mentioned in my first Despatch, particularly the need for first class basic training of junior leaders and rank and file; physical fitness and good discipline."

General Giffard concluded (p. 40):—

"Victory was achieved by fine leading by all Commanders; by the skill of the men in the ranks; by high courage in battle; by steady endurance under conditions of climate and health worse than almost anywhere in the world; by a determination to defeat the enemy, and by that spirit of co-operation among all ranks and arms, which alone enables an army to exert its maximum strength."

As recorded earlier in the case of the Eighth Army, the influence of the sudden changeover to offensive operations upon troops whose morale has reached a low level through a series of reverses and withdrawals is considerable. This spirit of ascendancy over the enemy, which was recorded by General Giffard in the case of the 14th Army, lasted throughout the latter phases of the operations against Japan. Nevertheless, as soon as the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the beginning of releases from the Fighting Services became known to the British troops out East, their thoughts turned, naturally perhaps, towards their home country and repatriation became uppermost in their minds. The distance from their homes and the shortage of shipping were factors which had a depressing effect upon their state of mind at this stage. This was particu-

larly strong in the case of men who had no civil employment awaiting them and who anticipated that, by the time they reached home, all the best jobs would have been filled by their more fortunate comrades released from theatres of war nearer home.

In the case of the Japanese, as with the Germans, the influence upon their morale was conversely affected by passing from superiority of numbers in the air and on the ground to parity and so on to inferiority, and from the offensive to the defensive and finally to retreat and surrender.

CHAPTER IV.—SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AFFECTING DISCIPLINE IN THE WAR, 1939–1945

Arising out of the narrative of events contained in the above chapters, the following conclusions stand out as of special significance:—

(*a*) In modern war morale is even more important than in the past, owing to the greater potential effects to be expected from external influences upon the mind of the soldier in battle. The wider range of modern weapons, especially the scope of air-power (and weapons connected with it), greatly increased the area within which troops remain exposed to potential dangers, while the speed of all movement, alternating with long periods of tension and waiting, added considerably to the nervous strain imposed upon the soldier's mentality during battle.

Field-Marshal Montgomery, whose inspiring leadership was one of the main factors in the Allied victory in North Africa and in Europe, based his methods on the belief, which he has since expressed, that "Morale is the greatest single factor in war."

(*b*) In the build-up and maintenance of morale, discipline is a primary and indispensable factor.

Owing to the spread of education, the unthinking, sheep-like form of discipline is unsuited to a modern citizen Army. Although the principle of unhesitating obedience to orders given by a superior must be firmly maintained, intelligent independence of action in certain conditions must be accepted (and encouraged in training), particularly in conditions where control is difficult, e.g. jungle warfare.

The value of drill, in which there is instinctive and cohesive response from a body of men to the order of an individual, as a medium for discipline-training and maintenance, is considerable.

(*c*) The mutual relationship between the soldier and the people tended to become closer under conditions of modern war, by reason of the greater scope for the use of scientific weapons and the wider area covered by operations, especially in the air; the increased employment of women in the services, and also the more rapid communication conferred by wireless between all parts of the country and to and from other countries.

In this war, the spirit of the people of Great Britain and especially of London, the enemy's favourite target and also the rallying point of British resistance against almost overwhelming odds, was largely reflected in the morale and discipline of the man in the ranks in times of crisis. The example set by the people in the early critical years served as a spur to his determination not to "let the side down."

(*d*) High morale and good discipline may be severely tested and strained by continual disasters, reverses, withdrawals, and heavy battle casualties, which tend gradually to undermine the confidence of men in their

leaders and in themselves, and to develop an inferiority complex in relation to the fighting efficiency of the enemy.

These qualities may also be lowered by extreme fatigue due to want of relief, rest and sleep; sickness; administrative shortages; lack of interest on the part of officers and also of the public; long absence and distance from their homes; and bad family news.

A combination of all or several of the above conditions over an extended period may result in producing such a low state of morale as to weaken the fighting capacity and discipline of troops, in times of stress or crisis, unless special measures are taken to guard against this.

The best guarantee against such a situation was proved to be:— Efficient and understanding leadership; adequate thought and care for the man's state of mind and body before, during and after battle; and intelligent and persistent interest on the part of the public and the Press in the activities and welfare of the Army, wherever situated. On no account should troops be allowed to feel that the particular campaign in which they are engaged is a "side-show" of small significance.

PART II

THE ADMINISTRATION OF DISCIPLINE

CHAPTER V.—THE ARMY ACT

(For further details see the Manual of Military Law, 1929, Part II)

The Army Act is an Act of Parliament dealing with Discipline, Courts-Martial, Enlistment and other cognate subjects. It has in itself no permanent operation but continues in force only so long as Parliament from time to time decides. In practice its operation is renewed annually on 30th April by the Army and Air Force (Annual) Act. In the event of this Annual Act being allowed for any reason to lapse, the maintenance of a Standing Army in the United Kingdom would be illegal in time of peace.

This practice of a yearly Army and Air Force Act accords with the constitutional principle of the control by Parliament of discipline, without which a Standing Army cannot be maintained. It also affords opportunities, of which considerable use is made, of amending the Army Act. Such amendments come into force from the date from which the Army Act is continued by the Annual Act.

Basically there was little change in the Army Act during the war. The amendments that were found necessary were mainly due to the introduction of Women's Services and the inter-relation between personnel of the Army and the Royal Air Force, where stationed in the same command or area—e.g. Section 39A, which was added by the Army and Air Force (Annual) Act of 1943.

The Army Act is divided into five parts, of which three are relevant to the study of Discipline, namely:—

Part I. Discipline (Crimes and Punishments, Courts-Martial, etc.).
Part IV. Supplemental Provisions as to Courts-Martial.
Part V. Application of Military Law; Saving Provisions, and Definitions.

It may be asked why this lengthy and somewhat intricate special code of law is necessary in the Army. It has already been shown in an earlier Chapter that Discipline is a primary and indispensable factor in the Army in war and therefore also in peace. It has been found in the past that this military form of discipline cannot be effectively maintained without a special code of offences and punishments and also special tribunals to administer that code.

In a fighting force, dereliction of duty cannot be treated merely as a breach of contract. The possibility of dismissal or an action for damages for breach of contract would hardly operate as a sufficient or effective deterrent on the mind of a soldier faced with battle conditions. Moreover, conduct which under the civil law is not a crime at all, e.g. insubordinate language to a superior officer, must be treated as an offence in the case of a member of the fighting forces. Again, the punishments which the civil law provides for assault would

be totally inadequate for so grave a military offence as that of "striking a superior officer."

Tribunals for the administration of this special code are necessary because civil courts have no power to try many of the offences and also because in the various foreign countries in which parts of an Army are constantly required to serve, there are no civil courts administering British law. Its own tribunals must, therefore, accompany an Army overseas. Moreover, in order that punishment may act as an immediate deterrent and example, military procedure must be more rapid and summary than the ordinary forms of law permit. It is also important from the point of view of Army discipline that those responsible for maintaining it should have vested in them the power of adjudicating upon offences and of inflicting punishments.

For these purposes, a list of crimes and a scale of punishments are contained in the Army Act—those of lesser character being suitable for summary disposal by unit or sub-unit commanders, while those of a more serious nature are for disposal by courts-martial.

Conditions of Service in the A.T.S.

Only a short description of the special Disciplinary Code of the Auxiliary Territorial Service will be given here. For fuller particulars reference is invited to the history of that Service in a separate volume of this series.

Briefly, Auxiliary Territorial Service personnel were not originally subject to Military Law, but they undertook certain obligations on enrolment, e.g. to comply with the rules and regulations laid down for their Service; to obey orders given by a superior and, in the case of volunteers, to go anywhere they might be ordered to go. Certain penalties and punishments were also included in the enrolment form, e.g. extra duties; stoppage of leave; restriction of privileges; admonition. Auxiliaries were warned at the same time that, on active service, they would become subject to Military Law.

In the early stages no difficulties were encountered in applying this somewhat indeterminate form of contract, because the original auxiliaries were all volunteers, anxious to serve and prepared to go anywhere. In consequence there was rarely, if ever, occasion to apply any code of punishments.

As, however, the Auxiliary Territorial Service increased and new types of auxiliaries, mostly non-volunteers, were admitted, the question arose as to the effect of allowing auxiliaries, who misbehaved and showed themselves unwilling to serve, to take their discharge. This question was particularly difficult in the case of those who had been employed on secret or confidential duties, since it would have been obviously unwise from the security angle to allow malcontents with confidential information to return to civil life at their pleasure.

Application of the Army Act to the A.T.S.

It was accordingly decided in 1941 under the Defence (Women's Services) Regulations to apply the Army Act in a strictly limited form. Under the terms of these regulations, auxiliaries could be held to serve against their will and become liable for charges under Section 15 of the Army Act for "absence without leave" and under Section 40 in respect of "Conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline," the word "military" being omitted before "discipline."

CHAPTER VI.—LESSER OFFENCES AND SUMMARY AND MINOR PUNISHMENTS

(*For details of these offences and punishments reference may be made to King's Regulations*, 1940 (*paras.* 582–642) *in addition to the Manual of Military Law*).

Powers of Unit Officers

When a person subject to military law was charged with an offence, his case had to be investigated without unnecessary delay. The first officer to deal with the case was ordinarily the company, etc., commander, who, if he were satisfied that the offence was one which he was competent and authorized to try (King's Regulations 568 and 592), would dispose of the case. Otherwise he reserved it for the commanding officer.

Powers of a Commanding Officer

In the same way, the commanding officer would take steps without delay to dispose of the case either by dismissing the charge, if he was satisfied that it should not be proceeded with, or by dealing with the case summarily within his powers, or by remanding the case for trial by court-martial.

Broadly speaking, a commanding officer's powers were limited as under:—

(*a*) He could not inflict punishment upon an officer, a warrant officer or a civilian.

(*b*) In the case of a non-commissioned officer, he could order a deduction from ordinary pay or award a reprimand or severe reprimand, or admonition.

(*c*) In the case of soldiers, the following were the authorized awards [*see* King's Regulations 587 (as amended)]:—

(i) Detention—Maximum 28 days.

(ii) Fines—For drunkenness only, on an increasing scale reaching a maximum £2.

(iii) Pay deductions—Maximum £4 except in the case of arms, clothing and necessaries, when the maximum was £10 [K.R. 1940, para 587(*a*)(iii)].

[In all cases under (*b*) and (*c*) (i) to (iii) above, the soldier had the right to elect trial by court-martial instead of, and prior to, the commanding officer's award, where forfeitures of pay were involved.]

(iv) Confinement to barracks—Maximum 14 days.

(v) Extra guards and piquets—For offences on these duties.

(vi) Admonition.

In certain cases more than one of the above punishments could be awarded together.

Special Active Service Punishments

In addition to the above peace-time punishments the following were awarded

by a commanding officer for offences committed on active service (for definition of "on active service" *see* Army Act, Section 189):—

(*d*) Field punishment—Maximum 28 days.
(*e*) Forfeiture of pay—Maximum 28 days.

In the case of field punishment, it was no longer permissible for the offender to be tied to a stationary object. He could, however, be confined in fetters or handcuffs or both (or straps or ropes in lieu) and be directed to hard labour as if under sentence of imprisonment with hard labour. It was specially laid down that this punishment would be carried out in such a way as to avoid causing injury or leaving any permanent mark upon the offender. It is emphasized that the circumstances justifying these punishments were defined as "on active service" and not "in time of war."

As regards forfeiture of pay on active service the award of field punishment involved forfeiture of pay for the number of days for which the field punishment was carried out. The total number of days' pay forfeited was not permitted to exceed 28, but forfeiture might follow on as a separate award after the conclusion of the maximum number of days' field punishment, thereby considerably increasing the power of punishment in the hands of a commanding officer on active service.

Administration of Discipline in the A.T.S.

The district commander was responsible for Discipline generally in respect of all Auxiliary Territorial personnel in his district. No other officer, except Auxiliary Territorial officers, had any power of punishment over auxiliaries.

Army officers and soldiers were not required to salute Auxiliary Territorial Service officers but were expected to do so as a matter of courtesy. It was usual for auxiliaries to salute male officers of the unit with which the former were serving, but it was rare for soldiers of such a unit to salute their Auxiliary Territorial Service officers.

The most common offences were absence without leave, theft and cases of joint disciplinary misdemeanours with soldiers. In the case of theft, it was rare for the offenders to be handed over to the civil courts for trial, with the result that the normal military punishment proved inadequate as a deterrent against repeated offences. In the case of joint offences with soldiers, these showed up a weakness in the Auxiliary Territorial Service code of discipline in that the soldier offender was liable to a much heavier penalty than was the auxiliary for the same offence.

Scale of Punishments in the A.T.S.

The scale of punishments was restricted. The maximum summary punishments awardable to auxiliaries were:

14 days C.B. and 14 days forfeiture of pay. In addition to these "extra duties," and, in the case of damage to Government Property, a special award of "stoppages of pay" up to a maximum of £4 could be imposed.

N.C.Os. were liable to: admonition; reprimand; severe reprimand; and forfeiture of pay.

A sentence by court-martial could increase the forfeiture of pay to 28 days and could award, in the case of N.C.Os., reduction in rank, or discharge. Officers and warrant officers were liable to be dismissed by court-martial.

CHAPTER VII.—COURTS-MARTIAL

(It may be pointed out here that the title "Courts-Martial" has no connection with "Martial" meaning "appertaining to war" or with "Martial Law" which indicates the suspension of civil law and the government of the country by military tribunals of its own Army. The term "Courts-Martial" should more properly be written "Courts-Marshal" since they derived originally from the title of the Earl Marshal, whose duty it was to marshal the Army and who sat as a member of the "Councils of War" or "Marshal Courts.")

When a commanding officer had decided that an offence was outside his powers as laid down in King's Regulations and the Army Act or when a soldier exercised his right of electing to be tried by court-martial, the commanding officer had to apply to higher authority either for summary disposal, where applicable in the case of an officer or warrant officer, or for trial by court-martial.

Persons liable for Trial

The persons who were subject to be tried by courts-martial as officers or soldiers were carefully defined in the Army Act. In addition to members of His Majesty's Military Forces (including the Auxiliary Territorial Service), civilians accompanying troops on active service were also liable to be tried by courts-martial, except foreign civilians in their own country.

In the case of the Auxiliary Territorial Service, an offender of any rank could elect trial by court-martial, in lieu of a summary award of forfeiture or stoppages of pay, but no auxiliary could be sent for trial by field general court-martial unless she so elected.

Offences triable and Punishments which could be awarded

The offences which could be tried by courts-martial were clearly set out in the Army Act, Sections 4 to 41, and the scale of punishments that could be awarded was shown in Section 44.

With a view to familiarizing the soldier with the special obligations which he had undertaken and the particular penalties to which he was liable, it was laid down in King's Regulations (para. 531) that certain sections of the Army Act should be read out every three months in each unit.

In order to fulfil its object, military law provided that the penalties awardable were heaviest when the offences were either those committed on active service, which might endanger the safety of an Army, the success of operations etc., or offences which otherwise struck at the very root of discipline.

Among the former type may be classed:—desertion on active service; cowardice in the face of the enemy; shamefully abandoning a garrison, post, guard; treacherous communication with the enemy, and, when acting as sentinel, quitting, sleeping on, or being drunk on, his post.

Among the latter may be included:—mutiny (i.e. premeditated collective

indiscipline); striking a superior officer in the execution of his office; and disobeying, in such a manner as to show wilful defiance of authority, a lawful command given personally by his superior officer in the execution of his office.

So far as practicable, every offence was categorized under the specific section of the Army Act, i.e. Sections 4 to 39, to which it appeared most properly to belong.

In addition, Section 40 provided that any conduct or neglect, prejudicial to good order and military discipline, but which was not otherwise covered by any specific section of the Act, was an offence, and Section 41 dealt with civil offences committed by a soldier for which he could be tried as such by court-martial. Certain offences, however, e.g. treason, murder, manslaughter, felony and rape, had, in the United Kingdom, to be tried by a civil court. On active service or where no civil court competent to deal with the offence was located within 100 miles, these offences could be tried by court-martial. It was an accepted principle to send for trial by a civil court any offence committed by a soldier which affected the person or property of a civilian. This, however, was not strictly adhered to during the war. There was a provision under the Army Act by which, if a soldier charged with a civil offence were tried and acquitted by a court-martial, he was still legally liable to trial by a civil court for the same offence, but this provision had not been applied, in practice, for many years.

Infliction of Punishments by Courts-Martial

From early times very severe penalties have been inflicted for offences committed in time of war, because of the serious consequences that might result under conditions of active service, especially with an Army in the Field. After the 1914–18 war, considerable political pressure had been brought to bear with a view to abolishing the power vested in courts-martial of inflicting the death penalty.

By 1929 this penalty remained operative in peace-time only in the case of mutiny, and in war for crimes of mutiny, treachery, cowardice, desertion, shamefully surrendering or abandoning a garrison or post, or a sentinel quitting, or sleeping on, his post. In 1930 the death penalty for desertion was abolished.

The punishment of flogging survived the First World War, but was abolished shortly afterwards, and the severity of Field Punishment No. 1, awardable to offenders on active service, was reduced by removing the liability of being tied to a fixed object.

The scale of punishments awardable by court-martial was laid down in Section 44 of the Army Act. The more common forms of punishment awarded in peace-time, i.e. detention and imprisonment, were in themselves unsuitable for active service conditions, since not only did these necessitate the removal of the offender from the front line but also a further waste of manpower was entailed in guards over the prisoners.

With a view to overcoming this objection, a system of suspending sentences was embodied in the Army Act (Section 57A (1)) after the 1914–18 war, which enabled the military authorities to suspend sentences of penal servitude, imprisonment and detention, so that the soldier continued to serve with his unit. His sentence was reviewed periodically, taking into consideration his conduct since the date of award of the sentence. This system is more fully dealt with in Chapter VIII below.

Types of Courts-Martial and their powers

In peace-time two types of courts-martial existed, i.e. the General and the District. The former consisted of not less than five officers each with not less than three years' commissioned service, and of whom four had to be of the rank of captain or higher. It had power to try an officer or soldier for any offence and to award any punishment contained in the Army Act. A District Court consisted of not less than three officers with two years' service or more. It could not try an officer or award death or penal servitude, and was subject to certain other limitations (*see* Army Act, Section 182 (2)).

For purposes of war, owing to the need for a more summary form of procedure and a more rapid execution of punishment on active service, it was found necessary to introduce the Field General Court-Martial when conditions made it impracticable to convene a General Court-Martial. Although more elastic and less restricted by legal technicalities, thereby allowing of more speedy punishment of an offender as an example to others, the proceedings of a Field General Court-Martial followed closely the procedure laid down for General Courts-Martial. An instance of the advantage of this Court was during the retreat from Mons in 1914 when a soldier deserted and was caught in hiding in civilian clothes at 8.15 a.m. on 6th September. Trial by Field General Court-Martial and confirmation of proceedings followed without delay and the sentence of death was carried out at 7 a.m. on 8th September, less than 48 hours after his arrest.

One special proviso was made regarding the award of the death sentence in the case of Field General Courts-Martial; the Court had to be unanimous in their verdict, whereas, in the case of a General Court-Martial, a two-thirds majority vote was sufficient.

Convening of Courts-Martial

The difficulties experienced by commanders and their staffs in war in dealing with courts-martial, their convening, procedure, and disposal of proceedings, deserve full consideration in view of their many other, and more immediate, commitments.

During the First World War, selected lawyers were appointed to headquarters of formations as "court-martial officers" to assist convening officers in the preparation of cases and to act as prosecutors at trials. After the war, this practice was extended and put on a regular basis by the formation of a Military Department of the Judge-Advocate-General's Office, manned by officers with legal qualifications, to carry out these and other legal duties. When the Second World War came, these officers were available for posting to headquarters of commands at home and to G.H.Q. and other headquarters overseas, where they gave valuable assistance to commanders and their staffs in legal matters.

Procedure

Full details of the procedure carried out at courts-martial are contained in the Army Act and Rules of Procedure. These are amended from time to time to keep pace with modern social conditions and practices.

Two points may be specially mentioned as affecting the citizen soldier, who comprises the bulk of the Army in war:—

(*a*) There is a popular fallacy that courts-martial are held *in camera* and that the public are never allowed to know what takes place in the proceedings.

Courts-martial are normally open to the public and the Press, in exactly the same way as civil courts. Only in cases where the identity of witnesses and the evidence given may have to be kept from the public, or where in some other way the interests of individuals or the State have to be preserved, are the public and Press excluded. This inherent right of trial *in camera* is, however, also vested in civil courts for the same purposes.

(*b*) The question of the grant of legal aid to soldiers had frequently come up for consideration in view of certain distinctions which existed, owing to the difference in circumstances, between practice in civil courts and at courts-martial. No provision was made under military law for grant of legal aid to persons tried by courts-martial, though in practice defending officers were always made available and during the war it was frequently possible to provide officers with legal qualifications to assist the accused in the preparation and conduct of their defence.

Before the war, a Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice Oliver had made certain recommendations to the effect that in suitable cases legal aid should be provided on lines similar to, and with safeguards comparable with, cases in which such legal aid is provided for civilians who are prosecuted. These recommendations had been approved in general principle by the Government in 1939, but the war supervened before effect could be given to them.

In practice, however, the proposals were implemented very effectively during the war by virtue of the large number of trained barristers and solicitors serving with the Forces all over the world, whose services were available free. Further consideration to the application of these proposals has been given since the end of hostilities.

Special Difficulties and Measures in War

In peace-time, part of the duties of every officer was to make himself acquainted with the Manual of Military Law and the King's Regulations. He was also required to attend courts-martial, at first as an officer under instruction and later to sit as a member.

Senior officers were required, in their turn on the roster of duties, to preside at courts-martial. So far as was possible, knowledge and experience were thus ensured.

In war, and especially on active service, conditions made the maintenance of this system difficult. The number of officers trained in, and with practical experience of, Military Law was comparatively few and, with a vastly expanding Army, time was short in which to include such training in the curriculum of unit or brigade training. A certain number of specially selected officers was attached to formation headquarters to supplement the cadre of Regular, or otherwise already trained, officers, but in view of the enormous increase of the Army in the first two years of the war and the numerous and multifarious duties to be learnt by an officer in a modern army, the diversion of more officers to these static duties was perhaps not to be expected. Nevertheless, it became clear, for the reasons indicated, that some immediate action

must be taken if the court-martial system was to be maintained at its pre-war efficient level—an extremely important factor in the "morale" of a citizen Army.

It is the misfortune of a nation which becomes involved periodically in a major war, but which maintains in peace-time only a small standing Army, that the early years of a war should invariably bring in their wake two overloading factors, viz. serious reverses overseas, with heavy losses in men and material owing to the enemy's superior numbers and preparedness, and, at the same time, vast expansion of the Army at home. This was the situation in the British Army in 1939–40. It produced the following results affecting discipline and courts-martial:—

(*a*) The men's morale was low and the weaker elements were tempted to find means of escaping from being sent overseas.
(*b*) As the Army expanded, large numbers of fighting formations were kept at home undergoing training and this necessitated keeping other bodies of "static" troops to serve and maintain them. Training establishments also increased the military population.
(*c*) The intake under the National Service Act included numbers of youths of bad or indifferent character.
(*d*) The large influx to the Army of women, whose duties brought them into close contact with the men at all hours of the day and night, introduced a new and potentially disturbing factor.
(*e*) The very large number of technical units included senior officers with high qualifications for their technical duties but who, nevertheless, had little administrative or legal knowledge or experience.

It was the vast numbers of "static" personnel who presented these administrative problems rather than the field formations whose time was fully occupied in mobile training. The hours of duty, and therefore of leisure, of the former were more regular and hence their opportunities for getting into trouble, especially of a non-military nature, were greater.

To deal with those cases which involved trial by courts-martial, it was clearly impracticable to call upon field formations to provide the members of the Court, as they were fully occupied in operational duties. This especially applied to the president, owing to the comparatively small number of senior Regular officers remaining with units. It soon became evident that the appointment of non-Regular, inexperienced officers as presidents of courts-martial led to unsatisfactory results. Many Regular officers were serving with training, or other special establishments under War Office control and it was specifically forbidden for such officers to be taken from their strictly legitimate work for other administrative or legal duties.

Permanent Presidents of Courts-Martial

It was accordingly decided to introduce a system of permanent presidents of courts-martial. It was clear that there must be a number of officers who, for reasons of age or some physical disability, were not suitable for more active duties but who would be eminently fitted to sit as presidents of courts-martial.

In March, 1941, five permanent presidents were appointed, as an experimental measure, to the establishment of General Headquarters, Home Forces, and attached to formation headquarters as necessary. In July of the same year, this number was increased to 15 and in November to 20. This experiment

proved eminently successful and in 1942 the establishment was increased to 36, at which number it remained until the end of the war.

In 1943, with the building up of 21 Army Group in England, 15 of the permanent presidents were transferred to the establishment of Group Headquarters and the remaining 21 were posted to the establishment of the various static headquarters in Great Britain.

The general consensus of opinion at headquarters of commands at home was that there were not enough of these permanent presidents. The effects of their introduction were greater efficiency and rapidity in the disposal of courts-martial, uniformity in standards of punishment throughout formations, and considerable benefit to junior officers who sat as members. It also lessened the work of "A" staff officers at headquarters of commands, because of the absence of errors in the Court proceedings.

The long-term result may have been that a number of Regular officers went through the war without sitting on a court-martial, thereby lessening their knowledge of this important duty for the future, but this temporary drawback was deemed at the time by those most concerned to have been offset by the considerable advantages gained.

When 21 Army Group landed in Normandy in June, 1944, its 15 permanent presidents accompanied the rear echelons and were found of great value, as they relieved fighting units of the responsibility of providing senior officers as presidents of field general courts-martial.

It was found necessary to appoint younger and fitter officers for these duties (which were carried out under battle conditions), as compared with the officers employed with 21 Army Group in England.

Administrative Difficulties and Delays

There were also considerable administrative difficulties in bringing offenders to trial without delay, in spite of the simplified procedure inherent in field general courts-martial. This delay was unavoidable under conditions of mobile warfare owing to the difficulty of carrying out investigation, convening Courts, and producing witnesses, and also owing to the severe strain imposed upon units, by having to provide, in the midst of battle, suitable officers to serve as members of Courts. It was often the case that the essence of an offence (e.g. desertion in order to avoid active operations) was such that the evidence was only available in units which were themselves engaged in active operations. In consequence large numbers of men were held by units pending trial—an embarrassment to units and bad for morale.

In North Africa, in order to overcome this difficulty, the practice was established of holding offenders awaiting trial at Reinforcement Training Depots. This system, though it relieved units of their embarrassment, nevertheless proved unsatisfactory, owing to difficulties of segregation and safeguarding, and the ill-effect upon the morale of young reinforcements arriving there.

In the Western Desert in 1942 and in Italy in 1943, Courts-Martial Holding Centres were accordingly set up in which men awaiting trial were held and at which permanent presidents remained in session. Members were detailed from forward units for a week or a fortnight at a time. These Centres were located near the headquarters of an area, whose commander could convene courts-martial and where necessary confirm proceedings.

The same difficulties and delays were also experienced to a somewhat intensified degree in 21 Army Group after their landing in Normandy in 1944. It soon became apparent that a special unit would have to be set up to deal with the problem of the guarding and disposal of offenders. This was first done by establishing a special Holding Unit and within five days of its institution 135 men were held there awaiting trial. Later, in September, 1944, a Court-Martial Centre was established with a special war establishment and capable of holding 150 soldiers and designed to try 100 cases a week. Permanent presidents and later a member of the Judge-Advocate-General's staff were attached to the Centre, which had the following main functions:—

(*a*) To relieve units in the line of paper work connected with trials.
(*b*) To relieve units of the responsibility of guarding soldiers under arrest awaiting trial.
(*c*) To hasten the disposal of cases.
(*d*) To hold Courts in permanent session.

In reports from overseas commands stress was laid upon the importance of care in selection of accommodation and of the adequacy of the staff for these Centres. It should be practicable to segregate the various categories (e.g. awaiting trial, awaiting promulgation and awaiting admission to penal establishments); the staff must be carefully selected and adequate to deal with any mass insubordination that may be engineered by bad characters within the Centre.

(NOTE.—The duties of the Special Training Units and of the Corps of Military Police during the war are dealt with separately in later chapters.)

Statistics

Full particulars of courts-martial convictions during the war years, both at home and overseas, are shown at Appendices I to III. In the case of Auxiliary Territorial Service personnel, 59, including one officer, were convicted by field general court-martial during the first three years (1941–43). Of these, one officer and 27 auxiliaries were charged under Section 15, the remaining 31 under Section 40 of the Army Act. A gradual increase was shown in these figures, which rose from 7 in 1941 to 35 in 1943. During the following three years, 89, including 7 officers, were convicted, of whom 47 were charged under Section 15, and the remainder under Section 40 of the Army Act.

CHAPTER VIII.—REVIEW AND SUSPENSION OF SENTENCES

Under the provisions of the Army Act (Section 57A, as amplified by the instructions on pages 795 to 808 of the Manual of Military Law), sentences of penal servitude, imprisonment with or without hard labour, or detention awarded by courts-martial, could be suspended by a superior military authority, either before the committal of the soldier or after. Although such suspension of sentence was usually made in connection with purely military offences, it was applicable to any sentence awarded by a court-martial.

All sentences awarded by courts-martial and which were in execution were subject to periodical review by a superior military authority (Army Council Instruction 430 of 1921). The first review was carried out 42 days after committal and subsequent reviews took place at intervals not exceeding six months. At each review the suspension or the remission of whole or part of the sentence still to be served was considered.

Suspension of sentence meant that, although a soldier had been tried by court-martial, found guilty and sentenced, the part of the sentence which he had not yet served was held in abeyance for the time being, and the man was returned to his unit for normal duty. Sentences under suspension were also reviewed at intervals not exceeding three months, and the result of such review was mainly determined by the conduct of the man himself while under suspended sentence. If he had been of good behaviour for a reasonable period, the suspended sentence might be remitted. If, on the other hand, his conduct had been unsatisfactory and troublesome, the sentence might be put into execution or left in suspension and put into execution for a further offence, when it might be directed to run either concurrently or consecutively with the new award.

The object of suspension of sentence was twofold. Firstly it enabled the commander to effect a saving in manpower, by returning to duty those soldiers who, after serving part of their sentences, were considered fit to return to their commands, in order to show by their conduct that they intended to make good. Secondly, it gave to the soldier a chance to rehabilitate himself. The power of suspension of sentence also placed in the hands of the commander an additional means of clemency, since he was able to grant to the soldier what amounted to a conditional release from prison or detention.

Soon after the beginning of the war, and with these objects in view, it was decided to release either by suspension or remission of sentence all soldiers whose unexpired sentences of imprisonment or detention at that time did not exceed three months. It was, at the same time, emphasized that the powers of suspension conferred by Section 57A of the Army Act should be used to the fullest practicable extent during the war by all superior military authorities in respect of sentences passed upon soldiers by courts-martial, so that these soldiers could be used, where possible, in the theatre of war in which they were sentenced.

As the war progressed, and the Army expanded, the numbers of court-martial cases increased very largely, and the burden of reviewing sentences became very considerable. Partly for this reason, and partly because sentences

were not suspended, large numbers of soldiers under sentence had to be sent home from overseas to complete their sentences owing to the difficulty of accommodating and guarding them locally. The review of all such cases was carried out, after the receipt of the necessary reports and documents from overseas, centrally in the War Office with a view to ensuring speedy disposal and uniformity of treatment. The commandants of military prisons and detention barracks were called upon to submit recommendations periodically to the appropriate reviewing authorities, for the suspension of sentences being served by offenders in their charge, if in their opinion suspension was warranted.

Subsequently, as overseas commands became established, it was considered undesirable, for the reasons indicated in Chapter VII above, that men who had committed offences while serving overseas should be sent home to serve their sentences. Whenever practicable, therefore, the soldier was retained in the overseas command in which he was serving if it was considered that speedy suspension of sentence would be justified. With this end in view, the appropriate authorities exercised their powers under Sections 58 and 64 of the Army Act, so that certain offenders did not need to be transferred to the United Kingdom to undergo their sentences. In cases where it appeared that early suspension would not be justified, soldiers under sentence were returned to the United Kingdom to serve their sentences in the normal manner.

A converse procedure, by which a number of men undergoing sentence in military and civil prisons in the United Kingdom were released on suspended sentence and despatched overseas, was tried as an experiment but was later discarded as being uneconomic in the long run.

This was the situation up to 1944.

When 21 Army Group was despatched to Europe it was the policy to hold all soldiers sentenced to detention, imprisonment or penal servitude with 21 Army Group Penal Establishments or with units. Unfortunately, owing to battle conditions, it was not found possible to establish these penal establishments overseas for some time and approximately 100 serious cases had to be evacuated to the United Kingdom.

For the same reason, the normal system of review was soon found to be unworkable in 21 Army Group, and a special Review of Sentence Board was set up by Headquarters, Second Army, in the first instance, for the review of court-martial sentences. Many of these cases involved sentences of 3 to 5 years penal servitude, mainly for desertion, and it was the policy that the first 2 years of such sentences should be served in a military prison. Some of the cases, however, were the outcome of battle exhaustion arising from long and close contact with the enemy.

One of the main functions of this special Review of Sentence Board was to ensure that the two objects of suspension were achieved; their task, therefore, included the selection, from soldiers under sentence, of men who should quickly be returned to fighting units. For this purpose the Review of Sentences Board examined by means of personal interview all cases in which soldiers had been sentenced for desertion and kindred offences after three months of the sentence had been served.

The Board was assisted by a psychiatrist and was empowered to suspend sentence in suitable cases and to return the soldier to front-line duties. Out of 596 cases reviewed by this initial Board, 435 were returned to the line and of these only 53 failed a second time.

Owing to the successful result achieved by this Board, further Boards were

set up for the same purpose in 21 Army Group, and later on in other commands overseas.

The technique adopted by these Boards was briefly as follows:—

Two senior staff officers and a psychiatrist interviewed each man personally when his case came up for review three months after being sentenced. The man's documents were carefully studied, and a questionnaire* which had been previously prepared was produced for the Board's perusal. The president dealt with military issues, the vice-president with domestic affairs, and the psychiatrist with the psychological and medical aspect of the case. These interviews were made as informal as possible to enable the Board to form, by direct contact with the man, an intuitive conclusion concerning him. Added to this, the information contained in the questionnaire filled in by the prison officer covered the main aspects of the man's life both civil and military, e.g. the chief traits of his character; his intelligence and education level; influences in his life affecting development of his personality, and also the commission of his offence; and any medical or psychiatric factors in his life or that of his family that might have a bearing on the case.

The intelligent and conscientious completion of this questionnaire was of the utmost importance, particularly from the psychiatrist's point of view.

In assessing the personality of offenders, these cases were classified in five groups:—

(1) *Adequate basic personalities.*
In such cases there was no suggestion of character defect and their offences were due to some temporary lapse.

(2) *Immature personalities.*
e.g. Youths unduly dependent upon parents, etc., who had not attained the stature or independence of manhood. Their morale was more easily broken and they were easily led astray.

(3) *Inadequate personalities.*
Those who showed inability to react strongly to danger or other stimulus, and usually had a history of neurotic traits.

(4) *Mentally dull.*
Those of such low intelligence that they were unable to derive full benefit from military or technical training.

(5) *Psychopaths.*
Men lacking in moral sense who had never shown satisfactory adaptation to any of the other groups of which they had been members, or tolerance of discipline. Their histories revealed frequent previous crimes and they showed no signs of shame or repentance.

From the military aspect, discharge from the service was the only satisfactory solution in such cases.

Of the first 2,000 cases investigated, the distribution to groups was as under:

Adequate basic personalities	864
Immature personalities	428
Inadequate personalities	506
Mentally dull	96
Psychopaths	106

* See Appendix IV.

In considering the military aspect, the Board had to make an assessment of the stress, due to battle or other conditions, operating up to and at the time of the offence, culminating perhaps in the death of some special "pal" or the loss of part of the man's sub-unit.

This stress may operate alone or may be additional to some other powerful influence affecting the man's mind, e.g. domestic affairs, unfaithfulness of wife, or serious illness of near relatives. Other potent causes of delinquency are inadequacy of training; transfers from one unit to another with lack of identification with the new unit and consequent loss of morale.

When considering the disciplinary aspects of punishment as opposed to suspension of sentences, the influence not merely upon the individual offender but upon the Army as a whole has to be taken into account. The Board expressed the view that, in the case of undisciplined soldiers, a period of from three to nine months' detention often served a useful purpose in instilling discipline but that beyond that period the man's anti-social tendencies tended rather to deteriorate than to improve.

Of the 2,000 cases referred to above, 75 per cent were released under suspension of sentence after their first interview. Of the remaining 25 per cent, more than half were released on a second interview. Only 5 per cent of the whole total were found to be irredeemable delinquents.

Summary

This new approach to the punishment and rehabilitation of offenders proved a valuable asset from the manpower point of view and also from the individual morale standpoint. It was based upon the assumption that human actions indicate the mental state from which they spring and that personality and environment are the chief factors affecting that mental state. The full investigation of these two factors was therefore adopted as an essential preliminary to arriving at a decision on the correct disposal, and also on the most expeditious method of rehabilitation, of each individual offender.

PART III

CRIME IN WAR-TIME

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, consideration was given to the problem of making the punishment fit the crime, based on the general assumption that human actions indicate the mental state from which they spring.

It will be remembered that a detailed study of the individual's character, personality and local environment at the time of the offence was carried out *after* he had been found guilty of an offence, and from this the Review of Sentence Board, which included a psychiatrist, endeavoured to decide upon the most appropriate degree of punishment, or other corrective action, in each case. The result of this selective study was to classify all offenders under certain groups, more or less in accordance with their liability, or capacity for resistance, to crime.

This method was of estimable value in its proper sphere of correction of the individual delinquent, but it had little or no material influence upon the conduct of others or the incidence of crime. Had it been possible to carry out some such comprehensive investigation into each man's character and antecedents, at the time of joining the Army (from 1939 onwards), a similar classification into suitable groups might have been evolved and special consideration, posting, etc., applied from the start to those types showing signs of criminal or subversive tendencies.

In war-time, however, owing to urgency and the large numbers involved, it had never been found possible to carry out more than a cursory examination of each man's body on joining the Army. This often left weaknesses undiscovered. It was considered equally impracticable, without a very large staff, to carry out a thorough investigation of every man's mental state, yet anything less was thought to be of little value and largely unreliable, because most of the information would have to be obtained from the man himself.

However, as the war progressed and the science of psychiatry became further developed and appreciated, methods of selection with the aid of psychiatric practice, which had been rejected before the war, were tried out, with the result that in July, 1942, the General Service Corps intake was introduced. From then onwards, all recruits were subjected to a series of intelligence and aptitude tests and about 14 per cent were, in addition, referred for psychiatric investigation. But by this time, as a distinguished psychiatrist-consultant expressed it, "too many horses had already left the stable."

In order, therefore, to discover the causes which led to the prevalence of the various crimes during the late war and also their possible remedies, it is necessary to examine the factors affecting crime and their relation to its incidence at different stages of the war.

CHAPTER IX.—FACTORS AFFECTING CRIME IN WAR-TIME

Personal Factors

Before the war, the standard of behaviour in the Army had been comparatively easy to control and maintain. The numbers were restricted; each individual was carefully selected both physically and mentally; all were volunteers and in most cases anxious to become and remain good soldiers; those who failed to attain the grade physically, mentally or morally were liable to be discharged.

On the outbreak of war (and subsequently), the periodical calls-up resulted in large-scale recruitments. Each included a cross-section of almost every class and creed of the community from which, however, many of the more highly educated and intelligent had been reserved for industry. The call-up men were not volunteers and many had little or no wish to serve; included amongst them were inevitably a percentage of criminals, semi-criminals and otherwise unsuitable individuals, who would not have been accepted, or at least would not have been retained, in peace-time. It is not, however, a sound solution of this problem in war-time to dismiss a man for misbehaviour, since this would invite criminality as an easy means of escaping liability to serve. At the same time these undesirable characters, even though in a comparatively small minority, are capable of having a marked influence for crime upon their companions, particularly upon the weaker elements, and especially in the stress of war when the morale of the men is low through reverses, heavy casualties, and sickness.

It will be recalled from the figures given earlier (in Chapter VIII, page 37) that the percentage of actual offenders who failed to respond to the corrective measures adopted in the first 2,000 cases brought under investigation by the Review of Sentence Board did not exceed 5 per cent. It is probable, however, that there is always a further percentage of hardened criminals who, while inciting others to commit crimes, escape being brought to trial themselves by sheer cunning and experience. Even so, the total percentage is relatively small and it may be wondered why the influence of this "select" and comparatively insignificant body of men upon the remaining well-ordered members in a unit should be considered important.

Generally speaking, war has a certain unbalancing effect upon an individual brought into the Army from civil life. For the majority of men it means a complete change of environment, which affects different individuals in different ways. Some are easily adaptable to their new surroundings; others, without any real experience of life as members of a community are less at home and, in most cases, each individual's reactions are bound to be influenced by the knowledge that whereas in civil life, if he were unhappy in his employment, he could leave and try his hand elsewhere, in the Army in war he must stay and make the best of things.

It is a known psychological truth that men in groups think, act and react otherwise than would each individual of the group if left to his own devices

in similar conditions. Their mental fusion produces a combined personality differing from that of any one of them. The inculcation of group life and spirit in each individual, perhaps for the first time in his life, demands that he should fit in his personality with others, and that he should control his individual tendencies in accordance with interests applicable to the group, or perhaps with the assertive influence of some leader.

Where for any reason there is lack of this community of interest it has been found that in neither the individual nor the group as a whole is full power or capacity given proper scope. The value of team-work, of "playing for the side," and to the will of the captain, is readily understood by any individual who has played regularly as a member of a team at football, hockey, cricket, etc. So, too, in the Army the greatest efficiency, the highest type of morale and discipline, and the greatest contentment, are to be found where each man is so imbued with the spirit of his organization that he has come to believe that his own interests and those of his unit are one and the same.

The factors, which go to create and maintain a high or low state of morale amongst troops in war-time, have already been set out at Part I, and more fully in the separate volume on "Morale" in this series. These same factors have a similar influence in the creation of an antagonistic or sympathetic attitude, as the case may be, towards crime, ill-discipline or subversive behaviour generally. Because of the unpreparedness of the nation's resources and the smallness of the Standing Army and Royal Air Force in peace-time, the conditions in which the civilian takes his place in the ranks of the British Army in the earlier years of a war are more conducive to low morale, discontent and maladjustment than would otherwise be the case. There are, therefore, inevitably a number of controlling influences operating in different directions and with equal force within a unit, with the result that a state of mental instability and stress is produced in certain types of individuals. In this state, before it becomes chronic, it is reasonably simple by correct treatment and understanding on the part of the man's superiors, and also on the part of the right kind of companion, to bring him back to contentment and normal standards of behaviour. At the same time, a man in this pliable state may equally be influenced by the few chronic grumblers and ringleaders in discontent, who are always to be found in every community, to join them in some subversive action, though not necessarily at first in spirit. It has been observed that in this way mental stress and maladjustment, if not discovered and remedied early, often lead to chronic discontent, disaffection and active delinquency, and thus gradually a period, if not a career, of crime may be embarked upon by individuals who are not criminally inclined by nature.

It is specially important that the individual soldier should be made to feel that his officers are approachable, sympathetic, and competent to advise on matters affecting family problems, leave, and other personal matters.

Where the men's superiors are keen observers and judges of character and are also in close touch with their men and their home problems, this inclination towards criminal tendencies in an otherwise well-behaved soldier will be quickly observed, and persuasive or other remedial measures instituted to check its growth and eventually to overcome it. If, however, appropriate action is not taken to control such subversive feelings, it has been found that the incidence of crime and indiscipline may increase with alarming proportions whenever opportunity offers in the shape of idleness, lack of welfare amenities, discomfort, fatigue, and in battle, serious or continuous reverses, continuous air-bombing,

heavy casualties, etc.; in fact in those conditions in which the men's morale is liable to suffer deterioration.

Environment

In general terms, the influence of environment upon the incidence of crime in war is perhaps easier to appreciate. The prevalence of certain types of crime, e.g. desertion and civil or sexual offences, is largely dependent upon the existence of conditions favourable to the commission of those offences. Moreover, the old adage that "idleness is chief mistress of vices all" is especially true of conditions in war-time. Whenever fighting is continuous, and particularly in operations which are being successfully conducted, it has been found that the incidence of serious crime diminishes. The converse is also true. Similarly in the case of units billeted behind the line near to large towns or cities, it may be expected that, during long spells of inactivity, offences such as drunkenness and insubordination will tend to increase.

During the late war, the environment of troops differed widely according to their location in the United Kingdom or in the various overseas theatres and garrisons, e.g. United Kingdom in 1940, in 1942 and 1944; in Egypt and North Africa when near to Cairo and Alexandria or in Cyrenaica or Tripoli, or during the various withdrawals in the desert; in Sicily and Italy; in Tobruk and in the final victorious advance; in the withdrawals through the jungles of Burma and Malaya with their hidden dangers and difficulties of movement; India (and the adjoining Eastern theatres generally) with its distance from home, its postal delays, its lack of welfare amenities and of European feminine society.

Each theatre had its separate and special problems and, in each case, local environment played a considerable part in influencing the minds of the troops against, or towards, the commission of crimes.

CHAPTER X.—STATISTICS OF CRIME

The use of statistics to show increases or decreases, progress or otherwise, in some particular industry or in scientific or health research can be of considerable value. Mere figures themselves cannot, however, be taken literally as a true indication of progress or setback. In order to derive valuable lessons or conclusions from statistics, it is necessary for all contemporaneous and relative influences to be taken into consideration.

As has already been shown in an earlier chapter, discipline and morale are liable to fluctuation in war-time according to the mental and physical state of the men at the time, the quality of the leadership, the efficiency or otherwise of the man-management on the part of officers and N.C.Os., and various other factors. Many of these same influences may cause similar fluctuations in the incidence of crime, and, without careful consideration of these and other relevant factors existing at the time, no real value can be derived from a study of the bare figures.

For the same reason, care has to be exercised in making a comparison between the incidence of crime in one war and that in another; or between the crime figures appertaining to one Army theatre of war, and those of another Army theatre. Where similar conditions do not obtain in each case, or where the figures apply to different periods, very careful consideration must be given to the varying factors. Difficulties also arise in attempts to cover statistically the whole field of crime and the administration of punishments. The less serious the form of crime, the lower the tribunal capable of disposing of the offences, and hence the wider the possible divergence in standards of administration and results. The treatment of minor offences must necessarily vary within units according to the sternness of the unit's discipline, the policy of the commanding officer and the prevalence of crime locally. A special factor also for consideration is whether a unit has been frequently employed actively in the forward areas (where the incidence of minor offences has been generally found to be low), or in comparative idleness in Lines of Communication areas. Actual numbers of crimes within units month by month could only be obtained by detailed research in record offices. These would not, however, indicate the relevant and contemporaneous factors affecting the incidence of crime, which could only be gauged by a reference to each unit's war diary.

On the other hand, only a relatively small proportion of offences ultimately lead to courts-martial. Moreover, the process by which a man is brought to trial under active service conditions may result in considerable delay between the actual commission of the crime and final conviction. For this reason, court-martial statistics relating to any particular period are not strictly reliable as representing the incidence for the actual period named, and this distorts somewhat the relation of increases or decreases to other significant events, e.g. defeats, victories, political events, and air raids, occurring in the same period.

Nevertheless, as information covering the whole duration of the war, these court-martial statistics, which have been accurately maintained by the Judge Advocate General's Office for all convictions wherever recorded throughout the

war, are of considerable value. It is probable that the cyclic distortions referred to are constant throughout and that an average period of three to six months should be allowed for purposes of relating court-martial statistics to current events.

The following statistical data will be found in Appendices shown:—

I. (*a*) Comprehensive summary of court-martial convictions (British other ranks) in the United Kingdom and Overseas.
   (*b*) Summary of court-martial convictions (British other ranks) in the United Kingdom.
   (*c*) Summary of court-martial convictions (British other ranks) in Overseas Commands.

II. Chart of court-martial convictions for ALL offences, showing most important events affecting the morale of troops in relation to the incidence of crime during the war years.

III. Comparative CHART of court-martial statistics in the United Kingdom and in Overseas Commands.

CHAPTER XI.—OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Reports in general terms were received at the War Office from home and overseas commands, which gave bird's-eye views of the state of crime in their respective areas. The purpose of these reports related specially to the state of morale in the various commands, crime being considered as one of its primary indications. No comparable statistics were included in these reports but the connection between the various factors, including crime, which affected, or were affected by, morale and current events, was examined. Where indicated, proposals were put forward for the raising of morale and for the improvement generally of conditions conducive to crime. These Reports were considered by the War Office Morale Committee and action was taken where required. In this way comparison between commands and co-ordinated action towards improvement of conditions were made possible.

In the earlier years of the war, the state of morale and the incidence of crime, especially absence and desertion, were very greatly influenced by successes achieved or reverses suffered in the operations in the various theatres of war, e.g. Dunkirk, Battle of Britain, Crete, and Singapore.

These Reports showed that, during the uncertainties of the war situation in these earlier years, a strong influence towards confidence and stability was the leadership of the Prime Minister at home and of Generals Wavell and Auchinleck in the Middle East. Other indications affecting morale at this stage were: the 1,000 bomber raids on Germany; the fall of Tobruk, and, in the case of the Middle East Command, a certain friendliness towards the German soldiers of the "Afrika Korps"; anxiety about families and sweethearts, especially in view of the presence of large numbers of Dominion and Allied troops at home; fear that all the best jobs at the end of the war would go to the men at home and consequent anxiety to get home as early as possible. Reports both from home and overseas commands throughout 1942 brought to notice the predominance of "absence," which accounted for 82 per cent of the men in detention barracks at this period of the war. In September of that year, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Anti-Aircraft Command, instituted special investigations and measures with the object of reducing the incidence of "absence" in his Command. These measures were subsequently adopted by G.H.Q., Home Forces. The two main lines of action in this "Campaign" against crime were: closer contact between regimental officers and their men, and special enquiries into the men's domestic worries, a considerable proportion of which were largely imaginary or exaggerated.

It was claimed by H.Q., Anti-Aircraft Command, that the effect of this Campaign in September, 1942, was to reduce "absence" in that Command by 25 per cent in the first three months.

Among special causes for "absence" in units at home, which were brought to light by this investigation were: wives who were sick but who would not enter hospital as that would entail leaving their children; and failure on the part of men ordered overseas to get the same amount of embarkation leave as others had had, owing to last-minute posting to replace last-minute casualties.

On the other side of the picture, one report included an essay written in December, 1942, by a private soldier in the Black Watch on "Morale and Efficiency," which contained useful suggestions regarding the causes of crime in the Army. The writer blamed to a large extent what he termed the Army "crime system," which aims at the maintenance of discipline by fear. He contended that fear is the driving force behind the execution of nearly every order and that it enters into every aspect of the soldier's life. "In the place of fear must be substituted the spirit of competitive keenness and leadership by example and encouragement. When men find that they have more to gain by co-operation, good behaviour and good work than by inefficiency and crime, the fear motive will soon become redundant and a great step forward will have been taken towards raising the whole standard of Army morale and efficiency. . . . Admittedly, the application of discipline is not made easier by the fact that the ranks contain many examples of the recalcitrant and rebellious man, the dodger and the slacker, while others have civil convictions against them. Nevertheless, there is every reason to believe that with firm and vigorous, though more comradely and human, handling, even the latter types would give their full co-operation.

"Evidence suggests that much absenteeism and desertion can be traced to the existing 'Crime System.' Even good men are driven to desperate acts of indiscipline, perhaps against their better judgment by the passions aroused through the near-to-persecution methods used by some non-commissioned officers."

The essay-writer quotes a Guardsman as having said that almost every man in his unit had been absent, as a result of too much "chasing around" by some of the non-commissioned officers. He explains "chasing around" as implying "unreasonably irritating and nerve-fraying petty fault-finding and the driving of men by threats." He adds that the Guardsman referred to was a good type of soldier, who would be a credit to any unit.

Although these views do not reflect a situation in any way different from what might be expected where the principles* inculcated upon all ranks in their early training are departed from, yet coming as they do from an obviously thoughtful man in the ranks and based on actual experience during the war years, they emphasize a useful lesson.

Another prevalent crime stressed in some of these reports during 1943 was theft, often "from a comrade." The chief cause of this was considered to be opportunism combined with the difficulty of buying articles in the shops. Men being transferred from one unit to another therefore seized the opportunity to steal a watch, or other useful article, from a member of the unit before leaving. Some of these cases were undoubtedly the work of professional thieves from civil life. Overseas, especially during an advance, there was a considerable amount of "scrounging" of enemy captured material, which called for special measures.

The influence of women upon their menfolk, often resulting in crime in various ways, was indicated in some of these reports, e.g.:—

(*a*) by persuading their husbands to go absent or to overstay their leave;
(*b*) by dissuading their husbands from volunteering for overseas special duties;
(*c*) by encouraging their husbands to take leave to coincide with their own leave from factories, etc.;
(*d*) by fickleness during the absence of the husband or fiancé with his unit.

* *See* Chapter I (pages 2–3).

Efforts were made to counteract these influences by special broadcasts on the B.B.C. to women at home in a series called "Mostly for Women."

In one command it was found to be an advantage for a company commander to write a tactful letter to a soldier's relations in order to enlist their co-operation in discouraging his subversive inclinations.

Reports from the Middle East during 1942–43 showed that as the tide turned in the Allies' favour, and repeated withdrawals and uncertainty gave way to advances and confidence in their leaders, especially in the Eighth Army, morale improved and crime as a whole decreased. This was particularly so among troops in the forward areas.

The report in October, 1942, contained the following illuminating remarks by the Chief Censor: "the fact that General Montgomery, G.O.C.-in-C., Eighth Army, took the whole Army into his confidence, right down to the last man, and stated exactly what he hoped to do and how he was going to do it, the belief that the plan was good, and the knowledge that the tools at their disposal were more numerous and effective than they had ever been, brought the spirit of the troops to a new high level and intensified their assurance and grim determination, which was to be fully tested and proved to the hilt in the twelve historic days which followed. On the evidence of this mail, no Army ever went into battle with higher morale."

The reports from India reiterated the statement that service in the East was as unpopular as ever with the British soldier, owing to the lack of amenities for leave, welfare, and European feminine society; and especially the distance from home, delay in mail services, and anxiety about their families and demobilization problems. The effect of this feeling of discontent upon the soldier's state of mind can best be described as a permanent irritation which was liable to break out, in times of stress, into waves of serious crime among men not otherwise criminally disposed in normal conditions.

The following views submitted by a divisional commander at the end of 1943 are of interest concerning the relationship between officers and their men and its influence upon the prevalence of crime:—

"The majority of men in detention are there for reasons of absence or desertion, mainly due to domestic worries, many of which could have been straightened out if they had been referred to, and sympathetically treated by, a regimental officer in their early stages.

"Many of the men have stated that facilities do not exist in their units for private interviews with officers as laid down in Army Council Instruction 47 of 1943, also that in many units King's Regulations para. 531 is not complied with, and Sections 4–44 of the Army Act are not explained to the men.

"From enquiries, I find that rarely, if ever, do Commanding Officers or Company Commanders visit Detention Barracks with the express purpose of interviewing their own men. This is, I think, an important point, for if more interest were shown by officers in their men when actually undergoing punishment, much good would accrue.

"Too many officers wait for the men to approach them with their difficulties, instead of the officers making the first move."

The "War Office Morale Committee" recorded their opinion at this stage of the war (October, 1943) that welfare work was the principal means of saving men from getting into trouble leading to detention. They put the potential figure of those who might have been saved if the official instructions (contained

in the pamphlet *The Soldier's Welfare*) regarding welfare had been fully carried into effect, at 50 per cent of those who were serving sentences.

At home, generally speaking, the impending invasion of Europe, which had become more than mere rumour owing to the appointment of the American and British Commanders-in-Chief, intensive training, etc., obsessed the minds of the public and the men in the Services, who hoped for early victory. Post-war problems became increasingly common subjects of conversation and correspondence, and altogether there was an atmosphere of confidence in the Allies' victory. Although this undoubtedly resulted in a general raising of morale among troops at home, reports from overseas commands reflected a certain feeling of anxiety for their future on the part of men who might be overseas after victory over Germany. Victory over Japan was not expected to be an easy matter and men were worried about the length of time that they would be required to remain in the Army while their more fortunate comrades at home were being released to industry. The indication was that these men were becoming more interested in themselves as individuals than in their Country or Empire as a whole, their chief anxiety being "When shall we get home?" In this attitude they became more easily disposed towards crime, especially absence and desertion. Theft also became very prevalent at this stage in certain overseas commands, but mainly as a means of money-making by conversion of the stolen articles into cash, often with a view to desertion.

PART IV

ABSENCE AND DESERTION

CHAPTER XII.—EXTENT AND NATURE OF THESE OFFENCES

Much of what has been said in Part III above under the general terms of "Crime in War," its causes, etc., is applicable *mutatis mutandis* to the particular offences of "Absence without Leave" and "Desertion." In view, however, of the exceptionally high incidence under these headings throughout the war and their detrimental effect upon the man-power situation and war effort generally, separate and special consideration is given in this Part to these offences.

Out of 27 classified offences of which the records of convictions by courts-martial were maintained, these two alone were responsible for the following percentages of all convictions during the war years:—

1939–40	26·7
1940–41	45·1
1941–42	49·5
1942–43	49·8
1943–44	50·5
1944–45	58·3

The steady percentage rise each year is perhaps misleading because there were considerable fluctuations at various stages caused by the local war situation and state of morale. The following are given as examples of some high percentages:—

Year	*Month*	*"Absence" and "Desertions" percentage of all courts-martial convictions*
1941	March	72·0
	August	67·9
	September	68·8
1942	February	68·7
	March	68·2
	November	68·3
1944	July	66·3
	August	67·8
	September	72·5
	November	67·7
1945	January	69·3
	February	68·6
	March	73·7
	April	66·1

During 1943, no month showed the exceptionally high percentages (over 66 per cent) given above.

It should be noted that the month of conviction was not necessarily the same as that in which the offence was committed.

The figures given are sufficient to indicate how serious a part these two offences alone played in weakening the Army's man-power effort, by the loss not merely of the effective service of offenders themselves over considerable periods but also of the administrative man-hours occupied in the work of the C.M.P. and others on the recapture, transport, accommodation, feeding and guarding of offenders. There were, too, the labour and time expended by officers and staff officers in connection with the investigation and trial of these offenders.

The above figures show only those cases actually convicted as "Guilty" offenders. In order, however, to obtain a more complete estimate of the wastage imposed by the whole tendency towards Desertion during the war, it is necessary to consider the total numbers struck off the strength of their units as "deserters" after 21 days' absence (without prejudice to their possible recapture and subsequent trial and conviction). 21 days is accepted officially as the limit of time within which an absentee, whose intention it is to return to his unit, will demonstrate that intention. If he does not return within that period he is declared, and is liable to be tried as, a "deserter."

Detailed statistics of absentees struck off and also those rejoined in the war years are shown at Appendix V. A chart of absentee-deserters, showing also those convicted by courts-martial, is at Appendix VI, and also, in the chart at Appendix VII, a comparison is shown between courts-martial convictions for desertion and absence in the United Kingdom and overseas.

There is, too, a certain distortion of the latter statistics owing to the delay often occurring after the man had been struck off and before he was recaptured and brought to trial. The essence of the offence of Desertion being the intention, *viz.* not to return, delay was caused owing to the necessity for producing witnesses for the purpose of proving this intention.

The full measure of the administrative load imposed by these two offences alone during the war years can be gauged from the following figures:—

Year	*Struck off strength as absentees*	*Courts-martial convictions for "Absence" and "Desertion"*
1939–40	5,935	2,040
1940–41	21,895	15,082
1941–42	20,471	19,413
1942–43	16,422	19,049
1943–44	16,206	19,886
	80,929	75,470

The highest monthly average of absentees was 1,842 during 1941. This had fallen to 1,263 during 1943 but rose to 1,531 in 1944. Approximately 11,500 rejoined in the first eight months of 1945, an average of 1,437 monthly, but there were still some 22,000 absent at the termination of hostilities.

The essence of the nature of these two offences is in many respects the same, though the outcome and the penalty may be very different. It is probable that at the outset the inclination or temptation in the man's mind may be no

more than the result of a temporary reaction against his environment which has lost its attraction or even become repellant. No specific intention to commit any offence may have formulated itself in his mind; but merely a somewhat nebulous urge to get away from things.

At some stage between his initial surrender to the urge or temptation and his final recapture, many changes may have occurred in the absentee's state of mind and intention, thus increasing the gravity of his offence and thereby his liability to heavy punishment.

Experience in the late war goes to show that absence rarely occurred among men of good morale and discipline, and that a man who had once absented himself was very liable to do so a second or even a third time. Once decided upon, the actual commission of the offence is probably the easiest of all to yield to without any conscious feeling of guilt, until afterwards. For a man who has reached a state of mental or physical exhaustion, acute discontent or even actual fear, it is perhaps a choice between two evils, whether to stay and endure these conditions of boredom, unhappiness or sheer fright, or to leave it all behind.

It is not too easy at first for the soldier fresh from civil life to realize that an act which would mean little in his ordinary everyday life and be comparatively lightly treated by his employer, at all events at first, is looked upon with the greatest seriousness in military life and is punishable with very heavy penalties, which until shortly before the war included death.

Except, therefore, in the case of the hardened and deliberate criminal whose definite intention is to desert and get clear away from the Army, it is fair to say that most cases of desertion begin as simple absence without leave; the intention to remain away develops while the soldier is in a state of absence.

A proper distinction between the two could only be made, and a man's ultimate intention discovered, after all the circumstances and possible causes leading to his absence had been brought out in evidence.

From a study of some 2,000 individual desertion cases (from the British Army of the Rhine) in which psychiatric technique was employed, the following outstanding pointers were recorded:—

Age.—Comparison of the age incidence among deserters with that for the Army group revealed a significant prevalence in the lower age groups, especially 20 years and below.

At the age of 25, the number of desertions was proportionate to the number of that age in units. For all higher age groups, for which numbers were large enough to be significant, the proportion was lower; for younger age groups the proportion was higher.

These figures clearly showed the part played by immaturity as a factor in Desertion and illustrated the importance of the staying power of the older men.

Length of Service.—Indications were similar to the above though not so marked in degree.

The number of desertions in Service Group 2–3 years was high, while that of groups of 5 years' service or over was low by comparison, in spite of the reasonable assumption that more of the senior groups would be family men with potential domestic problems.

Previous Crime.—89 per cent of deserters had no known record of civil crime or juvenile delinquency.

This fact appears to show that those who become military offenders through desertion are not necessarily criminal types by civilian standards and that

the personality of the offender and the circumstanecs in which the offence is committed are more significant factors.

Arm of Service.—Of the 2,000 cases which were the first 2,000 received and not selected in any way, 1,770 were men of Infantry units, the next largest figure among combatant Arms being 47 in the Royal Artillery. These figures are out of all proportion to the relative strengths of these two Arms.

The view recorded in this case was that this great preponderance was due to the nature of the Infantryman's task in battle which was described as "dangerous, arduous, unspectacular and unrewarding." Moreover, such duties as scout work and night patrols call for a higher standard of individual courage and morale than is needed in those Arms which fight in compact groups. No other soldier probably is called upon so frequently as the Infantryman to endure prolonged and unrelieved stress in war under the worst physical conditions.

CHAPTER XIII.—MAIN CAUSES LEADING TO "ABSENCE" OR "DESERTION"

The causes which led to men absenting themselves in large numbers in the late war, with or without real intention to desert, were numerous, and varied with individuals, types of individuals or stages of the war. Given other circumstances and environment, many of those who came to be finally convicted of "Desertion" might never have strayed at all.

Broadly speaking, absentees could be classified under three heads:—

(*a*) Habitual offenders.
(*b*) Irresponsible elements.
(*c*) Those who were disturbed by family troubles.

As a result of a special study carried out at an Army Selection Centre, the following conclusions were reached as to the main causes leading to absence:—

(i) Welfare problems not satisfactorily settled; ignorance of concessions, e.g. leave on compassionate grounds, general lack of confidence in officers and senior N.C.Os.
(ii) Self-anxiety, e.g. being called upon to perform duties beyond his capacity or feeling unequal to battle conditions.
(iii) Failure on the part of the man's superiors to give progressive punishments for repeated offences.
(iv) Unsympathetic handling of difficult men.

For those who were not habitual offenders, some form of psychological upset affecting the man's state of mind, with repercussions upon his morale and discipline, appears to have been the usual cause of the ordinary soldier absenting himself. Among the more common factors which brought about this unbalanced state of mind were: the system of drafting young or new soldiers from home to overseas commands, especially the apparently haphazard way of posting, e.g. an Englishman posted to a unit composed mainly of Glasgow Scots, or *vice versa*; the frequent moves from one unit to another; the "nobody's child" atmosphere reflected by the average Base Depot. These and similar points are mentioned in Overseas Reports as having often provided fertile soil for the seeds of "Absence," leading to "Desertion," among men whose patience and morale became gradually sapped until in despair, and often with only a bare conception of the consequences, they took what they considered to be the "easy way out."

Home troubles were responsible, or at least provided an excuse, for a considerable proportion of "Absence" cases. Genuine anxieties included: effects of air-bombing; sickness in family; birth of child; infidelity, real or imaginary; and problems of food and money. Where there was close mutual touch and understanding between officers and men in a unit, many of these troubles could be partially settled by personal and rapid communication with local authorities or by the grant of urgent compassionate leave. Owing, however, to frequent

changes of unit or lack of training and experience on the part of officers, these ideal conditions did not always exist, and men preferred to take "French" leave rather than risk the chance of their applications being turned down.

It would certainly have helped to keep up the men's spirits and set some of their anxieties at rest if regular communications (e.g. in the form of post cards) could have been received from local authorities representing the true state of affairs in the men's home towns. B.B.C. broadcasts could not give details, and generalizations often resulted in the men fearing the worst in their own homes, setting up anxieties which in the majority of cases proved to be unfounded.

CHAPTER XIV.—COUNTER-MEASURES

Efforts were made by means of periodical talks to the men, by letters to their families, friends and relations and by other propaganda methods, to prevent men from being persuaded that "absence" was an easy way out of the war, and to bring home to them the seriousness of the offence, especially on active service "in the face of the enemy."

Awards of long terms of penal servitude appeared to have no material effect in reducing the "Desertion" rates. A special test to prove this theory was carried out in the Anzio beach-head in Italy, when several awards of five years' penal servitude, instead of the more usual three years, were inflicted in the hope that this would have a deterrent effect, but no appreciable reduction followed.

This was probably due to the fact that a would-be offender realized that, in most cases, a long sentence would probably be suspended and the balance remitted after a portion had been served. Thus the actual length of sentence had small significance or terror for the determined or hardened criminal. It also had the converse effect, e.g. presidents of courts-martial, who wished to award a severe and exemplary punishment, often awarded an excessively harsh sentence in the belief that this would in all probability be suspended and substantially remitted.

In 1942, the situation in the Middle East as regards "Desertion" became so serious that the Commander-in-Chief (General, afterwards Field-Marshal, Sir Claude Auchinleck), with the unanimous agreement of his Army commanders, forwarded to the War Office a recommendation for the reintroduction of the death penalty for "Desertion" in the field, which had been abolished in 1930. The reasons given for making this recommendation were that "no less a deterrent is proved to be required from time to time, not merely in the interests of discipline but for the conduct of operations in conditions of strain and stress."

His view was that if enforcement of the death sentence had been within his powers and discretion (even though it might be comparatively rarely used, as in the case of the First World War) the knowledge of this fact would have proved a salutary deterrent in cases in which the worst example was set by men "to whom the alternative of prison to the hardships of battle conveyed neither fear nor stigma."

The fact that a suitable and sufficient deterrent will have the desired effect was reasonably well established by the experience early in 1945 when "Release Regulations" were published. These contained a proviso to the effect that any man who deserted after 1st February, 1945, and was convicted by court-martial, would forfeit all prior service for purposes of calculating his age and Service group for release. There was a sharp fall in the rate of desertion after this date and although this could be attributed partly to the general improvement in the war situation, it was considered to have been more than a coincidence that the publication of this Release Instruction should have been followed by a sudden reduction in the "Desertion" figures, e.g. in January, 1945, 2,129 were struck off as deserters, in February and March 1,720 and 1,568

respectively; conversely the numbers of previous absentees rejoining in these three months rose rapidly from 1,609 in January to 1,814 in February and 1,948 in March.

Apart from actual deterrents, the removal of inducement to desert as an easy way out of battle conditions was carefully considered, and measures were adopted to retain offenders in the war zone, if not actually in forward areas. The principles accepted in approaching this problem were that military crime must not necessarily be regarded as anti-social conduct (e.g. a soldier who absents himself without leave from a draft for overseas in order to visit his sick wife) and that, as a means towards the prevention of further crime, the causative factors of a man's offence rather than the method or degree of his punishment should form the subject for consideration.

The development of these principles with the assistance of qualified psychiatrists has already been briefly described in Chapter VIII above under "Review and Suspension of Sentences." This procedure resulted in considerable numbers of men, who would otherwise have been sent home, being retained in overseas commands with their sentences suspended against their better behaviour. This undoubtedly had a certain deterrent effect upon the type of man who, while not criminally inclined in the same sense as a murderer or thief, would have risked penal servitude as a means of ensuring his return to the United Kingdom.

CHAPTER XV.—THE ATTITUDE OF THE PUBLIC

The attitude of the public to this question of "Desertion" and its appropriate punishment is an important factor in the handling of the problem in war.

Their whole attitude towards crime and punishment, more especially where the death penalty was involved, underwent considerable changes between the two World Wars. The Committee on Courts-Martial Procedure which was assembled under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Darling immediately after the First World War recorded the opinion that "In regard to sentences we consider that, subject to the right to petition for clemency, the decision ought to be left, as at present, to the Military Authorities, who alone are in a position to form a correct judgment as to what sentences the state of discipline in the Army required. Nor do we consider that any exception ought to be made in the case of death sentences. During the recent war, not a single officer or soldier was executed under sentence of court-martial in the United Kingdom. Abroad a certain number of death sentences were carried out. In each case they were only carried out after personal consideration by, and upon the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and after the Judge Advocate General or his Deputy had advised him.

"As showing the care with which all considerations were weighed and the desire to show mercy whenever the interests of the Army as a whole, and of the nation, permitted, it may be stated that no fewer than 89 per cent of the death sentences pronounced were commuted by the Commander-in-Chief."

Finally the Committee pointed out that "the reasons for punishing crime in the Civil Courts are the amendment of offenders, the deterrent effect of punishment and the satisfaction of the outraged sentiment of the people, who would otherwise be apt to take private vengeance. For the punishing of military offences there is the further reason that unless Discipline in Armies be preserved such forces are but a mob—dangerous to all but the enemies of their country. Therefore the considerations sufficient for Civil Government are not enough for the ruling of the Armed Forces of the Crown. On Active Service especially, other sanctions must be sought when justice is to be done." In spite of these definite opinions recorded in 1919, the question of the abolition of the death penalty for military offences was raised in Parliament in 1923 and the following years. In 1925, the death sentence was abolished for all military offences in peace-time except mutiny and in 1928 for offences in war other than mutiny, treachery, cowardice and desertion, and also the offences of "leaving a guard" or "as a sentry quitting a post without being regularly relieved."

In 1928 and 1929 further amendments were pressed for in Parliament in regard to the death penalty for Cowardice and Desertion, on the score that these offences were the result of mental and physical breakdown. This argument overlooked the fact that in war both cowardice and desertion may involve the death of comrades in circumstances for which no measure of clemency could be shown or expected. It was in fact as a deterrent against such occurrences in the face of the enemy that the death penalty was retained. Nevertheless, Parliament

again raised the question in 1929 with the result that the death penalty for Cowardice and Desertion on active service was abolished in 1930.

These changes were implemented against the advice of the military authorities, who stressed the extreme leniency and discretion with which the powers vested in the Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force had been used in the First World War. Out of 31,367 cases of desertion tried by courts-martial between 4th August, 1914, and 11th November, 1918, the death penalty had only been carried out in 266 cases. There were therefore no grounds for assertion that these powers were at any time misused. Yet they had remained as a very strong deterrent for use at the right time. When the end of the Second World War came, there were still more than 20,000 deserters at large and there was also a steady outflow of an average of 1,200 absentees monthly. An agitation was at once raised for the remission of all sentences and for the grant of a pardon to all deserters who surrendered themselves. Both in Parliament and in the Press, efforts were made to put an end to a situation under which, so those who sought the proclamation of an amnesty claimed, thousands of able-bodied men were living by unauthorized means, as regards identification, rations, and clothing. In many cases, it was alleged, such men lived by necessitous thieving, instead of by being employed on urgent work in industry.

Such impassioned appeals, however sound from the humanitarian and industrial standpoints, had to be resisted on military grounds. It has been shown in an earlier chapter that a man who puts his own interests before those of his unit or country is not a good, well-disciplined soldier. Moreover, from the point of view of a commander in the Field, it is essential that there should be some assurance that his men will not, perhaps on the eve of battle, desert in large numbers with little fear of the consequences. It was with this aspect of the problem in mind that the Commander-in-Chief Middle East gave his reasons for recommending the re-institution of the death penalty for desertion as "not merely in the interests of discipline but for the conduct of operations in conditions of stress and strain."

The substitution of penal servitude as the maximum award had already reduced the deterrent influence upon the mind of a would-be deserter. He might argue to himself that by desertion he would certainly escape death in action, and that after the war there would probably be an amnesty, or at least a substantial reduction of sentence, for those undergoing penal servitude. Suspension of sentence would at least tide him over his immediate peril and, for a second offence, no worse punishment could be inflicted than a further sentence of penal servitude.

If, therefore, men on active service could safely rely on their sentences being remitted at the end of a war in which they had been guilty of one of the most serious, and often cowardly, of military offences, the position of a Commander-in-Chief in the Field would be gravely prejudiced.

A soldier's whole military training should have informed him that by deserting on service he is "letting his side down" (more especially, as often occurred, when he takes a vehicle with him), and is reducing the Army's chances of victory. No good reason for the complete remission of punishment of such a man could be supported on military grounds.

In this connection, the following extract from a letter recently published in *The Times* is informative:—

"Some months spent in daily contact with deserters in Italy taught me that, although there were a few very sad cases caused by nervous strain or domestic

troubles, the offence was usually a carefully thought-out plan, and the belief in a pardon after the war was widespread. Any Infantry officer who served there knows what a serious problem desertion was in that campaign. It is alarming to think what the position would be in another war if desertion should have been proved to be a paying proposition."

PART V

THE UNWILLING SOLDIER AND THE HARDENED CRIMINAL

CHAPTER XVI.—THE PROBLEM AND THE REMEDIAL APPROACH TO IT

The Problem in Peace-time

As already indicated in Chapter I, the problem of instilling and maintaining discipline in the Army in peace-time is a comparatively simple one. Recruitment is carried out on a voluntary basis in a steady flow throughout the year. The regular soldier is keen, or at least willing, to serve and to make a career in the Army. Progress, promotion, increased pay and finally pension have always served as incentives for the ambitious young soldier to keep a clean conduct sheet and a good record of service. Moreover, he is usually posted to a unit or corps of his choice, in which he hopes to pass his whole service; he therefore becomes part of it and his pride in his unit is reflected in such directions as good behaviour, self-respect, and turn-out.

In War

In war, the problem is more difficult. There are drafted into the Army at short intervals large numbers of men; they form a heterogeneous mixture of all kinds, classes and creeds, of whom only a proportion are volunteers. These intakes become more diverse and less "service-minded" as the war progresses. Unlike peace-time practice, it is impracticable in war to post more than a small proportion of these large numbers to the units of their choice.

Each of these young men brings with him from civil life the individual qualities and attributes which he has inherited or imbibed in his home, at school or in civil employment. His reactions, conscious or sub-conscious, to any given situation will depend upon his upbringing, environment, state of health, bodily and mental, and perhaps the nature and character of his companions. In most cases each individual in civil life has been accustomed to leading his own life in his own way, especially "off parade," with few, if any controls. His disciplinary principles may be negative or nugatory. In a few cases he may have been brought up and accustomed to respect authority out of fear of punishment or other consequences: only in rare cases will his sense of discipline have been developed on the lines of willing and sympathetic co-operation.

The problem facing the Army in war-time, therefore, is receiving this large and heterogeneous admixture of individuals, sorting them out, and moulding and eventually harmonizing them into one homogeneous "group," capable of reacting in the appropriate military manner at any given time to meet any required situation.

As is only to be expected, within this admixture is to be found a proportion

of anti-social elements, of varying degrees, who have no desire or intention to pull their weight in the Army, and, in certain cases, propose to use more sinister methods of obstruction.

Need for Special Measures

These special elements obviously require special measures for their early correction, with a view to confining their subversive influences within the smallest possible limits and at the same time reducing to a minimum the wastage of man-power. In the First World War, an effort was made to meet this situation by the establishment of what were termed "Penal Units," for the segregation of such personnel. Though these units achieved their purpose in relieving active units of their liabilities for these indisciplined personnel, their success so far as the individual soldier was concerned was short-lived because he was likely to break out again into criminal activities on being returned to duty.

New Approach to the Problem

When, therefore, a similar situation arose early in the Second World War, it was considered that the approach to the problem should be made on different lines. It was felt that the title "Penal Units" created the wrong impression and atmosphere and that to label a man, on joining such a unit, as an inmate of a "Penal" institution was calculated to lower his morale and self-respect at once. It was appreciated that it was impracticable to dismiss from the Army all those who showed themselves unwilling to respond to military discipline as this would merely provide an open door for those who disliked war service. On the other hand, the influence of even a small minority of this type of individual might prove so strong that it might, unless finally removed from contact with the more sober, disciplined young men, have a lasting effect upon them or at least one that would be difficult to eradicate later.

It was also realized at the same time that the disturbing elements comprising this comparatively small minority were themselves made up of several different constituents, each of which might require separate consideration and possibly quite different handling.

In short, the fact that a man had committed a military offence was not to be considered a good reason for stamping him as a criminal, and for throwing him into a virtual prison and treating him accordingly. Instead, the circumstances of the offender's upbringing, schooling, home atmosphere, employment and environment, and state of mind at the time of the offence, should form the subject of investigation and corrective measures designed and adapted to suit each individual case.

Segregation of Tainted from Untainted

The acceptance of these principles was the basis of the new approach to the problem of disciplining the young and apparently unwilling civilian soldier, and the first step towards this was to devise some medium for sorting out the various types of offenders into their proper categories suitable for selective treatment.

In general terms, the object aimed at was to segregate into separate com-

partments men who, for various reasons, failed to react favourably to Army conditions and expecially to military discipline.

The question of segregating young soldiers, who had made a bad start in military life, from the more mature and hardened criminals was given primary consideration.

In the early stage, though the problem and the suggested approach to deal with it were largely psychological, no organization had yet been set up for the application of professional knowledge and practice to such problems. As the war progressed, however, the use of psychiatric advisers in dealing with the treatment and disposal of delinquents of all types was developed to the great advantage both of the Army, in regard to the proper and economical use of man-power, and to the individual, in respect of his future career in the Army and also later in civil life.

Psychiatric Influence

The psychiatrist's outlook was based on the general assumption that, having regard to the community as a whole, military crime was not necessarily anti-social conduct. The code of military discipline, which, as has been shown earlier, differs in several important respects from the civil code, was designed not merely for the punishment of offenders but also, and perhaps more particularly, for the prevention of crime and indiscipline by the building up of morale and other soldierly attributes. Where these latter qualities were absent or where the individual showed himself unwilling or unable to assimilate them, it was considered that the normal system of punishment, followed by further punishment for each subsequent offence, was not merely useless but likely to cause permanent harm to the individual offender's character and self-respect.

Psychological Grouping

The psychiatric approach to the problem of assessing and reforming military delinquents divided the delinquents into five principal groups:—

(*a*) Young soldiers.
(*b*) Recidivists (habitual bad characters).
(*c*) Psychopaths and neurotic personalities.
(*d*) Dullards.
(*e*) Psychotics (mental cases).

Importance of Causative Factors in diagnosis of Criminal Types

As the importance of psychiatric advice and practice became established, it gradually became possible to evolve a scientific system of classification of delinquents by the investigation and discovery of causative factors in individual crime (which also assisted towards the prevention of further crime) and thus to enable each delinquent to be more suitably rehabilitated to the best advantage for both the Army and the individual.

(Fuller details of the working of this system and of the use of Psychiatry in the Army during the Second World War will be found in *The History of British Army Psychiatry*, 1939–47, by Major R. H. Ahrenfeldt, Royal Army Medical Corps.)

Effect was given to the acceptance of the above principle by the institution of two types of special unit for the reception of "difficult" cases. These special units were Young Soldiers' Training Units in 1941 (later Special Training Units) for the rehabilitation of young soldiers, and Special Labour Companies in 1942 for the redemption of habitually bad characters. These are dealt with in further detail in the ensuing chapters. The ultimate distinction between the purpose and functions of these two types of unit was given in War Office letter BM/LC/875 [A.G. 3(O)], dated 17th April, 1944, a copy of which is at Appendix VIII.

CHAPTER XVII.—SPECIAL TRAINING UNITS

In 1940 a number of Battalions of Young Soldiers (not over 19 years of age) were raised and employed in guarding aerodromes and other vital points. Because of the nature of their duties they were split into various detachments. Officers selected for posting to these units were not always, at all events at first, of the most suitable type. Moreover, this form of service in uncongenial surroundings, without adequate training or the advantages of a start in regimental life, resulted in loss of morale with a consequent harvest of offences against discipline.

The incidence of absence without leave and cases of indiscipline in these units reached alarming figures, out of all proportion to crime in other units, and much against their better judgment commanding officers found themselves compelled to award sentences of detention to these young soldiers.

Detention accommodation was not available for the large numbers involved and the men therefore had to serve their sentences in totally unsuitable conditions in unit lines, with the result that many young soldiers of excellent fighting material were in danger of becoming potential lags and of little value as soldiers. It became clear that some establishment was required to reclaim young soldiers who got into difficulty in their early life in the Army.

Young Soldiers' Training Camps

By 1941 there were ten of these young soldier units in Northern Command and on the recommendation of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of that Command a "Young Soldiers' Training Camp" was set up in September of that year at Pontefract in Yorkshire. Its stated objects were:—

(*a*) To assist young soldiers who find difficulty in adjusting themselves to Army conditions.
(*b*) To prevent them from embarking upon a career of crime.
(*c*) To instill into the more undisciplined a pride in their persons and units.

It was made clear that this was not a punishment camp and care was taken to avoid sending there any man under sentence.

The following were the chief features of this camp:—

Staff.—Specially selected for ability to study individual character.
Capacity.—150–200 young soldiers under 19½ years of age.
Duration.—Normally three months but no definite limit.
Training.—Full individual training in all military subjects.
Leave.—Normal leave and other privileges off duty.
Punishments.—Confinement to barracks or loss of privileges; in more serious cases, detention or return to unit. The success of this camp was immediate and in November, 1941, a Committee formed under the Chairmanship of Major-General M. C. Dempsey, D.S.O., M.C., recommended the establishment of one of these camps in each command. Two further camps, one at Lowestoft

in Eastern Command and one at Redhill in Southern Command, were opened during 1942. (Army Council Instructions 1371 of 1942, and 192 of 1943 refer.) The Northern Command unit was, in 1943, moved to Wetherby, Yorks.

Special Training Units

In September, 1943, the title of these units was changed to "Special Training Units" (see Army Council Instruction 1486 of 1943), and certain material changes were made in their nature and establishments. Their capacity was increased to 240 and the maximum age of soldiers sent there was raised to 21.

In view of the increased maximum age, it was decided to send men of any unit and to include a number of men whose sentences were under suspension. These latter were to be first of all passed by one of the newly-formed Army Selection Centres where psychiatric investigations and advice were available.

These changes materially altered the nature of these units as compared with the "Young Soldiers' Camps," e.g.:—

(*a*) The entrants were older men, fully trained and liable for posting overseas.
(*b*) Full military training had therefore to be afforded at these Centres.
(*c*) Educational facilities had also to be provided.
(*d*) Special measures had to be taken to segregate soldiers under sentence from the younger soldiers.
(*e*) Duration was increased to four months minimum up to six months.

The establishment of 240 was divided into two companies, each of 120, organized into three "Category" platoons: (*a*) easy to help; (*b*) susceptible of help; (*c*) difficult to help. These platoons were given names after distinguished war leaders.

The Nature and Types of Trainees

The original system by which trainees were selected by their own commanding officers had proved unsatisfactory and it was decided that these unit nominees should pass through an Army Selection Centre, where they were interviewed and subjected to various intelligence and aptitude tests in the presence of a Personnel Selection Officer, a Combatant Officer and a Psychiatrist.

Special Army Selection Training Unit, Leeds

During the course of their passage through the Selection Centre a certain number of these men were selected for separate consideration and were posted to a special Army Selection Training Unit, located at Beckett Park, Leeds, where they were trained in a number of trades, e.g. clerk, storeman, batman, sanitary duties, mess waiter and orderly. The types selected for this differentiation of training were generally speaking those who could not usefully be employed on combatant duties in their units, e.g. dullards, illiterates, elderly soldiers and men of low medical category.

Approximately 600 men were admitted to this unit every fortnight and the duration of their training was one month, the maximum capacity being 1,200. For administrative and training purposes the unit was divided into two battalions, each of approximately 600 trainees.

On conclusion of their course of training, these men were drafted to any unit where the particular trade in which they had been trained in this

unit could be usefully applied and, unless their medical category made this impracticable, they were drafted to all overseas theatres.

Periodical visits to these units were also carried out by psychiatrist advisers. After one such visit, the psychiatrist sub-divided the various types he had seen under the following broad and frankly descriptive categories:—

(*a*) The physically immature lads, who shaved once a week and who could not stand up to the ordinary training.
(*b*) The young volunteers, irresponsible, who had hoped for glamour and excitement but found fatigues and mud.
(*c*) The "mother-attached," dependent type, never before away from home, who could not "take it" and reacted by running away home at every opportunity.
(*d*) The "rowdies," usually brought up in the tenements of large towns with little sense of self-respect. Though loyal to their own "gang" they resented all forms of discipline.
(*e*) The duller type, for whom the ordinary war-time training was too fast.
(*f*) The "social rebels," who from their earliest age had been unable to adjust themselves to respect authority. Some of these had been in Home Office Schools and often also had Borstal or prison records.

Usual Reasons for Admission

The causes leading up to the posting of the various types to these units were also categorized by one of the Commandants as follows:—

(i) Irresponsibility regarding their personal habits, kit, arms, etc., and duty to the community.
(ii) Frustration in one form or another.
(iii) False interpretation of the meaning of "a Free Country."
(iv) Low estimate of the Army.
(v) Lack of confidence in their leaders, many of whom took little or no personal interest in them.
(vi) Defective home relationship or family discipline.

Treatment

The treatment to be applied to the various types of trainees for the speedy remedy of the causes of their admission to these units constituted the measure of the problem facing the Commandants and their staffs during the war.

The word "treatment" is deliberately chosen as being perhaps the most suitable to describe the attitude adopted towards the young men posted into these units, which was calculated to remove any thought or suggestion that they were confined in a penal establishment. There were no guards and the gates were left permanently open.

The officers and many of the non-commissioned officers took a personal interest in their men and encouraged the latter to come to them at once if in any sort of trouble. The Commandant of No. 1 Special Training Unit described his methods as follows:—

"When a man arrives, particulars as to his name, number, birth, religion and home address are entered in my book and he is brought to my room by the Reception Corporal, a young soldier who was himself sent to me to make a

fresh start. He sits down and we have a talk and smoke. I usually give him a book written by the Radio Padre and broadcast after a visit to this unit. While he reads, I go on with my work and then we have a further talk. I make notes about him in my book. I explain to him that he can come and see me at any time he likes without a non-commissioned officer, when not on parade, and that I shall be delighted to see him. A large number of these men had rows with their parents on account of their behaviour and I promise them that, when they have settled down, I will write to their parents and let them know how well their boys are doing. We always end by shaking hands and with the soldier promising me faithfully that he will do his best and also that if his old temptation to go absent, steal, etc. comes over him, he will at once come to me and tell me about it. My first object is to show men that it is they themselves who are to blame. My second is to eliminate self-pity, in many cases our hardest job. My third is cleanliness in body and appearance."

It was constantly stressed that these men were in most cases little more than lads, just passing out of the difficult stage of adolescence, somewhat bewildered by the peculiarities and abnormalities of Army life. The dictum "the secret of help is encouragement" was sedulously applied; considerable deviations from the normal military methods and disciplinary code were permitted to suit the special features of each individual case.

Training

The aim of these units was to train the young man to be a soldier in every way. At first, training was limited to the Individual Training Standard, but later the whole field of Training for War had to be covered.

Specimen "Distribution of Training Periods (200) Monthly," is shown at Appendix IX.

Education Training included a wide range of subjects, e.g. modern languages such as French, German, Russian and Spanish; musical appreciation; handicrafts such as wood-carving, leather-work, etc.

Outside activities were encouraged. In addition to the normal sports, boxing, and P.T. displays, No. 1 Special Training Unit organized a Dance Band in conjunction with the local Munitions Women's Hostel, and also won cups for road-walking and cross-country teams. No. 2 Special Training Unit provided the Guard of Honour for Field-Marshal Lord Ironside during the "Salute the Soldier" week.

Closing down

By February, 1944, all three units were overfull, with a waiting list of some 150, but, owing to the careful weeding out of cases at Selection Centres and also the advent of "D"-Day, with the move of 21 Army Group in June, numbers fell rapidly. Towards the end of 1944, these units were so much reduced that it was decided to abolish No. 3 Special Training Unit. Nos. 1 and 2 remained in operation, though much reduced in numbers, until their disbandment in August, 1945.

Trainees were disposed of in accordance with the recommendations of command personnel selection officers, who, in conjunction with psychiatrist advisers, interviewed each man.

Summary of Results

These "Special Training Units" derived considerable benefit from the successful experiment, originated in Northern Command in 1940, of the establishment of a "Young Soldiers' Training Camp."

Statistics show that, in spite of the greatly increased difficulties of the task imposed upon these Special Training Units by the additional responsibility of accepting older trainees and a proportion of criminally inclined and involved men, the results continued to be most successful.

Altogether roughly 4,000 men passed through these units, distributed as under:—

No. 1 . . .	2,056
No. 2 . . .	1,056
No. 3 . . .	900

An inspection of the records of some 860 consecutive cases produced certain interesting features, e.g.:—

Age.—Average 19½.

Married.—52.

Profession.—690 were classed as labourers, 75 as skilled tradesmen and 24 as scholars.

Home towns.—80 per cent came from large towns, 4 per cent were country lads.

Previous record of crime.—Figures taken from records maintained by No. 2 Special Training Unit show that, in 1944, out of 387 lads, 21 per cent had been convicted by the civil authorities, 8 per cent had been to Borstal or to prison, and 25 per cent to Home Office Schools. In 1945 40 per cent of the trainees had police records before enlistment; 13 per cent had been on probation only; 7 per cent had been in Home Office Schools.

Since enlistment 6 per cent had served prison sentences and one per cent had been sent to Borstal.

There seems no doubt that the type of trainee deteriorated towards the end of the war, when the young conscript and younger volunteers, who had lacked a proper home life and a father's guiding hand, began to appear in these Units. The former resented the change from high wages and unfettered freedom; the latter had become restive (often through being wrongly posted) in the Army.

Towards the end, it was estimated that at least 10 per cent of the intake were of criminal type, and about 35 per cent had already been put on probation.

In spite of these increased difficulties, it was calculated that 80 per cent of all those who passed through these units were subsequently rehabilitated and that, judging from the follow-up tests which were carried out, this standard of improvement was maintained.

As a result of this war-time success, the Secretary of State for War announced in July, 1946, that one of these Units would be retained in the post-war Army.

With this in view, the following remarks, made by an adviser in psychiatry who frequently visited these Special Training Units during the war, are recorded for guidance in similar circumstances in future:—

"(*a*) Given equal length of service and severity of records, the aggressive individual adjusts better than the 'spineless' lad.

"(*b*) The duration of stay at these units was too short for the tense explosive

individual. He is unlikely to do well in this time, unless he has a genuine grievance which can be dealt with.

"(*c*) Dull men who alternate labouring jobs with larceny as a means of supporting their families seldom make satisfactory soldiers.

"(*d*) The very intelligent chronic offender, with several convictions, can be helped if caught young enough, provided his pattern of social adjustment is still modifiable.

"(*e*) The most suitable types for successful treatment at these units are: the minor offender with Approved School or Borstal experience; the young volunteer who has been mismanaged; the city lad who has hitherto been his own boss; the chronic absentee, with no civil criminal record, and the 'cocky' lad, who answers back and always knows best."

CHAPTER XVIII.—LABOUR COMPANIES

Redemption of Bad Characters

As the war progressed it became increasingly clear that a considerable number of habitual bad characters were being recruited. These men were too old for acceptance in the Special Training Units but not eligible for discharge on grounds of age. It was therefore decided in November, 1942, to form a number of Labour Units and to draft these bad characters into them for segregation and special remedial treatment.

Two companies were raised in the first instance early in 1943, No. 1 at Edinburgh and No. 2 at Tadcaster, each with an establishment of 200. Personnel were selected by commanding officers and nominated by Army Commanders. They were unarmed.

The object was mainly reformatory and special stress was laid upon the need for re-establishing a man's self-respect and better outlook.

Later in the year the scheme was overhauled. No. 1 Company was moved to Gareloch and two new companies were formed: No. 3 in Western Command and No. 10 at Halkirk, Caithness, the latter being reserved for the reception of incorrigibles. All postings for these units were to pass through Army Selection Centres and be graded, with the assistance of psychiatric advisers, for appropriate remedial treatment.

Selection of "Trainees."

The selection of these "trainees" was a more difficult and complicated problem than in the case of Special Training Units. They were habitually bad characters, older men (i.e. above 21 years of age) and, in many cases, without any desire or intention to be "reformed."

It gradually became possible, however, to grade these men into categories which were designated broadly as under:—

(*a*) *Redeemables.*—Likely to respond to special treatment.
(*b*) *Doubtful.*—Still retaining some spark of self-respect and not definitely "incorrigible."
(*c*) *Incorrigibles.*—Hardened criminals who appear to be beyond reaction to any special treatment.

As a result of the first year's experience, an effort was made to separate these classes by posting them to different companies. Age groups 21–28 were posted only to No. 1 Company. Those classified under (*c*) were posted to No. 10 Company. It was, however, always contemplated that re-postings might take place at any time as a result of experience derived from the men's conduct.

Methods of Treatment

As in the case of "Special Training Units," it was emphasized that these labour units were in no way punishment camps. Men were allowed normal

leave and privileges. The aim was to redeem a man's morale and self-esteem and to prevent further deterioration in his character. With this end in view, a high standard of administration was maintained and special stress was laid on the importance of smart turn-out and soldierly bearing among the men. Military training was included in the weekly syllabus, but labour of various kinds was given priority.

An officer, who commanded alternatively No. 1, 3 and 10 Companies gave the following details of the methods of rehabilitation employed:—

"(*a*) *Personal touch.*—Officers in particular and some N.C.Os. were able, to deal with cases individually and so get down to bedrock in the man's troubles. This was supplemented by frequent visits from Command and Army Psychiatrists and Personnel Selection Officers. In this way men were put on the right road at once.

It involved considerable deviations from ordinary military discipline and the exercise of leniency on many occasions, but the results almost invariably justified the means and proved that, in cases of this type, the personal touch was far more effective than strict disciplinary measures.

"(*b*) *Welfare.*—The personal touch involved much welfare work of all kinds, and the solving of the men's personal and family troubles helped greatly in the work of rehabilitation. Family troubles were the cause of the greater part of the absenteeism and with the removal of the cause, the call to go absent ceased. All officers from the C.O. downwards were available at practically any time to help in solving the men's problems.

"(*c*) *Spare-time occupation.*—This included indoor and outdoor sports, entertainment, education, including correspondence classes and classes of illiterates, and handicraft classes of all kinds. Use was made of A.B.C.A. and Civil Affairs pamphlets and in every way the men were encouraged to improve themselves as men and citizens.

"(*d*) *Re-sorting of misfits.*—It was found that, in many cases, military misdemeanours were due to uncongenial employment in the Army. With the assistance of Psychiatrists and Personnel Selection Officers, the pegs were put into their appropriate 'holes'."

Another C.O. stressed the value of gaining the man's confidence:—

"One has to disabuse his mind of misconceptions. For one reason or another many men take a poor view of service in the Army to start with. Until the man's confidence has been gained and his antagonism dissipated nothing can be done for him."

Difficulties and Results

The results achieved by these Labour Companies do not, of course, compare favourably with those of the Special Training Units. The task of the staff was immeasurably more difficult, as the material on which they had to work was so much less malleable. The Officer Commanding No. 1 Company's description of his men included the following remarks:—

"Just as the intakes were almost wholly unintelligent so they were correspondingly non-adult psychologically. As with a child, nothing was ever their fault—it was always their wives, the Army, the capitalist system, the medical officer, never themselves. . . . In the Orderly Room, no reliance

could be placed on the formal meaning of any statement they might make. Very many of the trainees were without any sense of responsibility or social duty."

Records showed that approximately one quarter of each man's service had been spent either in detention or else in absence without leave. From the criminal aspect, the trainees could be divided under two broad headings, *viz.* those who were anti-socially active in civil life and those who were almost entirely military offenders with little or nothing against them before enrolment. In both types, their conduct in their units had reached a stage when their commanding officers considered that the normal disciplinary methods were not producing the right results and in consequence, recommended their posting to these Labour Companies.

In assessing the value or success of these units, therefore, the fact of their comparatively low incidence of military crime in these war years should be emphasized. Up to September, 1944, i.e. in 21 months' existence, No. 1 Company had had only 46 field general courts-martial; while in 9 months Nos. 3 and 10 held 9—these two Companies having only half the strength of No. 1 Company. The average was rather less than 1 in 10 of the strength of trainees.

In No. 10 Company (the "incorrigibles") in nine months, only seven men were charged with civil offences, e.g. housebreaking, larceny, stealing, etc. Moreover, in spite of a certain amount of local apprehension at the thought of this gang of criminals being located in their midst, the local police reported that crime in the locality was less than when other, more ordinary, units were stationed there. No cases of molesting of women were attributed to men of this unit.

A system of follow-up reports was instituted in order that touch could be maintained with the records of ex-trainees. From these records it was estimated that the following percentage of men were rehabilitated as a result of their "treatment" at these units:—

No. 1 Labour Company . . .	40 per cent
No. 3 Labour Company . . .	20 per cent
No. 10 Labour Company . . .	28 per cent

These men were therefore restored to fighting units instead of remaining a liability to their units as before.

This relief to units from their liability for looking after these bad characters was one of the chief advantages gained from the work of these Labour Companies. In addition, the accommodation and disciplinary control of large numbers of these bad and doubtful characters afforded a great measure of relief also to the civil authorities, particularly to the police. Many of these characters might otherwise have been at large and hence a danger to the community in time of war, blackouts and raids, etc.

One further benefit claimed for these units was the excellent labour of various kinds carried out by them. Several very favourable reports were received from Deputy Commanders Royal Engineers of the good work output achieved by teams from these units. No doubt, much of this enthusiasm may have been due to their desire to show their proficiency at such labour in the hope of being left to continue with it, instead of being sent overseas. Nevertheless, the results were excellent and other, more military, units were saved from the interference with training that these labour duties would otherwise have entailed.

PART VI

PENAL UNITS

CHAPTER XIX.—MILITARY PRISONS AND DETENTION BARRACKS

Historical Outline prior to the War

Until the middle of the last century, it was the custom for all military offenders to be confined in County Gaols and Public Prisons. This system had been frequently criticized because of the admixture of soldiers and convicts in the same penitentiary, and in 1836 a Committee of Investigation was appointed, which recommended that separate military places of confinement should be provided. The reasons given for this recommendation were that "a soldier, though under punishment, should not lose sight of the profession against the rules of which he has offended, nor should he be placed where he is in contact with men, whose notions of crime are not very strict and have none whatever of the nature of a Military Offence."

It was not, however, until 1844 that any change was made. It was then decided that any term of imprisonment up to 28 days should be undergone in barrack cells. At the same time the Secretary for War was authorized to set aside certain buildings as Military Prisons and to appoint Military Inspectors with the same powers as Visiting Justices. Thereafter, Military Prisons became established in most of the larger garrison towns at home, including the following: Brixton, Dover, Gosport, Chester, Lancaster, York, Taunton and Devonport in England; Cork and Limerick in Ireland; and Stirling and Glencorse in Scotland. Overseas Military Prisons were also established at Gibraltar, Malta, Cairo, Alexandria, Jamaica, Bermuda, Mauritius, Barbados, and other places, as necessity demanded.

In spite of their title and the nature of their occupants, Military Prisons in the United Kingdom remained under the control of the Home Office and their staffs were still civilian personnel. It was not until the end of 1901, during the South African War, that the formation of the "Military Prison Staff Corps" was approved (Army Order 241 of 1901), and raised from serving personnel. At the same time, the administration of Military Prisons was transferred from the Home Office to the military authorities.

The punishment of "Detention" was introduced by the Army Annual Act of 1906 and all Military Prisons were redesignated "Detention Barracks" with the exception of Dover and the new prison at the Curragh, which were reserved for soldiers undergoing sentences of imprisonment.

The title of the "Military Prison Staff Corps" was also changed at this time to "Military Provost Staff Corps."

Policy and Development

The early history of the treatment of military prisoners indicates that the principle adopted towards inmates was that the utmost severity and even

cruelty should be applied and, whenever possible, the maximum publicity given by way of example and determent to others.

The following instances of this attitude are selected from the records of military prisoners and punishments:—

In 1700, "running the gauntlet" between two ranks of men armed with switches was a common form of punishment.
In 1727, a soldier was executed for "attempting to desert."
In 1728, a soldier was sentenced to 12,600 lashes for "slaughtering his Commanding Officer's chargers and selling the hide" (after 1,800 lashes had been administered, the balance was remitted).

More recently, transportation for certain offences was still in force up to 1866, and though mutilation, tongue boring, etc., had been abolished, branding on the breast with the letters "BC" (bad character) was still in force in 1870 (*vide* Mutiny Act, 1870.)

Public punishments, which included the public exposure of offenders in the "stocks," gradually gave way to more private forms of punishments such as chains and fetters within prison limits, and with the transfer of administration to the military authorities in 1901 a more humane and less spectacular code of punishments was introduced.

The "Rules of Military Prisons," drawn up in 1899, included the following new paragraph, which is indicative of the attitude to be adopted by Prison Staffs towards those undergoing sentences:—

"It must ever be borne in mind that military prisoners are not criminals but soldiers withdrawn only temporarily from their units for breaches of military discipline. Every effort must, therefore, be made to prevent any falling off in their soldierly bearing and military spirit during their period of imprisonment."

Each prisoner was confined in a cell by himself and sufficient bedclothes and a proper supply of clean linen, towels, etc., were provided. The hair of the head was not to be cut "closer than may be necessary for purposes of health and cleanliness."

The power to punish prisoners was vested in the hands of the Governor. This power was strictly limited; only the Prison Visitors were authorized to award heavier punishments. (The immediate control of all Military Prisons at home and in the Colonies was of course still vested in the Inspector General of Military Prisons.)

Corporal punishment was awardable only for mutiny or incitement to mutiny or for gross personal violence to an officer or servant of the prison. This could only be inflicted on the order of three Visitors with the approval of the District or Station Commander. The "cat" or birch-rod was used and not more than 25 lashes were to be given. Prior certificate of fitness from the Medical Officer was essential in all cases of corporal punishment.

A system of marks, similar to those in civil prisons, was in vogue, enabling a man to progress by industry from one stage to another, the stringency of his treatment and the severity of his labour tasks being regulated according to his progress; but there were no means of earning remission of any part of his sentence.

Included in the labour tasks were:—

Shot-drill, i.e. the carrying of shot weighing 24 or 32 lb. and dumping—limited to one hour at a time, and not more than two hours a day.

Crank-drill, i.e. the working of a crank handle with a resistance of 12 lb. —not to exceed six hours daily in two shifts.

In the next few years various changes and improvements in the system of Military Prisons and punishments were effected. In 1904–5, earned remission of one-sixth part of the sentence was introduced. In 1906, with the change to Detention Barracks, soldiers undergoing sentences were allowed to wear uniform instead of prison dress. They arrived at the prison in marching order with rifles. Only soldiers undergoing sentences of imprisonment had to wear prison clothing.

Efforts to improve the lot of the military prisoner and to abolish all unproductive forms of labour in favour of useful industrial tasks, whilst undergoing sentences, gradually took effect. Shot-drill, which was useful only as a form of physical exercise, was abolished in 1902 and the picking of oakum in 1906.

Prison schools were also started at this period.

From historical records, it would appear that the period 1904–6 was perhaps the most progressive period in the introduction of reforms into the Military Prison system. The object became reformation of character rather than punishment for previous offences, and military penal establishments became training schools for discipline and educational subjects rather than penitentiaries for convicts.

The success of these new methods was shown by the large drop in numbers of soldiers committed to prison after the changes had materialized. It had been common for men under the old regime to become violent with vindictiveness shortly after leaving prison because of the harsh treatment they had received in prison, with the result that many of them found themselves shortly afterwards back in prison.

The officer who commanded the Detention Barracks at Aldershot in 1914 reported that "the reform system of treatment of military offenders has now been in full swing for about 11 years and the results are startling."

In 1912 there were 12,000 soldiers committed as against an average of about 20,000 annually under the old system. Moreover, punishments for offences against prison staffs were of frequent occurrence in the old days, whereas under the Detention Barracks system, by which the men were treated as soldiers, "offering violence" or "insubordination" became practically unknown offences.

This system survived the First World War and very few changes were made during this period and for some years afterwards. Further steps towards the maintenance of the soldierly spirit were, however, taken in 1930 by the release of the soldier, on discharge from Detention Barracks, at the Railway Station (instead of escorting him back to his unit) and in 1935 by further extending this policy by releasing the man at the Detention Barracks gates.

In 1937, the "Rules for Military Detention Barracks and Military Prisons" were revised, embodying the various changes in policy, which had been authorized since the previous (1924) edition. These revised rules were operative in 1939 when the Second World War broke out. It will be noted that the title of the new publication included the words "Military Detention Barracks and" in front of "Military Prisons" as compared with the title of the Rules published in 1899.

The control of all Military Detention Barracks and Military Prisons (other than those in India and Burma) was in the hands of the Army Council. In India and Burma this was vested in the Government of India. The establish-

ments came under the command of the local G.O.C.-in-C., and Commandants at home and Superintendents abroad were appointed by the War Office or by the G.O.C.-in-C. respectively. The Department under the Army Council responsible for the general administration of these establishments was that of the Adjutant-General at the War Office.

At the outbreak of war, the only Detention Barracks and Military Prison in operation was that at Aldershot, where about 200 prisoners were undergoing sentences.

War Expansion—United Kingdom

The rapid expansion of the Army resulted in a sudden increase of the number of soldiers under sentence and this necessitated taking over three civil prisons and other suitable buildings.

The Civil Prisons at Shepton Mallet (in October, 1939) and Riddrie, near Glasgow, and Hull (both in 1940) were taken over. Improvised Detention Barracks were opened at Carrickfergus (Northern Ireland), Chorley and Coatdyke in 1940, the last named including accommodation earmarked for members of Allied Forces.

Accommodation was again increased in 1941 by the opening of Detention Barracks at Langport, Sowerby Bridge, Stakehill and Fort Darland, the last named with a potential accommodation of 1,200. In addition, an approved School at Balgowan was taken over, and Northallerton Civil Prison was taken into use to replace the Barracks at Hull, which had been bombed.

At the end of 1941 there were some 5,000 men undergoing sentences in the United Kingdom, including approximately 100 members of Allied Forces.

In 1942, owing to the arrival of considerable numbers of American troops, Shepton Mallet and Langport were handed over to the Americans, and Mossbank (Glasgow) and Colchester Detention Barracks were taken into operation in replacement. Coatdyke was handed over—to the Admiralty—and the Allied personnel moved from there to Balgowan, which remained an Allied place of detention until the end of the war, and was staffed by British personnel, with the assistance of Allied interpreters and instructors.

The peak figure for British personnel held in these Establishments in the United Kingdom was reached in January, 1943, with a total of 5,151 (which included 118 men of the Royal Navy and 396 Royal Air Force personnel). The figure fell, however, to 4,730 by the end of the year, and to 4,000 by the end of 1944.

Except for the two small Detention Barracks at Ronaldshay and Middlebie, which were opened to deal with cases among the garrison of the Orkneys and Shetlands, no further penal establishments had to be opened in the United Kingdom during the remainder of the war.

War Expansion—Overseas

At the outbreak of war, Military Detention Barracks existed at the following stations abroad (other than India and Burma):—

China.—Hong Kong, Shanghai and Tientsin.
Egypt.—Cairo (also used as a Military Prison).
Mediterranean.—Gibraltar, Malta.
West Indies.—Jamaica.

Sudan.—Khartum (not more than 42 days' sentence to be carried out between 1st November and 31st March).
Malaya.—Singapore.

All these were administered under the same system as those in the United Kingdom, in accordance with the "Rules for Military Detention Barracks and Military Prisons, 1937."

Expansion was soon found necessary with the increase in overseas garrisons. New Detention Barracks were opened at Cairo, Cyprus, Jerusalem, Nairobi and also in Iceland, and the Civil Prison at Gibraltar was merged with the Military Detention Barracks.

In the Middle East, further Detention Barracks and Prisons were opened as the war progressed, and were given numerical designations from 50 to 57 without relation to any specific location. A number of Field Punishment Camps were also formed for the temporary detention of offenders.

The Detention Barracks in China and Malaya were captured by the enemy in 1941–42. Singapore was reopened in 1945.

New Detention Barracks were opened at Trinidad in 1943 and in Ceylon in 1945.

When 21 Army Group invaded Normandy on 6th June, 1944, one Military Prison, capable of accommodating 500 soldiers under sentence, and five Field Punishment Camps, each with a capacity of 150, were mobilized. (Soldiers sentenced to one year's detention or more whose sentences were not suspended were evacuated.) The first Field Punishment Camp formation arrived in Normandy on 23rd June and the Camp was opened on 18th July. By the end of September, the Military Prison and all five Field Punishment Camps were in operation. Later, a second prison was opened, also with a capacity of 500.

No. 34 Special Training Barracks

In addition to the normal military detention barracks and prisons and the punishment camps established to meet the increasing demands in overseas commands, a new type of unit was raised in Italy in 1944.

Its inception was due partly to the increased numbers of offenders, mostly desertion cases, being admitted to Detention Barracks, which resulted in the accommodation at these establishments becoming full to overflowing. The question of further extending the policy of suspension of sentences came under consideration and other measures were also discussed. Prison commandants expressed the view that a number of men in their charge were capable of redemption; many of these men had expressed a desire to be allowed to make good, and the commandants were of opinion that, with proper treatment and given suitable environment, carefully selected men could be rehabilitated.

The experience gained from Field Punishment Camps in the earlier stages of the war and the success of the Special Training Units at home no doubt combined to influence the decision to open a Rehabilitation Centre in Italy under the title of "34th Special Training Barracks" with a view to affording men who had been sentenced to long terms of imprisonment or detention another chance to make good.

The differences between this unit and that of the Special Training Units formed at home were that 34th Special Training Barracks was a Penal Establishment and also that the trainees were men whose long sentences it was proposed

to remit or suspend. The course of training at this unit was intended to fit the trainees for return to military duties.

The course of training was designed to last three months, 100 men being admitted each month. The unit was arranged in three companies, each of approximately 100, and every batch moved progressively each month into a new and freer company.

Although the trainees were kept under lock and key for two-thirds of the duration of their course, and the personnel of the staff were at first drawn from the M.P.S.C., the trainees were treated primarily as soldiers and not as convicts. They were never referred to as "soldiers under sentence" in this unit but were called "recruits." They were made to understand that they were there for training and not for punishment. Instructors were also referred to as such, never as warders.

No recruit was retained with this unit unless he was willing and the only punishment awardable was return to the prison from which he came. This policy was proved sound and successful.

Although the staff of "Instructors" was drawn at first from M.P.S.C., the need for up-to-date battle training required the employment of Regimental N.C.Os., who were used gradually to dilute the M.P.S.C. personnel.

The training consisted mainly of military, physical, educational and psychological periods. Physical fitness, knowledge of military matters and above all the right attitude towards military discipline were specially stressed. The improvement in the physical and mental condition of the average "recruit" after about the sixth or seventh week was particularly marked.

The type of trainee was assessed by the Commandant, after the intake of the first 1,000, in the following categories:—

(i) The young, poorly-trained and possibly not particularly well-led, immature soldier, who deserts after his first action.
(ii) The more mature soldier (25–30), no better trained, who deserts after several actions and before going into action again, or possibly after recovering from a wound.
(iii) The thoroughly undisciplined soldier accustomed to doing what he liked, who had not been "pulled up with a jerk" early enough in his Army career.
(iv) The so-called specialist who deserts on transfer to what he considers a non-specialist sub-unit, e.g. rifle company.
(v) The trained or untrained soldier determined to avoid battle at any cost, even by desertion.

Eighty per cent of the first ten batches of 100 received in this unit could be classified under one of the above five categories.

From reports on this unit's activities written at the time there are certain noticeable differences between the treatment of trainees there and that at other similar establishments penal or non-penal. For instance, the services of a psychiatric adviser do not appear to have been called in either at the time of the man's admission or on discharge, nor is any mention made of the services of a chaplain either on the establishment or as a frequent visitor, and no welfare activities are included in these reports.

The system employed by which each intake of 100 recruits moved into a different company after every month's training meant that month by month each trainee was given, and found, progressively greater freedom and more

privileges. Only very rarely were these abused. Finally, he was passed out, the standard set being very high. The decision whether a man was fit or not to rejoin a unit rested mainly upon the ability or otherwise of each member of the staff reporting upon him to answer honestly the question, "Would I have this man in my own company?"

Each intake was visited by a Board of Officers about the end of the second month of the course. This Board comprised a senior commanding officer, a staff officer, the Inspector of Military Prisons and the Commandant 34th Special Training Barracks. Each recruit was interviewed individually by this Board, who were the final arbiters on a man's disposal on completion of the course.

This unit was in active operation from December, 1944, until November, 1945. The records maintained for the first ten months show the following results:—

Total recruits admitted—1,046.

Returned to prison at own request . . .	52
Returned to prison by Commandant's orders	108
Returned to prison by Allied Forces H.Q. Board's orders	178
Escaped	15
In hospital	2
Trained soldiers returned to duty . . .	691
	1,046

Plans had been made and orders given for the establishment to be increased so that as many soldiers under sentence as possible from Military Prisons should pass through this unit before returning to duty. When the war ended these orders were cancelled.

War Expansion—M.P.S.C. Staff

In 1939 the establishment of the Military Provost Staff Corps in the United Kingdom amounted to 45 on the Active List, with 13 reservists. This was adequate to deal with commitments at Aldershot.

On mobilization, two Military Prisons were required to accompany the Expeditionary Force and had to be manned from these slender resources. The replacement of these men and the reinforcement of the Corps at short notice was not a simple problem. The Corps comprises only warrant officers, staff sergeants and sergeants and in peace-time men were required to serve a probationary period of six months. After this probationary period, a man was accepted in the rank of sergeant.

Immediate reinforcement therefore had to come from ex-M.P.S.C. pensioners and other pensioners considered suitable. These pensioners were available in small numbers only, and it became necessary to recall from the Reserve 189 Civil Prison Officers and to transfer them compulsorily to the M.P.S.C. During this period of inability or unwillingness of serving personnel to transfer, these Prison Officers proved invaluable.

In 1941, a special Army Council Instruction (A.C.I. 1141 of 1941) was published calling for volunteers to transfer as N.C.Os. not below the rank of

war-substantive corporal. One month's probation only was required. This had the effect of bringing in a number of suitable N.C.Os. In 1942 a similar invitation was published (in A.C.I. 2444 of 1942) with favourable results. At the same time, however, an increase of 25 per cent in the establishment of the Corps, based on the recommendations of the Dempsey Committee, was approved (*see* below, p. 80).

In spite of all efforts, however, it was found impracticable to keep pace with the expansion of penal establishments as the war progressed by the transfer of trained N.C.Os. to the M.P.S.C. and these had to be supplemented by the temporary attachment of untrained N.C.Os. from other Arms of the Service.

In 1945, there was a deficiency in the United Kingdom of approximately 180 N.C.Os., of whom 121 were under training. At the same time, in overseas commands, there was a deficiency of roughly 400 M.P.S.C., against which 237 N.C.Os. had been borrowed from other Arms to fill vacancies as an emergency measure.

Changes in Administration of M.P.S.C. during the War

Since 1935 the records of the Military Provost Staff Corps had been in the charge of the Officer i/c C.M.P. and M.P.S.C. Records. These were transferred in 1940 to the Officer i/c R.A. and Coast Defence Records. Promotions and postings of M.P.S.C. personnel were, however, carried out on the recommendation of the Inspector of Military Detention Barracks and Prisons, working under the orders of the Director of Personal Services in the Adjutant-General's Department.

Ths Inspector was also responsible for carrying out periodical inspections of all Detention Barracks and Prisons and reporting to the War Office, copies of his reports being sent to headquarters of commands concerned.

G.Os.C.-in-Chief and local commanders also carried out inspections periodically with a view to ensuring that the administration was being conducted in accordance with the "Rules for Military Detention Barracks and Military Prisons, 1937."

Within these penal establishments, before the war, the administration, discipline and training of the soldiers under sentence had been carried out in accordance with the above Rules, and owing to the smallness of the numbers and general similarity in type of offenders, no special distinction had been made in the treatment between one soldier and another except in the case of those to be discharged from the Army, who were dealt with separately. The one Military Prison and Detention Barracks at Aldershot, authorized then to hold 220 soldiers under sentence, was adequate and the prisoners, being soldiers who had enlisted voluntarily, were necessarily of good character on enlistment. Moreover, they were for the most part fully trained soldiers and the offences for which they were admitted were mainly of a military nature. Men of less redeemable characters were normally discharged.

Generally speaking, the atmosphere was that of a prison, the policy adopted largely punitive and deterrent. The only officers were the Commandant and the Assistant-Commandant, and the staff was composed entirely of warrant officers and N.C.Os. permanently transferred to the Military Provost Staff Corps and therefore possibly out of touch with military training. Their outlook was, in fact, as might be expected, akin to that of prison warders. Such conditions were not well suited to the administration and control of war-time

military delinquents, and the expansion indicated above in the numbers of these establishments during the war brought about certain essential changes in their administration and system of discipline. Owing to the conscription of large numbers of men of all types and characters, the ratio of prisoners rose from 2·5 per 1,000 in 1939 to 3 per 1,000 in 1943 and to 3·5 by the end of the war. Included in these figures were a proportion of habitual criminals and also a number of young potential bad characters. Moreover, life in a penal establishment appealed to a certain type of war-time soldier in preference to the conditions and dangers of active service in the Field. This type called for special consideration and treatment.

This treatment could not always be provided. The new buildings taken over to accommodate the increased numbers of prisoners were not always satisfactory for this purpose, and the meagre cadre of Military Provost Staff Corps was insufficient to staff such buildings efficiently.

With a view to arriving at a practicable solution of these difficulties, two committees, the Dempsey Committee and the Oliver Committee, were appointed to investigate conditions and to make recommendations.

The Dempsey Committee

The Dempsey Committee was appointed in 1941 under the Chairmanship of Major-General M. C. Dempsey, D.S.O., M.C. Its terms of reference were: "To enquire and report as to whether the treatment, training, accommodation and feeding of soldiers under sentence in Military Prisons and Detention Barracks is in accordance with modern standards and satisfy the requirements of a war-time Army."

After visiting a number of barracks and prisons and taking evidence, the Committee made a number of recommendations, many of which were adopted, including the following:—

(i) Periods of detention not exceeding ten days to be served in a Unit or Corps Guard Room.
(ii) The number of officers on the staff of Barracks and Prisons to be increased, and N.C.Os. to be increased by 25 per cent.
(iii) For every 500 soldiers, a full-time Chaplain to be appointed.
(iv) A Welfare Officer to be attached to each establishment.
(v) A Psychiatrist to examine all soldiers under sentence and, for every 500, a full-time Medical Officer to be appointed.
(vi) All training to be placed under the supervision of the Director of Military Training.
(vii) Unit commanders to send a description of the man's character, attainments and weakness, and also state of training, to the Commandant of the Barracks or Prisons at the time of the man's admission.

As a result of these recommendations, staffs were increased in March, 1942, and soldiers under sentence were segregated by types so as to avoid the habitual criminal and the young offender being thrown together while undergoing sentence (Army Council Instruction 812 of 1942). Emphasis was laid upon Military Training (*see* Army Council Instruction 811 of 1942) and the aim was to endeavour to rehabilitate the men as soldiers and to return them to their units as early as possible. Welfare officers and chaplains were in fact appointed but, owing to shortage of officers, whole-time medical officers could not be

posted. In all other respects, these recommendations were put into effect during 1942.

The Oliver Committee

The Oliver Committee in 1943 (under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice Oliver) had the following terms of references:—"To enquire into and report on the treatment of men under sentence in Naval and Military Prisons and Detention Barracks in the United Kingdom and whether it is in accordance with modern standards and satisfies war-time requirements.

"The investigation will cover *inter alia* the supervision and administration of discipline, medical care, training, welfare, accommodation, feeding and the suitability and adequacy of the staff."

Before detailing their recommendations, the Committee made certain important observations which seem specially relevant and worthy of recording here:—

"As applied to the Services, while the word 'detention' carries less stigma than the word 'imprisonment,' the treatment of persons sentenced to imprisonment and detention is in the main the same, the only difference being that some of the places of detention are in their environment more unpleasant than others." (As regards soldiers under sentence) "The best of these are men who have transgressed more or less accidentally or because of some other family trouble or other pressure. The worst of them are men who show by their conduct that they are quite determined not to serve in any event but would rather spend their time till the end of the war in detention or prison. These may be called recidivists.

"In these circumstances several considerations present themselves as reasonable:—

"(*a*) Places of detention must not offer greater attractions than service with a unit, but less. Conditions must therefore be strict and the work and discipline hard. Complete loss of liberty is probably the strongest deterrent, but additional penalties have to be provided to deal with those who refuse to conform to the discipline of the places themselves. These take the form of dietary punishment, loss of privileges, loss of remission and the like.

"(*b*) In the case of all but the recidivists the object of these places should be rehabilitation, the training of a good soldier, in place of a bad one, the building up of self-respect by discipline of the right sort.

"(*c*) In the case of the recidivist, it is probably hopeless to try to convert him to better ways, but, at the same time, while he is unlikely to be of any use to his country in any capacity, it cannot be allowed to go forth that a man whose services have been demanded by his country can secure for himself exemption, whilst others serve, merely by refusing to perform them. This would only tempt waverers to follow suit."

The chief recommendations made by the Oliver Committee, to which effect was given whenever practicable, were:—

(i) The institution of a Military Provost Staff Corps Training School.
(ii) General increase in staffs of Detention Barracks and Prisons, particularly in the case of commissioned officers.
(iii) Appointment of a whole-time medical officer for each establishment

and infrequent changes of those posted. (The difficulty, owing to shortage, of giving effect to a similar proposal by the Dempsey Committee has already been referred to.)

(iv) Facilities for military training and general education to be extended.

(v) The system of segregation of different types of detainees now in force to be strictly maintained.

Summary

From the brief historical sketch given earlier in this Part it will be seen that, even before the war, there had already been a wave of feeling in favour of the amelioration of conditions of those sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, which had repercussions also upon the conduct of Military Detention Barracks and Prisons.

The whole attitude of the Commandant and his staff at Aldershot had been directed towards the "instilling of soldierlike and moral principles," "striving to acquire moral influence by performing their duties conscientiously and without harshness," etc. The replacement of the title "prisoner" by "soldier under sentence," the introduction of earned remission of sentences, the replacement of unproductive labour by useful industrial work, the grant of financial assistance in suitable cases on discharge from prison to enable men to exist reasonably while seeking civil employment; all these and other innovations had indicated a more humane and understanding method of approach to the problem of "rehabilitation" of military offenders as opposed to stark, severe punishment without remission or chance of recovery, however penitent or well behaved the offender might be.

It has also been shown that in peace-time this problem was a comparatively simple one since it applied only to the professional voluntary soldier.

Nevertheless, conditions at Aldershot were far from perfect. The prison atmosphere was still very prevalent there; the staff were out of touch with modern conditions in units and lacked experience and knowledge of latest methods of training; the offence rather than the offender was considered the important factor and his body rather than his mind was given the greater attention.

Had the war not supervened, no doubt changes would have taken place in order to keep pace with modern trends towards prison reform. As it was, the advent of war made certain modifications of attitude and methods essential to meet the different conditions arising out of expansion and conscription. Not only was the type of individual admitted to Military Penal Establishments different but his attitude towards detention (and hence his behaviour) was coloured by his outlook on what was going on in the outside world, his chances of survival in war, and his desire or otherwise to fight for his country. Moreover, the attitude of the military authorities towards the problem also underwent a change, for their chief anxiety was to rehabilitate every soldier for his quick return to the ranks. The rigid system of punishment operating in peace proved unsuited to the war-time Army.

The various types of delinquent being received in these Establishments soon began to be recognized and it became evident that one form of treatment could not be applied to all types. Owing perhaps to psychiatric doctrine, the importance of the man's state of mind, his environment, upbringing and other causative factors towards crime came to be studied, and the theory that

military crime is not necessarily anti-social conduct and military offenders are not necessarily criminals began to receive more favour and attention.

The acceptance of these theories as applicable to the war-time delinquent brought about a change of heart in the administration and conduct of Military Penal Establishments. Terms such as "corrective measures," "rehabilitation," and "training," came to be used instead of the word "punishment." The segregation of young offenders from the old lag and the hardened criminal, and, generally, the distribution of the different types of delinquents according to their criminal or psychiatric classification were measures designed to apply the right "treatment" to the right "patient."

The formation of punishment camps, special training barracks and other special types of unit, in which the ordinary rigid forms of discipline were partially discarded in favour of more suitable and flexible methods of correction, was the direct outcome of this new approach.

Apart from the necessity to maintain the man's military knowledge and training up to date, the importance of employing the remainder of his time while undergoing his sentence usefully and profitably also came to be realized and applied. Moreover, the man's soldierly instincts, self-respect, turn-out, and determination to make good were encouraged and developed in every way.

Remission, earned by good behaviour while under sentence, up to a limit of one-sixth was introduced before the war. This was increased to one-third in 1940 as a greater incentive to more rapid rehabilitation and, in certain of the new types of penal establishments, the method of progressive freedom by monthly stages was applied with advantage.

Finally, where all corrective measures had failed and discharge was found to be unsuitable, all practicable aid was given to the man to enable him to be rehabilitated as a citizen in civil life.

The lessons derived from the measures put into practice during the war, together with the opinions expressed by the investigating Committees, particularly the broader views of the Oliver Committee, provided excellent material which has been utilized to the full in framing the new policy for the reorganization of the Military Penal System.

PART VII

THE CORPS OF MILITARY POLICE

CHAPTER XX.—BRIEF HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO SECOND WORLD WAR

Personnel of the Corps of Royal Military Police are the executive representatives of the Provost-Marshal.

The Provost-Marshal's appointment dates back to the days of the Norman and Angevin kings. It was a personal appointment made under the King's authority for the purpose of watching the Royal interests.

As a military title, it appears to be the oldest in the country. The duties of the Provost-Marshal in the earliest times were to enforce the King's peace within military assemblies and camps and also in the Field. It is recorded that one officer holding this title accompanied Edward III's first expeditionary force and that another was present at Crécy and Agincourt. Early in the sixteenth century, Provost-Marshals were frequently mentioned in Henry VIII's "Articles of War," and references are also made to Provost Companies. It does not appear, however, that these Provost-men on the Marshal's staff were soldiers, as they are later mentioned in some detail as "tipstaves," "gaolers," and "assistant-gaolers." The Provost-Marshal continued to carry out his functions as chief gaoler and executioner of malefactors and, when any particular expedition was prepared, a separate Provost-Marshal was appointed for the purpose. Thus in 1611 there is mention of a Provost-Marshal in America with the troops in Virginia and in 1678 one at Fort St. George, Madras.

It is not, however, until Wellington's campaign in the Peninsular War that the military nature of the Provost-Marshal's duties came to be fully appreciated and developed. The Army in the Peninsula was notoriously ill-disciplined and the Provost-Marshal's establishment totally inadequate to deal with the situation. In 1810, however, the Provost-Marshal's duties were clearly defined in Wellington's orders, "The office of Provost-Marshal has existed in all British Armies in the Field. His particular duties are to take charge of prisoners confined for offences of a general description; to preserve good order and military discipline; to prevent breaches of both by the soldiers and followers of the Army by his presence at those places in which either are likely to be committed and, if necessary, he has by constant usage in all Armies, the power to punish those whom he may find in the act of committing breaches of order and discipline." Wellington increased the Provost establishment by posting special troops to work under the Provost-Marshal's orders. They were, however, retained on the muster rolls of the units to which they belonged and were not placed on a separate corps list.

After the Napoleonic Wars, the appointment of Provost-Marshal was reduced to that of Captain in the Army, though it was emphasized that the appointment

was "one of great responsibility, requiring the utmost vigilance and activity."

His Headquarters were established at Aldershot, where the training of Provost-men was undertaken. It was in 1855 that the term "Military Police" first made its appearance in military parlance when the Corps of Mounted Police was formed.

In 1865 the establishment was only 32 mounted police, and it was found that the Garrison Police, formed from regimental establishments, were inadequate to deal with discipline and these were gradually reinforced by trained "Policemen" from Aldershot.

The Staff of Military Prisons became specialized and were called the "Military Prison Staff Corps," but eventually (owing presumably to the Provost-Marshal's traditional duties as Chief Gaoler of the Army) changed their title to "Military Provost Staff Corps."

In 1877, there were military police detachments serving at Portsmouth, Shorncliffe, Dover and the Curragh on permanent garrison duty, and in 1882 detachments were serving overseas in Cairo and also with the Field Forces at Tel-el-Kebir and Suakin, where they had a number of casualties. For these duties in Egypt a special Corps of Military Foot Police was raised from reservists who had joined the Metropolitan Police after leaving the colours. These were retained after the war in Egypt and in 1885 the Corps of Police was divided into two wings, Mounted and Foot, each with its own promotion roll.

The Records of these Police were transferred about this time from their units to the custody of the Provost-Marshal and in 1886 the members serving in the two wings totalled 263. There were still no officers.

Foot Police were now established in all the large garrison towns in England, e.g. Aldershot, Colchester, Dover, Shorncliffe, Chatham, Woolwich, Portsmouth, Gosport and Devonport, in order to assist units in the efficient performance of garrison police duties. Detachments also operated at the Curragh, at Edinburgh and in most of the permanent stations abroad.

During the South African War (1899–1902) about 70 men, including all the Provost and Police personnel in Egypt, were sent out for police duties. An important duty in this campaign was the picketing of water-points against possible poisoning by the enemy, as had occurred in the early stages. Two Military Policemen were awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

During the First World War, the vast expansion of the British Army necessitated the appointment of a Provost-Marshal at G.H.Q. Home Forces, for the co-ordination of measures affecting the Corps of Military Police in the various commands. Officers were also appointed to carry out the duties of Assistant Provost-Marshal in areas and formations. These officers' functions were not at first clearly defined and stress was laid upon such duties as counter-espionage and control of aliens rather than discipline. Military Policemen, too, were often misused as orderlies, horseholders, and messengers, and formation commanders resented the situation by which personnel employed in their area of command were not for general employment if and when required.

At first regimental personnel were used for garrison police duties owing to shortage of Military Police, but the weakness of this system was that these men were empowered to arrest only men belonging to their own units. Subsequently Garrison Military Police were formed to supplement the Corps of Military Police, and this system was adopted throughout the United Kingdom. The former were paid at the same rates as the latter and came under the orders of the appropriate Assistant Provost-Marshal.

The difficulty of obtaining the right type of officer and man for these duties

in sufficient numbers was experienced at this juncture. This problem of finding suitable personnel for important extra-regimental duties is, however, an almost insoluble one in an Army which is required to expand in war to the extent necessary for the British Army.

The most satisfactory solution was found to be to transfer personnel from the Garrison Military Police, originally selected by units for garrison police duties, to the Corps of Military Police (A.C.I. 1733 of 1916), and to replace them by other men from units, who would similarly be tried out in Garrison Military Police.

Dock Police and Port Police, the latter under the Intelligence Department, were usefully employed at each of the larger embarkation ports.

In overseas theatres the Military Police were required to perform a variety of duties both in forward and in rear areas. The most important became that of traffic control, starting with the battle of Neuve Chapelle in 1915 up to the final advance, including the Battle of the Somme in which Provost personnel were required to hold bridges, stragglers' posts, etc., often under heavy fire. In rearward areas, their duties included the recovery of stolen Government property, clothing, rations, etc.

During the First World War the following decorations were awarded to Military Police personnel:—13 D.S.Os., 8 M.Cs., 55 D.C.Ms., 260 M.Ms., 26 M.S.Ms., while 105 were mentioned in despatches.

Throughout this war the Military Police were armed with pistols, but even a supply of these was difficult to maintain and some detachments at home had to remain unarmed. The total strength of the Corps of Military Police in France at the end of 1918 was more than 5,000 all ranks.

During the occupation of Germany, the special problem facing the Police was that of avoiding clashes between British troops and German soldiers or civilians. A Provost representative officer, with a German-speaking officer attached, was posted to each Area of Occupation for special duties, control of passes, etc., and, in addition, Assistant Provost-Marshals were appointed in the bigger towns with Deputy Assistant Provost-Marshals at smaller places. Their duties included control of the Press and other printed matter, telephones, alcohol, places of entertainment, and brothels. In addition searches for hidden arms, wireless sets, cameras, etc., had to be carried out and although persons of different nationalities were allowed to intermingle, fraternization of any kind had to be severely controlled. Undoubtedly the Provost made a valuable contribution to the success of the occupation.

On 27th February, 1926, the Military Mounted Police and the Military Foot Police were merged into one Corps, under the title of the "Corps of Military Police," the establishment being reduced to 508.

In 1927 the first self-contained and self-administered Provost Company was formed to accompany the Shanghai Defence Force, and in 1933 the first Provost exercise was practised on manœuvres.

In 1935 the Provost-Marshal became Commandant of the Depot and School of Instruction, in addition to his duties as officer in charge of records of both the Corps of Military Police and the Military Provost Staff Corps (*see* Chapter XIX.—*Military Detention Barracks and Prisons*). The Corps was organized into companies and sections and, with mechanized vehicles, it was found that by a reduction of small garrisons and a wider dispersal of detachments better use could be made of available resources.

A company was despatched to Hong Kong and one to Singapore, which

became permanent Military Police Stations, and the remainder of the Corps was distributed as under:—

United Kingdom . .	364 all ranks	
Egypt: Cairo . . .	One company	
Abbassia . .	One company	
Moascar . .	One company	(one section at Alexandria)
Malta	One section	
Gibraltar	One section	
China: Shanghai . .	One section	
Total	500 all ranks.	

The standard of recruitment was high, the qualifications required being 2nd class certificate, Good Conduct Stripes, 3 years' service and irreproachable character.

In 1936 two companies were despatched to Palestine with three Corps and Lines of Communication sections. One company remained there after the return of the rest of the force at the end of the year. In 1938, a Military Police Supplementary Reserve of 500 men was raised mainly from Automobile Association Road Patrols. This number was later increased to 850. In addition, Guards' reservists, who had civil police experience, were posted to Provost units.

In February, 1939, a Provost Company was allotted to each of the Divisions of the Territorial Army, the distribution then being:—

Serving Soldiers (C.M.P.)	769
"A," "B," and "D" reservists	500
Supplementary reservists	850
Territorials	1,002
Guardsmen reservists } mainly from civil police.	500
Other reservists }	500

This grand total of 4,121 all ranks provided an effective strength of approximately 3,000.

The new company organization allowed of a system of grouping, which was in operation in 1939 in the United Kingdom. One group was known as Command or "Static" Companies, the other as Field Formation Companies. The Divisional Provost Company (which became the best known of these Military Police units) was organized in Company H.Q., and six sections for use with its appropriate divisional units. The Static Companies were intended mainly for garrison duties, a company being stationed in each command.

In spite of its excellent war record in Egypt and South Africa and its active part in many countries during the First World War the Corps of Military Police was still non-combatant in 1939.

CHAPTER XXI.—DUTIES DURING SECOND WORLD WAR (FIRST PHASE)

France and Flanders, 1939–40

With the arrival of the British Expeditionary Force in France in September, 1939, one of the first tasks to be undertaken by the Provost units was traffic control. Writing on 14th October, a press correspondent gave the following account of the large-scale movement of British troops across France shortly after their arrival:—

"Some 720 men of the Corps of Military Police brought 25,000 vehicles many miles across country which they themselves had never seen until the day before the operation began, and they did so without any block or hold-up or serious inconvenience to the normal French traffic. Never at any time did the driver of a vehicle have to open a map; his way had been marked for him by signs and by Military Police at cross-roads.

"Organized by the Provost-Marshal and his assistants, all this was carried out almost unaided by the N.C.Os. of the Military Police. Each section consisted of a Serjeant, Corporals and Lance-Corporals in a self-contained unit with its own truck containing traffic-control apparatus, arrow or stencilled designs in black and white; paint remover, so that the signs can be altered; with its own cooking apparatus and driver of the truck, who is also the unit cook. It is accompanied by a French gendarme who deals with the local Mayor and gendarmerie and arranges billets.

"The success of this operation was a tribute not only to fine organization which had been going on for a whole year but also to the qualities of the men who carried it out."

From the above account, it can be fairly claimed that the method of training, the new organization and the valuable aid of the reservists drawn from the Civil Police and Automobile Association patrols all proved their worth in this first traffic control operation of the Second World War, which was described in a "Special Order of the Day" as the largest road movement ever undertaken with motor transport by any British Army.

During the first six months in France, there was little active hostility on the part of the enemy, and the duties of the Military Police differed little materially from those required of them at home. Co-operation with the French appeared to cause little difficulty and within a short time British Military Police were controlling traffic even in big cities and being obeyed with amiable docility by the French public. In regard to crime also, the Provost staff worked in close co-operation with the French police both in dealing with petty thefts of private property and in investigating unauthorized disposals of Government Stores and equipment. The Special Investigation Branch of the Police was later formed to deal with these activities.

Duties at Home

In the meantime the Military Police were getting into their stride at home. Many of their duties were merely a continuation of those existing in peace-time.

On the other hand, their work in connection with vehicles was much greater, e.g. road discipline, dangerous driving, waste of petrol, etc. During air-raids they had the two-fold task of maintaining discipline as in normal times and also of showing by example that work must go on, in spite of danger.

German Offensive in France, May, 1940

When the Germans opened their offensive on 10th May, 1940, the British Expeditionary Force was required to move across the Belgian frontier to positions on the River Dyle from Wavre to Louvain, a move of about 60 miles over unreconnoitred routes. Moving some hours ahead of the main body, the Traffic Control Police had the roads marked and sign-posted to facilitate the troops' rapid movement to their assembly areas. The organization was apparently excellent but a serious impediment in the form of refugees had not been foreseen. The difficulty of controlling the movements of these thousands of refugees fleeing for their lives was an almost superhuman task, made still more difficult owing to the language complications. Finally some sort of order was created out of chaos and the moves were completed and the Police returned to their numerous other activities, e.g. security duties; prisoners of war; suspected fifth columnists; traffic control at dispersal points and supply, ammunition and petrol parks, and guide posts and information bureaux.

During the retreat to Dunkirk the Police again assumed their role of traffic controllers, but they played many other parts in addition. A combined British and French movement control organization was established in May and a Special British Traffic Control Company was formed (No. 151 Provost Company) from existing companies in France, including a large number of reservists employed by the Automobile Association. This Company was attached for traffic control duties to No. 1 Road Control Group with H.Q. at Amiens. In the heavy fighting around Amiens in the middle of May, No. 151 Provost Company performed many additional duties including helping the medical authorities with the wounded, opening their H.Q. as a Dressing Station, guarding stores, etc.

On 19th May, No. 1 Control Group withdrew *via* Beauvais, Vaudricourt, and Montreuil, the roads being heavily congested with Belgian troops and civilians. They were heavily machine-gunned from the air and were diverted to Desvres (as Montreuil was cut off) and Steenvorde, but never arrived, as they were surrounded and cut off by German tanks. Many were wounded and taken prisoner. At Dunkirk, Divisional Provost Companies saw their own formations embark in the evacuation craft and then stayed on to assist in the evacuation of the wounded, to act as messengers on the beaches, etc. The final boat which left the beaches on 2nd June contained a large proportion of men of the Corps of Military Police. In the Calais area, Provost personnel carried out traffic control and also dock duties. At the end, when all communications had been cut, two Military Police corporals undertook to carry a message to Dunkirk. One of them reached Dunkirk, the other was killed.

Throughout this phase of the campaign, the official weapon for Provost personnel had been the pistol. It became clear, however, that this weapon was totally inadequate for some of the situations with which these men had to deal, and in which they were compelled to arm themselves, though untrained, with some long-distance weapon. As a result of this short experience, it was decided to augment their pistols with rifles and automatics.

Norway

During the brief campaign in Norway from March to June, 1940, a company (No. 6 L. of C.) of Military Police accompanied 49th Division. They were employed in security duties at the docks, town patrols and traffic control duty and did excellent work in the evacuation.

The United Kingdom, 1940–41

In June, 1940, all active fighting had ceased in the West and none had yet begun in the East. The task of the Army at home was therefore one of intense effort—firstly to recover from the severe mauling received on the Continent resulting in serious loss of arms, vehicles and stores of all kinds; secondly, though simultaneously, to prepare for possible enemy invasion; and thirdly to train fresh troops for despatch to the Middle East to ensure the safety of Egypt against invasion.

The administrative effect of this intense activity was reflected in the springing up of new Headquarters and camps all over the country and the endless movement of troops either for defence purposes or to and from training centres, by road and rail. The importance of road discipline began to be realized as stricter traffic control was imposed.

One defensive and security measure adopted caused considerable difficulty and embarrassment to traffic control personnel. This was the removal of place-names from railway-stations, post offices and advertisements, and the removal of road sign-posts. Apart from the problem of directing units and military personnel during road travel, the practical experience gained in France and Belgium indicated that the difficulty of controlling and directing vast numbers of civilians would be far greater, and the absence of place-names presented a somewhat stiffer problem than anything with which the traffic control staff had yet had to deal. The formation of a separate Traffic Control Wing was decided upon in order to tackle this and other major problems arising at this stage of the war. The Provost-Marshal's status was raised to Brigadier and Command Assistant Provost-Marshals were upgraded to Deputy Provost-Marshals.

Because of the threat of invasion, the duties and training of the Military Police in Eastern and South-Eastern Commands were naturally more nearly operational than in other commands where disciplinary duties were predominant. But in the Southern Command, the arrival of Dominion troops at first resulted in a number of disturbances, requiring increased activity and also considerable tact on the part of the Provost police.

In London, the special knowledge of the city, its terminus stations, main thoroughfares and also its amenities, required to assist soldiers passing through, was soon acquired by the London "Redcap," who also showed a remarkable spirit of self-sacrifice and quiet initiative during the serious air-raids at this period of the war. Undoubtedly, too, close co-operation developed between these Military Police and the Metropolitan Police Force, and Police Liaison Officers were appointed in all parts of the United Kingdom to foment and maintain such co-operation with the Civil Police.

Early in 1941, another separate Wing (the Vulnerable Points Wing) was formed for the special duty of guarding strategic points in relief of other fighting troops. These points were manned by men of comparatively low

edical category. At this stage training mainly stressed the Defence aspect of erations, which afforded comparatively little value from the traffic control int of view. From the lessons learnt, however, it appeared that little change as necessary in the organization and training of these units as adopted in 39. As they became available, jeeps were introduced in replacement of otor-cycle combinations.

Gradually the fear of invasion dwindled and the spirit of training changed offensive, affording wider scope for large-scale movements and traffic control oblems. A difficulty experienced in the training of Provost units for over-as was lack of knowledge of their future destination and probable duties and was found necessary therefore to train and equip them to be more or less terchangeable at short notice between traffic control and other Provost duties.

With the advent of Russia into the war and the accession of the United ates to the side of the Allies at the end of 1941, the whole scope of the war as considerably enlarged and the possible spheres of operations in which troops ight be required were similarly increased. The numerous duties which units the Corps of Military Police were called upon to perform during these critical ar years may be conveniently considered (*see* Chapters XXII to XXV) under e following headings:—

(*a*) Continuation of war-time duties at home, including organization and training of units for overseas campaigns.
(*b*) Campaigns in Greece, Crete, Syria, Palestine and Singapore.
(*c*) Middle East campaign, Sicily and Italy.
(*d*) Allied campaign in North Africa.
(*e*) Campaign in North-West Europe.
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Gradually the fear of invasion dwindled and the spirit of training changed to offensive, affording wider scope for large-scale movements and traffic control problems. A difficulty experienced in the training of Provost units for overseas was lack of knowledge of their future destination and probable duties and it was found necessary therefore to train and equip them to be more or less interchangeable at short notice between traffic control and other Provost duties.

With the advent of Russia into the war and the accession of the United States to the side of the Allies at the end of 1941, the whole scope of the war was considerably enlarged and the possible spheres of operations in which troops might be required were similarly increased. The numerous duties which units of the Corps of Military Police were called upon to perform during these critical war years may be conveniently considered (*see* Chapters XXII to XXV) under the following headings:—

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(*d*) Allied campaign in North Africa.
(*e*) Campaign in North-West Europe.
(*f*) War against Japan.

CHAPTER XXII.—DUTIES DURING SECOND WORLD WAR (SECOND PHASE)

Duties at Home

Although all serious threat of invasion had disappeared, no reasonable precaution was relaxed and the duties of the Corps of Military Police in regard to the defence of vulnerable points continued to occupy a number of Vulnerable Point Companies. In addition, the problems of traffic control, general disciplinary duties and especially those connected with vehicles, involved full-time duties for their appropriate companies. With each annual intake the size of the Army increased and to a certain extent, as conscript succeeded volunteer, the type and character received in these intakes deteriorated. This created new problems for the Corps.

Discipline

Early in 1942 large numbers of American troops, with vehicles and stores, began to arrive in uncertain but ever-increasing volume. These troops were disembarked in Northern Ireland and thence proceeded to various parts of England and Scotland for training. They brought their own Military Police with them but these appeared to have had little police training and were in any case somewhat adrift in their new surroundings.

In Londonderry there were occasional disorders between American Marines and British sailors and finally an American Marine Shore Patrol had to be stationed there to assist British Police in their efforts to play the part of impartial referee.

Similar episodes of varying difficulty occurred in various places, but considering the problems of the situation, especially in regard to the women, who in many cases were separated from their menfolk, while Dominion and American soldiers in Great Britain were separated from their womenkind, there were, on the whole, comparatively few major clashes.

Traffic Control

Although there were fewer private cars on the roads, the number of Service vehicles, especially lorries, increased tremendously, and the calls made upon the traffic control staff at all hours of the day and night were very heavy. The effect was, however, to produce greatly improved Road Discipline among unit drivers.

Value of Training

Two exercises, "Tiger" and "Spartan," were held and afforded excellent practice both for traffic control companies and for the troops. In the first of these, each force had to carry out alternately a rapid advance followed by a rapid withdrawal at short notice. The result was to strain to the fullest extent the traffic control organization of formations taking part. The second exercise—

"Spartan"—was the largest-scale exercise yet held, involving an Army of invasion against the forces of the invaded country. Many important lessons regarding the organization and operation of traffic control were learnt from this exercise, several of which were at once put into effect. Of these perhaps the most important and urgently needed was a clear definition of the proper relationship and distribution of responsibility between the Staff and the Military Police. During the exercise, operation orders had been issued by Q (Movements) Staff direct to the Traffic Control Group without reference to the Deputy Provost-Marshal concerned, who thus had no official knowledge of the whereabouts of, or duties assigned to, his units. Moreover, there was no ordered traffic control plan for the whole system of lengthening communications as the exercises developed, e.g. linked traffic posts, information posts, road intelligence. This lack of co-ordinated planning and purpose resulted in considerable chaos and the lessons they produced were so clearly defined as to be learnt and acted upon before being driven home through experience in actual operations. The consequent re-distribution of responsibility and overhaul of methods resulted in much smoother working between the Staff and the Traffic Control organization. The Deputy or Assistant Provost-Marshal concerned was in future given the executive responsibility for traffic control and for the implementation of the traffic plan in accordance with the orders of the Staff.

As a further result of the lessons learnt during this productive exercise and from subsequent discussions, a pamphlet was drawn up by the combined efforts of the Q (Movements) staff and the Provost-Marshal's staff, which contained the Common Doctrine agreed upon by both. This was issued in May, 1943, under the title "Notes on the Control of Military Road Movement in a Theatre of War." Thus the many errors, both of omission and commission, brought out in this training exercise turned out to be a blessing in disguise for the operational working of the Traffic Control system in war.

Man-power Problems

The provision and preparation of units for overseas forces, both in being and in prospect, in addition to normal reinforcements, presented a formidable task. New duties were continually being found for Military Police units, and it was often found that war establishments were inadequate for the purpose, and needed to be increased.

The main problem was the provision of the right type of individual with the necessary qualifications and within the time available. As far as possible all ex-policemen were extracted from other Arms in order to reduce the normal period of police training required, but some of their new tasks peculiar to war, e.g. duties with Beach Provost Companies, necessitated specialist training and a high standard of battle courage and morale. Men had to be selected for these companies, and companies prepared for static and mainly defensive roles had to be re-trained and partially reorganized for the more active operational roles required of them.

Equipment and Vehicles

In addition to the strictly man-power difficulties, there were considerable problems to be overcome regarding new types of equipment and vehicles being issued and some measure of standardization was necessary for efficient handling and maintenance.

Signal Communications

At this stage too the much-vexed question of Signal Communications for Military Police units was solved by the decision to convert one of the Traffic Control Companies into a Military Police Signal Company.

Further Consolidation of Policy

In July, 1943, shortly after the formation of 21 Army Group, a large-scale invasion exercise "Jantzen" was staged in Wales with the object of trying out the whole assault machinery for a landing in force and the building up and exploitation of a bridgehead and of beach areas and sub-areas.

This was excellent practical training for the newly organized Provost Beach Companies and many useful lessons were derived from it. New devices such as hand carts, motor-cycle and bicycle lamps, coloured screens, etc., were employed and as a result became part of the authorized equipment for these companies. Above all, the importance, in view of their multiple and vital duties, of keeping these Beach Companies fully informed of all details in the planning, and changes thereto, was clearly brought out.

Towards the end of 1943, the Civil Affairs organization began to take shape and the question had to be settled as to the place into which the Military Police network would be fitted in the various foreign countries in which British troops might be required to operate. The main point of agreement was that Military Police should be free to deal direct with Civil Police organizations overseas and would only be required to call in the medium of Civil Affairs authorities in the event of difficulties.

Finally a Provost study-week was organized by 21 Army Group to examine the working of Formation Military Police Companies with a view to standardizing and co-ordinating their operational drill. It was found that the principles formulated in the Common Doctrine issued early in that year were sound and required few amendments. A revised version was, however, issued under the title "Notes for the Control of Military Road Movement in North-West Europe." This study-week was attended by representatives of the Royal Air Force and Canadian and American Provost Services. A settlement was reached on the relative responsibility for Royal Air Force moves as between the Army and the Royal Air Force and a drill agreed upon.

A further measure of co-ordination of policy was attained early in 1944 by the attachment of two American Military Police officers to the Headquarters of the Provost-Marshal 21 Army Group.

The final Order of Battle for 21 Army Group contained the following Military Police units:—

Traffic Control Companies . .	15
Traffic Control Company (Signals)	1
Vulnerable Point Companies . .	6
Port Companies	1 (to be followed later by 2 more)

Although specially allotted to the duties indicated by their title, the training of these units was so designed and directed as to make them interchangeable at short notice from operational to disciplinary duties or *vice versa*, if required.

Finally the vast concentration of the many thousands of units which comprised the first echelons of 21 Army Group, began in May, 1944. The following

extracts from an account written at the time by an officer of a Traffic Control Company give a vivid description of the scene:—

"The vehicles, tanks, jeeps, trucks, bull-dozers, cranes, self-propelled guns, all the assorted engines of war, moved forward to their embarkation points. The column moved endlessly. The nights were filled with the grinding roar of tanks, the squeal of their tracks, the grumble of their engines. The darkness was punctured with the blue flames of their exhausts.

"At all critical points were the Traffic Control Police and their auxiliaries, working all hours, leading convoys; pointing the way; marshalling vehicles; . . . calming the agitated, stimulating the laggard, always alert; always present.

"Not a vehicle was lost, not a serial was late and there was never a hold-up or delay which could be attributed to the fault of the Traffic Control. By the end of July nearly 30,000 vehicles had passed through the marshalling area. Traffic Control had handled them all."

Throughout this vast operation, there had been complete understanding and co-operation between Provost and Staff and between Provost and other British units and also with units of the United States Army; a tribute to the excellent organization, discipline and training, which had made this feat possible and a hopeful augury for the still sterner tasks ahead.

CHAPTER XXIII.—DUTIES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR (THIRD PHASE)

Greece and Crete, 1941

In Greece and Crete in 1941, Provost duties mainly centred round the evacuation. Organization at points of embarkation; evacuation of the wounded; shepherding of stragglers and the safe loading (or alternatively the complete destruction) of equipment were their chief concern. Other duties carried out were anti-looting patrols, evacuation of prisoners of war, and, particularly in Crete, counter-attack sallies against enemy paratroop landings.

Palestine and Syria

Apart from the normal peace-time duties, Provost personnel were actively employed in Palestine on anti-fifth-column work in conjunction with the Field Security wing of the Intelligence Corps, and anti-pilfering duties in conjunction with the Special Investigation Branch and the Palestine Police. Considerable quantities of Government stores, including weapons, ammunition, rations, etc., were recovered.

In Syria, the Provost had some difficulty in guarding the Free French prisoners, who were anxious to stir up trouble between the Jews and Arabs. Mounted Provost were used on these duties, in conjunction with the Cavalry.

Singapore

A Provost Company was organized at Singapore in June, 1940. Until January, 1942, their normal duties were disciplinary and traffic control, including the docks area. In the period immediately preceding the Japanese attack on the island, Provost were kept very busy during air-raids policing and preventing looting in the bomb-damaged areas.

In captivity 50 men of one Divisional Provost Company died of disease, and in a party selected by the Japanese for "coolie labour," 70 per cent died of disease.

Egypt, Cyrenaica and Tripoli

It will be remembered that, before the outbreak of war, there were Provost Companies stationed in Egypt at Cairo, Abbassia and Moascar, with a Section at Alexandria. These units were under the Assistant Provost-Marshal at H.Q. British Troops in Egypt at Cairo. There were also small detachments in Palestine working directly under the War Office. Up to the declaration of war by Italy in June, 1940, the duties of these units and detachments were much the same as in peace-time. The problem after this date was one of provision of suitable personnel, in view of the situation at home. No reinforcements were forthcoming and as fresh formations arrived in Egypt without Provost personnel, these had to be raised from within the formations themselves and trained locally.

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In March, 1940, a Provost-Marshal, Middle East, was appointed.

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Traffic control at this stage was particularly difficult because communications rom front to rear and *vice versa* consisted of one road only which was in bad epair in many parts, and any vehicle leaving the road was liable to become ogged in the sand with consequent delay and difficulty in being returned to he road. The strictest "Road Discipline" was therefore essential.

As the advance progressed, e.g. to Benghazi in February, 1941, the task of aking over captured towns and villages, reorganizing the civil police, and naintaining order, fell to the Provost Staff.

Meanwhile, in Egypt, the strength of Provost after the capture of Benghazi ad increased to three officers and 80 N.C.Os., but it was still wholly inadequate or their numerous tasks in an exacting climate and sandy conditions.

During the long retreat from Cyrenaica to El Alamein in 1942, the Corps of Military Police enhanced their good reputation among the troops. Straglers' Posts and Information Posts were established at all suitable places in a errain which bore few spots capable of easy recognition. These Posts were manned continuously by two or three military policemen for 24 hours a day with unceasing vigilance in case any straggler should go astray or fall by the wayside. Finally, when there were no more stragglers to assist, the Police rom their posts had to find their way back to safety at El Alamein.

The reorganization and refitting of the Eighth Army included the Corps of Military Police, which had been strung out over an immense mileage for considerable periods without relief or rest. The strength of the available personnel by this time had risen to 73 officers and 2,047 rank and file.

In order to present a clear picture of the problem which the Corps of Military Police had to face when the day came for the Eighth Army to resume the offensive, it may be recalled that the reason for the selection of the position at El Alamein as a final barrier against the enemy's invasion of Egypt was its comparatively narrow frontage coupled with its absolutely safe flanks, covered by the Mediterranean on the right and the impassable Qattara Depression on the left. For this reason, it was a very dangerous position for an advancing enemy to thrust its nose into and conversely, for the same reason, any advance from behind such a position must necessitate moving on a comparatively narrow front. Two serious handicaps must attend any major operational planning of this nature, owing to the lack of cover in the desert. These are firstly, the ease with which tracks or any continuous markings can be spotted from the air, and secondly, the distance at which lights can be observed at night. On the other hand, the distance at which columns of sand, indicating movement of troops, can be seen by day greatly reduces the chances of achieving that element of surprise which is a first essential to any such operation.

Comprehensive planning and organization continued for several weeks

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before the date appointed by the Commander Eighth Army for the resumption of the offensive (23rd October, 1942). Under staff direction and co-ordination, the respective duties of the Royal Engineers, Royal Signals and the Provost units were allotted to enable the troops, vehicles, etc., to be shepherded safely through our own minefields and finally through the German minefields; the Sappers grading the tracks and clearing the minefields, while the Signals provided special communication facilities. The final plan involved the following tremendous tasks:—

(*a*) *Between D–5 and D–1*, i.e. the five nights and days (mostly at night without lights) preceding the day fixed for the advance. Move of the undermentioned formations, stores, etc.:—

Units of 51st Highland Division
Units of 10th Corps Artillery
Units of 30th Corps Artillery (and its "B" Echelon)
Rations, P.O.L. and ammunition vehicles

(*b*) *D–1*, *D*-night (23rd/24th October, 1942).
Move forward of the following formations from areas in rear:—

New Zealand Division (including 9th Armoured Brigade)
1st Armoured Division
10th Armoured Division

The area through which this move had to be operated was 26 miles in length and 4 miles in width.

The break-through was ultimately a complete success, and as this was the first occasion on which Provost had been used in the forward area in desert warfare, their thoroughness and efficiency were recognized forthwith, resulting, as is often the case, in further and more dangerous demands being made of them, in co-operation with Sappers. Throughout the long and victorious advance which ensued practically every desert track was laid and marked by Provost. This entailed the placing on an average of seven signs to each mile, over many hundreds of miles of tracks, over desert and rock, through minefields, often under fire; every one of these signs had to be lit up at night by means of lights concealed from enemy view.

On 5th November, 1942, in a "Special Order of the Day," issued by the Commander of an Armoured Division, it was stated that "They (C.M.P.) marked routes with the same precision and efficiency as in training schemes in the rear areas."

Throughout the advance from El Alamein to Tunis, Provost were continuously employed in route-marking, sign-posting and controlling the vast mechanized columns following up the retreating enemy. As each new town was taken, Provost police were the first to contact the local civil authorities and re-establish normal life and activities. Finally, as the Eighth Army approached Tunis, co-operation was arranged with units of the First Army and a link-up took place near Kairouan on 11th April, 1943.

Sicily and Italy

After the Eighth Army's victorious advance to Tunis, a sea- and airborne invasion of Italy *via* Sicily was planned and it was decided to use Malta as a

jumping-off place. In preparation for this, 105 Provost Company (less two sections in Cairo and two in Tripoli) was sent to Malta in advance; it remained there until the operation was launched on 9–10th July, 1943, and arrived in Sicily with all sections complete three days later.

No major police problems arose during the course of this part of the campaign, which ended with the capture of Messina on 16th August.

On 3rd September, 1943, landings were effected on three beaches between Reggio and Gallico, ten miles north of Reggio in Italy. By 24th September H.Q. 5th Corps and 8th Indian Division had arrived at Taranto, which was filled with troops of many nationalities. The 5th Corps Provost Company had only three sections and was therefore unable to deal with the various disturbances occurring, particularly in the port area where numbers of unemployed Italian ratings were to be found at all hours, and several knifing incidents occurred. The 8th Indian Divisional Provost Company and 2nd Parachute Brigade Provost Unit were accordingly detailed to assist in the control of this area.

On the Reggio-Taranto road, 43, 49 (Traffic) and 105 Provost Companies were in action; 505 Provost Company was distributed between Bari and Brindisi. 78th Division was in advance at Foggia at this stage. On to this initial lay-out, the Provost and Traffic organization was gradually fitted as the Force advanced inland and more Police units arrived from Sicily. The length of the Lines of Communication at this stage was approximately 210 miles by road.

In the landing at the Anzio beach-head in January, 1944, one Provost section landed with the assault brigade and two sections with the Beach Group. Shortly after, the Assistant Provost-Marshal landed with two more sections, followed by the remainder of the company. Roads and report centres and traffic posts were soon established and in operation. It was, however, at this stage that the German opposition stiffened and for four months no further advance was possible, the troops being forced to live in the narrow beach-head established at the landings. The positions were overlooked from enemy observation posts and shelling from guns of a variety of calibres was almost continuous. Nevertheless, the work of the Provost had to go on, and the control of movement on the roads and tracks leading to the forward areas had to be maintained. This resulted in numerous casualties among the Provost units, but they also established an excellent reputation. In an appreciation written at the time, the General Officer Commanding, 1st Division (Major-General W. R. C. Penney), remarked upon "the conspicuous success and efficiency of 1 Division Provost" and added "I am not piling it on when I say that I look upon them, and shall, I trust, always do so, as one of the best organizations I know. In every branch of their activity, they have won a reputation second to none."

At the end of 1943, the crossing of the Sangro River provided excellent practice for the Provost in traffic control duties. It was conspicuous for the construction of the longest Bailey bridge ever built, which created a narrow defile requiring careful traffic organization and planning. Wherever possible, in the adverse weather conditions obtaining at this time, tanks and heavy tracked vehicles were taken over at fords or other suitable crossings, but often the subsequent effect was that these vehicles brought with them on to the main roads large quantities of wet mud and slime, which converted the surface, particularly on inclines, curves, corners, etc., into dangerous zones. On the San Salvo–Vasto road, where there was an uphill stretch with deeply

cambered corners, it was normal to see as many as 10–15 vehicles ditched within a distance of 100 yards. During this period Provost officers and senior N.C.Os. were on the road almost continuously. Company commanders were reported as averaging only four hours sleep at night, and the strain upon all ranks, especially in Traffic Control units, whose physical standard is normally not of the highest, was most marked.

Fortunately this period of intense activity was followed in February, 1944, by a lull, which gave time for rest, reorganization and planning. Within a month, a re-grouping of the Services in Italy was ordered, which entailed the Eighth Army taking over an additional sector from the Americans. This involved the replacement of United States Provost personnel by British and the substitution of British traffic signs, notices, etc., for American along the entire routes being taken over. This handing over was completed by the end of March, 1944. On the Capua road, however, joint control was exercised by American and British patrols, who shared the same vehicles and worked together very effectively.

On 4th June, Rome was taken with all bridges to the south intact. Route-marking through a city of the size of Rome presented certain difficulties, but the simple plan was adopted of having one military axis, which was clearly marked by Army shields and arrows wired to lamp standards or by specially constructed stands at road junctions.

At the end of July, His Majesty King George VI paid a visit to Italy; Military Police enforced a "stay-indoors" order on civilians in the areas visited and also kept clear the roads being used for the visit. No untoward incident occurred.

The entry into Florence early in August, 1944, was the scene of bitter street fighting, mainly owing to the activity of armed partisans, who had taken control by piqueting points in the town. In addition, therefore, to enemy shelling and sniping, there was the problem of sorting out the partisans and Fascists in their sporadic bursts of street fighting. Ultimately the position was brought under control and the partisans disarmed.

With a view to further advance, it was decided to transfer the bulk of British and Canadian forces to the East Coast and a reconnaissance party including Provost moved to Ancona on 6th August, 1944. All moves were completed, with the exception of the transporters, by 24th August and preparations were now set for the projected further advance of the Eighth Army. Rimini was captured on 20th September and became the new road-head on the eastern flank. From this point, the main burden of Provost work fell upon Corps and Divisional Provost Companies.

North Africa

On 8th November, 1942, First Army and American troops landed on the North Coast of Africa.

The problem of traffic control in this campaign was complicated by the state of the roads. The main roads, though tarred in the centre, had soft edges and became slippery in wet weather; they also deteriorated somewhat rapidly in dry weather. Many small bridges existed over streams and these were not up to weight for several types of military vehicle. Owing to enemy air superiority, most of the heavy road traffic had to be confined to hours of darkness. In addition, personnel of the Traffic Control units were employed on traffic duties and the enforcement of road discipline on all maintenance routes on the Lines of Communication and in Base areas.

Personnel of the Provost Wing concentrated on the maintenance of military

discipline and the Ports Company on the prevention and detection of theft of War Department stores in the dock area. The Special Investigation Branch were occupied with serious crime. At first there was a good deal of indiscipline owing to the potency of the local wines and the attractions of the "bazaars" in the neighbouring towns, and for a time the resources of the Provost were taxed to the full. As, however, the troops became more acclimatized and the numerous restaurants, cafés and undesirable establishments came more strictly under control, conditions improved. The large-scale theft of War Department stores was at this stage the biggest problem facing the Military Police, and reached such vast proportions that the Special Investigation Section detailed to control these activities found itself unable with its slender resources to cope with the task. Finally, a Special Investigation Branch H.Q. controlling five sections had to be established, and the recovery of stolen property steadily mounted as each new section came into operation.

During the initial advance after the landings, two lessons were learnt about the establishment and type of vehicles required for Divisional Provost Companies. The first was that motor-cycle combinations were unable to keep pace with the remainder of their sections. These were, therefore, discarded; jeeps, 15-cwt. trucks and motor-cycles (solo) only being retained. The second was that wireless trucks were essential for the control of the movements of large mechanical transport columns; these were accordingly introduced.

During the 9th Corps advance in North Africa in April, 1943, the Traffic Control units found considerable difficulty in laying out suitable routes, owing to the paucity of main roads and the large numbers of "wadis" and fords striking across the planned direction. These necessitated frequent detours and much hard work for the Sappers in improving tracks, crossings, etc. Even then some of the routes had to be one-way traffic only and, at first, partly for security reasons and partly owing to shortage of lamps, much of the distance had to be covered in the darkness and without lights. Conditions, too, were also difficult at times owing to sand storms. In spite of these difficulties the Road Discipline was on the whole very good.

A feature of Provost work at this stage was the close co-operation with the Royal Engineers. Combined reconnaissance of routes by representatives of both Corps was an essential preliminary to any large-scale move in order to decide upon a suitable and weather-proof route, which would require the minimum of work on improvement by the Engineers.

Among other duties assigned to the Corps of Military Police in this campaign was the safeguarding of the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, during his visit. This proved an unenviable task as Mr. Churchill wanted to go everywhere and see everything, without thought for his own safety. However, the task was safely accomplished and the responsible Provost Staff were able to breathe freely again.

On 11th April, contact was made with Eighth Army troops in the neighbourhood of Kairouan.

CHAPTER XXIV.—DUTIES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR (FOURTH PHASE)

21 Army Group's Campaign in North-West Europe

Organization (June–July, 1944)

In the initial phase of this campaign, the organization of Military Police resources was as follows:—

H.Q. 21 Army Group.—Provost-Marshal; 2 Deputy Provost-Marshals.
Canadian Army.—Deputy Provost-Marshal.
H.Q. Lines of Communication.—Deputy Provost-Marshal.
Each Corps and L. of C. Area.—Assistant Provost-Marshal.

In addition, in accordance with the Common Doctrine, the Provost-Marshal and each Deputy Provost-Marshal had an Assistant Provost-Marshal and Deputy Assistant Provost-Marshal, both for traffic control duties.

The distribution of Provost Units for the initial landings and build-up of the bridgeheads was as under:—

(i) Three Divisional Provost Companies (each H.Q. and 6 Sections)	Traffic duties for the assault and follow-up brigades.
(ii) Six Beach Provost Companies (each H.Q. and 4 Sections) and some additional Traffic Control Sections	Traffic control and sign-posting of routes in the beach transit and assembly area.
(iii) Ten Vulnerable Point Sections	Construction of cages, guarding of prisoners of war; detection of suspects.
(iv) Two Corps Provost Companies	To control area between beaches and forward divisions.

As the position in the Bridge-head became consolidated, further Provost units were added as below:—

(v) One Provost Company	For each assault division.
(vi) Four Provost Companies Four Traffic Control Companies One Vulnerable Point Company	For each Army.
(vii) Seven Provost, seven Traffic, and three Vulnerable Point Companies	For L. of C. areas.

This organization and allotment of duties proved suitable and adequate with the single exception of the Beach Provost Companies, which found their four sections to be inadequate to cope with the numerous and arduous duties required of them. Moreover, the roughness of the weather interfered with the

timed arrival programme, with the result that only corps and divisional Provost units arrived on time.

The Beach-Head

During the subsequent build-up, the problem of maintaining an easy flow of traffic was complicated by the fact that a modern mechanized Army was attempting to manœuvre on a system of narrow and badly maintained roads, designed to carry the slight traffic of an agricultural area.

Within a few weeks of landing, the beach-head, which measured little more than 20 miles broad by 10 miles deep, contained 115,000 vehicles. At one check-post 18,836 vehicles passed in one day, i.e. an hourly average of 785 or nearly one vehicle every four seconds, night and day, a tribute to the excellent training of Provost and other units in Control and Road Discipline.

The policy at this stage was to accept any vehicle on the road at any time and to keep traffic moving at all costs. As soon as possible, relief tracks and cross-country tank routes were developed and a firm plan for traffic control was established under Movement Control. This effected an immediate reduction in movement by day and confined all operational moves to the hours of darkness.

The congestion at first in the beach-head made uniform sign-posting difficult and this had to be taken under Provost Control and a sign-factory established with the assistance of Pioneers and civilian carpenters and sign-writers.

Each Corps and Army was allotted a Traffic Control Signal Section, which proved invaluable for the speedy control of traffic.

One Special Investigation Section was allotted to Second Army and was fully occupied during the build-up in investigating cases of looting and illegal disposal of Government stores.

Crossing of the River Seine (August and September, 1944)

As soon as the build-up was complete and the German defence started to weaken, preparations were begun for an advance on a large scale to, and across, the River Seine.

Early in August, six additional Traffic Control Companies arrived and by end of August Second Army and 1st Canadian Army each had four Traffic Control Companies under command while seven were under Command H.Q., Lines of Communication.

Experience in this campaign showed that one full Traffic Control company was required for the control of a roadhead, supplying three Corps, and also that it was better to allot the same company permanently to this task owing to the special nature of the duties, sign-posting, etc. Better mutual understanding in matters of Road Discipline as between Provost and unit drivers was also established in this way.

The policing of liberated towns as the advance progressed became a major commitment, which was undertaken by Special Investigation units immediately in rear of the forward troops. They handed over in turn to the Lines of Communication Provost units.

Two Provost Sections were included in the set-up for the landing of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem in September, but though they landed successfully, the subsequent operation did not work out as planned.

Formation of Antwerp Base and Crossing of River Maas (October to December, 1944)

This phase involved considerable liaison duties in Brussels and elsewhere in Belgium, and 30 Belgian gendarmes were attached to H.Q. 21 Army Group for this purpose.

Four Traffic Control and seven Vulnerable Point Companies were added to the establishment during this period and it may be said that the Corps of Military Police was working at its full capacity in all its normal functions of patrolling and sign-posting of routes, guarding vulnerable points, routing convoys and exercising disciplinary control over military personnel throughout the whole area occupied by 21 Army Group. Their special task at this stage was dealing with the problems arising out of the establishment of Antwerp as an Advanced Base, and of Brussels as the main leave centre. In Antwerp, the main problem was that of pilfering, necessitating the location of Special Post and Security Police in the docks area and also mobile patrols in motor launches on the River Scheldt. In Brussels, there were the special difficulties which must be expected in a large continental city, e.g. control (in close co-operation with the local police) of cafés, clubs, and brothels, countering black-market activities and instituting anti-venereal disease measures. The smartness, discipline and restraint of troops on leave were favourably commented upon by the local inhabitants.

The Special Investigation units were also kept very busy at this stage and made a specially notable "scoop" which led to the arrest of a gang of deserters masquerading as an authorized military unit. It was organized even to the extent of having its own identification cards and stationery printed and for several months drew petrol and rations from Army sources and requisitioned billets and motor-cars from unsuspecting civilians.

From the Maas to the Rhine (January to May, 1945)

The swiftness of the moves leading up to this advance made rapid communication an essential for strict control. A series of check-points was established at intervals along the routes, each being connected by telephone with the Q (Movements) and Provost Branches at H.Q. 1st Canadian Army. In this way careful check was maintained on the timings of units and any errors were quickly rectified.

During the move into the forward areas immediately before the assault, special traffic control had to be imposed on five consecutive nights to ensure good Road Discipline, and also to ensure that administrative and incidental traffic did not interfere with these operational moves. As a special measure to ensure this priority, 600 selected personnel from a Canadian Light Anti-aircraft unit were lent to the Provost Service for their assistance.

The result of these special precautions and arrangements was that, although sudden thaws caused a number of places on the roads to become impassable, no major delays occurred in the arrival of units at the marshalling area in readiness for the assault.

When the time came (24th March) for the break-out from the Rhine bridgehead, Second Army had seven Traffic and three Vulnerable Point Companies under command, while 1st Canadian Army had four Traffic and one Vulnerable Point Companies. These resources proved adequate for all their requirements in Germany and Northern Holland.

On the Lines of Communication, however, it was considered necessary to increase the number of companies from nine Traffic and eight Vulnerable Point Companies to ten and nine respectively.

The total Provost strength had risen from 6,648 on "D"-Day to 10,294, of whom 400 were officers and 5,035 were Provost, the remainder being Traffic Control and Vulnerable Point personnel.

Special Investigation Branch units continued to maintain a careful watch on crime, especially the disappearance of considerable quantities of Government stores into the black market of liberated countries.

A duty of historical interest was carried out by members of the Provost Section at Tactical H.Q. 21 Army Group when they escorted German officers through the British lines for the negotiations leading to the final surrender.

Another unusual occurrence was the attachment of 60 German civil police to the Second Army for a short course of instruction. These afterwards helped British Provost units in the enforcement of law and order.

Main Lessons

The following were considered by H.Q. 21 Army Group to have been the main lessons affecting Military Police units, which were brought out during the operations in North Western Europe:—

(i) The necessity for the closest liaison between Provost and other services and also with flank formations, especially Allied Armies, in order to ensure a common policy in maintaining good "Road Discipline," was constantly made clear.

(ii) Unless the Provost staff are kept fully informed of all plans and developments, they will be unable to give their normal assistance in traffic control in periods of rapid change in operations and forward supply movement, such as resulted from the flooding of the River Maas.

(iii) The development and use of the Military Police Signal Company was undoubtedly justified throughout the campaign.

(iv) Too sharp a division should not be maintained between the working of the personnel of the three wings—Provost, Traffic Control, and Vulnerable Points—because it was found that a sharp division resulted in lack of flexibility. It was considered preferable and likely to lead to the best results if every officer and man in the Corps were capable of undertaking any Provost function at short notice.

CHAPTER XXV.—DUTIES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR (FIFTH PHASE)

War against Japan

In 1939 the Corps of Military Police was not represented in India. All police duties were carried out by Garrison and Regimental Police.

In 1941 a training course for Deputy Assistant Provost-Marshals was held at Mashobra, near Simla, which was attended by 15 officers. These officers in their turn raised and trained Provost units in India, mostly for despatch overseas.

It was not until August, 1942, that the "Corps of Military Police, India," was formed, and static units were raised for disciplinary and traffic duties to meet the increasing demands of the rapidly expanding Army in India.

Expansion in India

In connection with the operations in Burma, an important duty was the policing of the Assam supply route from railhead to Dimapur, through Kohima to Imphal and Tiddim, for which special Provost units had to be provided, while for landing operations against Southern Burma, the Andaman Islands and Malaya, Beach Provost units had to be provided.

As these various operational roles increased, so also did the importance of India as a Base become enhanced, resulting in heavy demands for Vulnerable Point units for docks at Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi, Madras and Vizagapatam.

To meet these additional demands, the War Office were asked to despatch four Provost Companies, which arrived early in 1943.

Owing to the increased importance of the Provost services in India, the appointment of Provost-Marshal (India) was approved in February, 1943, with the rank of brigadier.

In certain respects, the normal duties of Military Police in India differed from those elsewhere, e.g. under the heading "disciplinary duties" were included "bounds" and "price control," by which certain hotels, establishments, etc., could be placed "out of bounds," either because the premises were insanitary or had an unsavoury reputation, or because prices were considered exorbitant. These powers proved of great benefit to troops and raised the standard of custom. A further important duty was the enforcement of anti-malarial measures. Anti-malarial curfews were sounded to remind troops that measures contained in orders which were to be taken daily, e.g. at sundown, should be carried out on hearing the curfew.

Because of leakage of Government stores, arms and ammunition, periodical searches of baggage were made at railway stations and at times recoveries were considerable. On a few occasions valuable medical and mechanical transport stores were found and at other times efforts to smuggle large quantities of opium were foiled.

Traffic Control duties in India proved very arduous; the heat, dust, poor

condition of the roads, and lack of intelligence of the average inhabitant (whether driver, pedestrian, or bullock-cart driver) all continued to produce a low standard of Road Discipline, with consequently a high incidence of road accidents and damage to vehicles, causing serious delays. The task of Provost police on railway duty was also very difficult because of the crowds which throng the trains and platforms, the noise, and general lack of control of public and passengers at the railway stations.

At the main ports, special Provost detachments worked in conjunction with the Civil Port and Harbour Police and, in Calcutta, in co-operation also with American Provost Police.

With the expansion of Provost in India and the appointment in 1943 of a Provost-Marshal (India), formation commanders began to appreciate the importance and proper functions of the Provost Police, especially in the matter of movements of units and formations.

In connection with the preparation of forces on a large scale based on India, a special training centre was formed at Mahdi Island off Bombay for the organization and training of such special units as Beach Maintenance Units.

Advance into Burma

As 14th Army advanced into Burma and later into Malaya, new areas and sub-areas were created, which required the presence of Provost personnel. Strictly operational demands did not increase greatly but numbers were in any case found to be inadequate. In June, 1944, there were only two sub-areas, but by August, 1945, there were three areas and eight sub-areas.

The somewhat involved Lines of Communication through Kohima and Imphal already mentioned provided a number of complex problems for which special appointments of Deputy Provost-Marshal, Assistant Provost-Marshal, and two Deputy Assistant Provost-Marshals had to be made. The special Provost unit which had been prepared on an increased war establishment for duty with General Wingate's "Chindits," never came into action, because its increase of establishment was not sanctioned. An Independent Provost Company for Police duties in Malaya and a Special Investigation Branch of three sections both came into operation during this phase of the campaign.

Other duties of a special nature were connected with air-traffic, e.g. air strip traffic control in co-operation with the American Air Control Staff; checking authority for all travel by air; receipt and escorting of all prisoners of war arriving by air; evacuation of wounded by air; and general assistance and distribution of personnel arriving or departing by air. At the time of the siege of Imphal, three non-commissioned officers were flown in from Comilla airstrip. The control of aircraft leaving and arriving at these airstrips called for special care, tact and patience, as the runways were always crowded with vehicles of all kinds, whose drivers frequently did the wrong thing at the sight of aircraft, with consequent damage to vehicle or plane or both.

For these long spells of duty in a trying climate with little change or relaxation, the Military Policeman had to be fit and tough. On the narrow Tiddim Road, even patrolling by motor-cyclists up and down the column was impracticable and police had to walk along the line, pushing broken-down vehicles over the side. Later, as the battle moved out into the Imphal plain, traffic problems became easier, and two-way roads now replaced the previous narrow one-way road.

On the whole, relations with local inhabitants were amicable. There were occasional disagreements over price control and outbursts of assaults but these were minor incidents.

Prisoners-of-war cages began to be constructed, but at first comparatively few prisoners were taken.

A Provost detachment landed with the troops at Akyab in January, 1945, and established an Information Post on the beach with up-to-date locations of units. They also sign-posted all store areas. Provost again did good work in the subsequent landings at Letpan and Ramree Island.

In the assault on Rangoon, Provost were not involved in operations but were kept very busy in the early stages on anti-looting activities.

CHAPTER XXVI.—AUXILIARY TERRITORIAL SERVICE WING (CORPS OF MILITARY POLICE)

From the time (1941) that the Auxiliary Territorial Service became subject to punishment under certain sections of the Army Act and auxiliaries were liable to be apprehended for offences, some sort of Police Force consisting of auxiliaries was indicated.

At the end of that year, selected Auxiliary Territorial Service officers underwent a course of Provost Training at the Military Police Training Establishment at Mytchett, near Aldershot. Included in the syllabus of this training were "unarmed methods of defence," and "first aid to the injured."

At first, however, since crime was almost negligible among Auxiliary Territorial Service personnel, these officers found their duties comprised merely setting a good example to young auxiliaries in matters of deportment, turn-out, saluting, etc.

A Deputy Assistant Provost-Marshal (Auxiliary Territorial Service) was posted to each command and after the first auxiliaries' course in 1942, an Auxiliary Territorial Service Wing, affiliated to the Corps of Military Police, came into being. These auxiliaries were not, however, members of the Corps. They were recruited by voluntary transfer from Auxiliary Territorial Service units and did their training at the Military Police Depot. Their standards and disciplinary duties were virtually the same as for the Military Police.

As the war progressed, the Auxiliary Territorial Service Wing expanded considerably, finally reaching a strength of over 500. A detachment was sent out to the Middle East and the status of the senior appointment there and also in the three chief home commands was upgraded to Assistant Provost-Marshal.

SUMMARY TO PART VII

The success achieved by the Corps of Military Police in the War was probably due more than anything to the fine "esprit de corps" which gradually became established as the Corps grew from its comparative obscurity to play the large and very vital part it did in operations all over the world. Because of this spirit, its influence upon the discipline of troops both in garrison and on the road, was exercised naturally and without effort. Very early on in the war, it established a name for conscientiousness, reliability and patient good-humour, and lived up to this reputation throughout, both among British troops and among those of the many other nationalities with whom its units were brought into contact.

In the sphere of traffic control it is impossible to calculate the immense value of its contribution in instilling and maintaining Road Discipline both in operational moves and, administratively, in the acceleration and smooth working of road and rail moves on the lines of communication. On the beaches at Dunkirk; in the heat and sand of the desert; in the wet and frost of Italy; in the congested beach-head in Normandy and on the narrow tracks in Burma during the monsoon, the Traffic Control personnel never failed and, from all commanders' reports, appeared to have worked longer hours than most in all conditions and climates.

The personnel of the Vulnerable Points Branch played an important, though less spectacular, role both in the defence of Britain in the early days and later in a number of vital localities overseas. In this special capacity, they were able to relieve other less suitably organized units for duty elsewhere.

The Special Investigation Branch's activities were also confined mainly to the background areas, and in consequence perhaps have received somewhat sparse mention in the foregoing chapters. Nevertheless, the sum of its achievements was very considerable, both in terms of disciplinary advantage and financial savings. It owed its origin to certain suspicious occurrences in France in 1940, which had resulted in serious losses of both military equipment and N.A.A.F.I. stores, mostly in transit between ports. Its original personnel were loaned from Scotland Yard for these special duties and, on return from France after Dunkirk, they continued to perform similar duties in the investigation of serious crime and losses of Government stores. As overseas commands were established, Special Investigation Sections were sent out to assist local authorities in combating pilfering, black market and other serious crimes. The following estimates compiled from reports submitted at the time give some idea of the vast proportions to which the activities of this Branch had expanded by the end of the war:—

	Number of Investigations	*Number of Arrests*	*Value of Stores recovered*
United Kingdom, 1945 . .	6,727	4,277	£68,695
World-wide figures, 1946 .	38,138	19,210	£2,898,714

Of the total recovered in 1946, £1,523,531 worth of stores were accounted for in the British Army of the Rhine Area. In a number of cases, the criminals

used gangster methods and on several occasions shots were exchanged, which, though hardly coming within the scope of "active operations," was none the less dangerous to the personnel of the Special Investigation Sections engaged.

EPILOGUE TO PART VII

In recognition of the excellent work done by the various elements of the Corps of Military Police in many parts of the world during the war, to which scant justice only has been done in this brief survey, His Majesty The King in November, 1946, conferred the honour and title of "Royal" upon the Corps.

COMPREHENSIVE

Offences	1939–40			1940–41		
	Home	Overseas	Total	Home	Overseas	
Cowardice	—	—	—	2	3	
Offence against inhabitant	—	80	80	—	22	
Sleeping on or leaving post	265	210	475	776	207	
Mutiny	—	72	72	—	4	
Striking or violence to superior	242	308	550	769	178	
Threatening or insubordinate language	139	230	369	707	149	
Disobedience	248	306	554	1,345	273	
Resisting escort	43	72	115	173	53	
Desertion	529	23	552	2,654	70	
Fraudulent enlistment	7	1	8	16	1	
Absence without leave	1,149	339	1,488	12,074	284	1
Fraud	55	16	71	146	14	
Theft	461	178	639	2,043	143	
Self-inflicted wound	17	5	22	3	7	
Indecency	25	23	48	58	18	
Drunkenness	145	409	554	402	153	
Allowing to escape	2	—	2	110	4	
Escaping	144	40	184	1,085	47	
Losing by neglect	655	24	679	5,059	45	
Injuring property	16	14	30	128	22	
Falsifying official document	17	8	25	83	1	
Enlisting after discharge with ignominy	5	2	7	—	—	
False answer on attestation	6	—	6	37	1	
Ill-treating a soldier	34	31	65	112	18	
Miscellaneous Military offences	424	436	860	2,863	388	
Miscellaneous Civil offences	130	98	228	579	75	
Totals	4,758	2,925	7,683	31,224	2,180	3

APPENDIX I(a)

(*See* pages 27–33 and 42–43)

MMARY OF COURT-MARTIAL CONVICTIONS
RITISH OTHER RANKS)
HOME AND OVERSEAS)
ptember, 1939–31st August, 1945)

	1941–42			1942–43			1943–44			1944–45			Grand Totals
	Home	Overseas	Total	Home	Overseas	Total	Home	Overseas	Total	Home	Overseas	Total	
5	—	26	26	1	23	24	—	41	41	1	70	71	167
2	1	51	52	—	159	159	—	165	165	—	94	94	572
3	463	168	631	249	361	610	134	333	467	49	639	688	3,854
4	—	79	79	—	61	61	—	344	344	—	240	240	800
7	617	343	960	447	556	1,003	447	776	1,223	283	1,092	1,375	6,058
6	475	271	746	458	494	952	446	643	1,089	263	988	1,251	5,263
8	1,219	470	1,689	1,216	932	2,148	1,427	1,249	2,676	671	2,054	2,725	11,410
6	137	84	221	107	143	250	100	177	277	60	156	216	1,305
4	3,675	647	4,322	4,030	1,083	5,113	3,892	1,827	5,719	3,885	8,425	12,310	30,740
7	23	4	27	17	15	32	7	5	12	4	—	4	100
8	13,978	1,113	15,091	11,835	2,101	13,936	11,175	2,992	14,167	10,032	8,085	18,117	75,157
0	148	35	183	86	48	134	87	57	146	72	86	158	852
6	2,739	491	3,230	2,840	1,326	4,166	2,468	1,374	3,842	1,639	2,897	4,536	18,599
0	1	18	19	—	8	8	21	19	40	30	208	238	337
6	53	39	92	59	57	116	53	81	134	49	275	324	790
5	182	70	252	99	630	729	51	714	765	31	926	957	3,812
4	120	24	144	95	30	125	91	23	114	107	47	154	653
2	731	124	855	514	183	697	393	250	643	201	375	576	4,087
4	4,828	361	5,189	620	852	1,472	388	461	849	198	436	634	13,927
0	147	18	165	106	54	160	122	44	166	90	51	141	812
4	113	10	123	92	36	128	73	108	181	39	143	182	723
	1	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	2	2	11
8	23	—	23	25	—	25	11	—	11	5	1	6	109
0	78	48	126	64	75	139	40	104	144	30	131	161	765
1	2,831	980	3,811	2,687	2,051	4,738	2,395	2,485	4,880	1,456	4,089	5,545	23,085
4	923	217	1,140	901	406	1,307	639	637	1,276	403	1,033	1,436	6,041
4	33,506	5,691	39,197	26,548	11,684	38,232	24,461	14,911	39,372	19,598	32,543	52,141	210,029

[*To face page 112*

SUMMARY OF COURT-MARTIAL
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(UNITED KINGDO
(1st September, 1939–31st Au

Offences	1939–40			1940–41			1941–42			
	*DCMs	†FGCMs	Total	DCMs	FGCMs	Total	DCMs	FGCMs	Total	DCM
Cowardice	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	—
Offence against inhabitant	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—
Sleeping on or leaving post	217	48	265	8	768	776	—	463	463	—
Mutiny	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Striking or violence to superior	204	38	242	8	761	769	—	617	617	—
Threatening or insubordinate language	108	31	139	7	700	707	—	475	475	—
Disobedience	200	48	248	13	1,332	1,345	—	1,219	1,219	—
Resisting escort	36	7	43	1	172	173	—	137	137	—
Desertion	471	58	529	14	2,640	2,654	4	3,671	3,675	8
Fraudulent enlistment	6	1	7	—	16	16	1	22	23	—
Absence without leave	919	230	1,149	21	12,053	12,074	2	13,976	13,978	1
Fraud	52	3	55	—	146	146	—	148	148	—
Theft	414	47	461	3	2,040	2,043	—	2,739	2,739	—
Self-inflicted wound	17	—	17	—	3	3	—	1	1	—
Indecency	21	4	25	—	58	58	1	52	53	—
Drunkenness	120	25	145	—	402	402	—	182	182	—
Allowing to escape	2	—	2	1	109	110	—	120	120	—
Escaping	124	20	144	1	1,084	1,085	—	731	731	—
Losing by neglect	585	70	655	9	5,050	5,059	1	4,827	4,828	—
Injuring property	13	3	16	—	128	128	—	147	147	—
Falsifying official document	15	2	17	—	83	83	—	113	113	—
Enlisting after discharge with ignominy	5	—	5	—	—	—	—	1	1	—
False answer on attestation	6	—	6	—	37	37	—	23	23	—
Ill-treating a soldier	31	3	34	—	112	112	—	78	78	—
Miscellaneous Military offences	352	72	424	13	2,850	2,863	—	2,831	2,831	—
Miscellaneous Civil offences	127	3	130	3	576	579	—	923	923	—
Totals	4,045	713	4,758	102	31,122	31,224	9	33,497	33,506	9

* DCMs = District Courts-Martia
† FGCMs = Field General Courts-

APPENDIX I(b)

(*See* pages 27–33 and 42–43)

ONVICTIONS
S)

, 1945)

1942–43		1943–44			1944–45			Total DCMs	Total FGCMs	Grand Totals
GCMs	Total	DCMs	FGCMs	Total	DCMs	FGCMs	Total			
1	1	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	4	4
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
249	249	—	134	134	4	45	49	229	1,707	1,936
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
447	447	—	447	447	21	262	283	233	2,572	2,805
458	458	—	446	446	30	233	263	145	2,343	2,488
,216	1,216	—	1,427	1,427	45	626	671	258	5,868	6,126
107	107	—	100	100	3	57	60	40	580	620
,022	4,030	4	3,888	3,892	385	3,500	3,885	886	17,779	18,665
17	17	—	7	7	—	4	4	7	67	74
,834	11,835	1	11,174	11,175	974	9,058	10,032	1,918	58,325	60,243
86	86	—	87	87	5	67	72	57	537	594
840	2,840	—	2,468	2,468	204	1,435	1,639	621	11,569	12,190
—	—	—	21	21	2	28	30	19	53	72
59	59	—	53	53	4	45	49	26	271	297
99	99	—	51	51	3	28	31	123	787	910
95	95	—	91	91	18	89	107	21	504	525
514	514	—	393	393	24	177	201	149	2,919	3,068
620	620	—	388	388	22	176	198	617	11,131	11,748
106	106	—	122	122	10	80	90	23	586	609
92	92	—	73	73	3	36	39	18	399	417
—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	5	2	7
25	25	1	10	11	1	4	5	8	99	107
64	64	—	40	40	4	26	30	35	323	358
687	2,687	—	2,395	2,395	143	1,313	1,456	508	12,148	12,656
901	901	—	639	639	39	364	403	169	3,406	3,575
2539	26,548	6	24,455	24,461	1,944	17,654	19,598	6,115	133,980	140,095

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SUMMARY

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Offences	1939–40			1940–41			D
	*DCMs	†FGCMs	Total	DCMs	FGCMs	Total	
Cowardice	—	—	—	—	3	3	
Offence against inhabitant	—	80	80	—	22	22	
Sleeping on or leaving post	78	132	210	67	140	207	
Mutiny	—	72	72	—	4	4	
Striking or violence to superior	91	217	308	56	122	178	
Threatening or insubordinate language	49	181	230	57	92	149	
Disobedience	94	212	306	110	163	273	
Resisting escort	26	46	72	21	32	53	
Desertion	6	17	23	24	46	70	
Fraudulent enlistment	—	1	1	—	1	1	
Absence without leave	73	266	339	89	195	284	
Fraud	11	5	16	6	8	14	
Theft	32	146	178	36	107	143	
Self-inflicted wound	—	5	5	1	6	7	
Indecency	8	15	23	4	14	18	
Drunkenness	46	363	409	46	107	153	
Allowing to escape	—	—	—	1	3	4	
Escaping	12	28	40	13	34	47	
Losing by neglect	7	17	24	20	25	45	
Injuring property	3	11	14	6	16	22	
Falsifying official document	3	5	8	—	1	1	
Enlisting after discharge with ignominy	1	1	2	—	—	—	
False answer on attestation	—	—	—	—	1	1	
Ill-treating a soldier	6	25	31	7	11	18	
Miscellaneous Military offences	135	301	436	99	289	388	
Miscellaneous Civil offences	23	75	98	18	57	75	
Totals	704	2,221	2,925	681	1,499	2,180	

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APPENDIX I(c)

(*See* pages 27–33 and 42–43)

COURT-MARTIAL CONVICTIONS
ITISH OTHER RANKS)

VERSEAS COMMANDS)

ember, 1939–31st August, 1945)

1941–42		1942–43			1943–44			1944–45			Total DCMs	Total FGCMs	Grand Totals
FGCMs	Total	DCMs	FGCMs	Total	DCMs	FGCMs	Total	DCMs	FGCMs	Total			
26	26	—	23	23	—	41	41	—	70	70	—	163	163
51	51	—	159	159	—	165	165	—	94	94	—	571	571
155	168	1	360	361	8	325	333	—	639	639	167	1,751	1,918
79	79	—	61	61	—	344	344	—	240	240	—	800	800
299	343	—	556	556	5	771	776	8	1,084	1,092	204	3,049	3,253
245	271	1	493	494	1	642	643	1	987	988	135	2,640	2,775
422	470	3	929	932	1	1,248	1,249	4	2,050	2,054	260	5,024	5,284
71	84	—	143	143	—	177	177	1	155	156	61	624	685
635	647	—	1,083	1,083	13	1,814	1,827	—	8,425	8,425	55	12,020	12,075
4	4	1	14	15	—	5	5	—	—	—	1	25	26
1,062	1,113	7	2,094	2,101	69	2,923	2,992	34	8,051	8,085	323	14,591	14,914
34	35	—	48	48	—	59	59	—	86	86	18	240	258
475	491	1	1,325	1,326	10	1,364	1,374	10	2,887	2,897	105	6,304	6,409
18	18	1	7	8	—	19	19	—	208	208	2	263	265
28	39	—	57	57	1	80	81	2	273	275	26	467	493
40	70	5	625	630	—	714	714	—	926	926	127	2,775	2,902
23	24	—	30	30	—	23	23	—	47	47	2	126	128
113	124	1	182	183	—	250	250	—	375	375	37	982	1,019
349	361	—	852	852	—	461	461	1	435	436	40	2,139	2,179
18	18	2	52	54	—	44	44	—	51	51	11	192	203
10	10	—	36	36	—	108	108	—	143	143	3	303	306
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	1	3	4
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	2	2
46	48	—	75	75	—	104	104	2	129	131	17	390	407
921	980	4	2,047	2,051	11	2,474	2,485	8	4,081	4,089	316	10,113	10,429
187	217	—	406	406	2	635	637	1	1,032	1,033	74	2,392	2,466
5,311	5,691	27	11,657	11,684	121	14,790	14,911	72	32,471	32,543	1,985	67,949	69,934

= District Courts-Martial.
(s = Field General Courts-Martial.

· CHART OF COURT-MARTIAL

(ACTUAL NUM



DUNKIRK
fall of FRANCE

Heavy GERMAN *Air-raids*
BATTLE *of* BRITAIN

Initial BRITISH *successes in* LIBYA

Heavy Air-raids on BRITAIN
BRITISH *Conquest of* ABYSSINIA

Withdrawal from GREECE *and* CRETE

RUSSIA *joined* ALLIES
RUSSIAN *withdrawals and counter-offensive*

JAPAN *attacked* PEARL HARBOUR.
Sinking of REPULSE *and* PRINCE *of* WALES
AMERICA *joined* ALLIES.
Fall of HONG-KONG *and* SINGAPORE

ALLIED *landing in* MADAGASCAR
BRITISH *withdrawal from* BURMA

BRITISH *withd*
in LIBYA *-fall of*
Enemy threat to
Changes in BRITA

I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII I II III IV V VI VII VIII

1939 1940 1941 194

8470 - 1000 - 7/49

CONVICTIONS FOR ALL OFFENCES.

MBERS BY MONTHS - 1939 - 1945)

TYPE O | ALLIED Invasion of NORTH AFRICA | BERLIN BOMBED | Stalemate in BURMA | Invasion of SICILY | Invasion of ITALY | BRITISH advance into BURMA | Deadlock in ITALY | Invasion of NORMANDY | Invasion of S. FRANCE | RUSSIAN offensive in BALTIC, AUSTRIA and POLAND | Crossing RHINE

GERMAN time | BRITISH | Capture of TRIPOLI | Advance into TUNISIA | Fall of MUSSOLINI · ITALY Surrendered. | Sinking of SCHARNHORST | RUSSIAN advances in RUSSIA and ROUMANIA | Battle of ARNHEM | Capture of WARSAW | Occ

STALINGRAD | Advance in LIBYA

Further GERMAN withdrawal in RUSSIA | Heavy Air-Raids on LONDON | RUSSIAN Successes | Heavy air-Raids on LONDON | V.1. Air-raids on LONDON | Capture of V.1. Sites | V-2. Air attacks | GERMAN counter attack IN ARDENNES | GE

X XI XII I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII I II

1943 1944

COMPARATIVE CHART OF COURT-MARTIAL CONVICTIO



S HOME FORCES AND OVERSEAS COMMANDS

PTEMBER, 1939, TO 31ST AUGUST 1945

MMAND



APPENDIX IV

(*See* page 36)

REVIEW OF SENTENCES BOARD

Questionnaire

NOTE.—*The questions in Parts 1 to 5 are for completion by the Prison Officer concerned; those in Parts 6 and 7 by the Psychiatrist during the Board's interview.*

1. *Service.*

1.1 Has he been adequately trained for his job?

Points. Trained as a driver or cook and used as a rifleman in emergency, etc.

1.2 Did he have any difficulty in absorbing training?

Points. He had difficulty in picking up technical matters as fast as other men, etc.

1.3 Has he been consistently employed in the job for which he was trained? Or at least for some time before the offence?

Points. Employed on driving or as a clerk until shortly before desertion. Was then serving as a rifleman, etc.

1.4 Had he any difficulty in adapting himself to the Army on being called up? If so, has he overcome this difficulty?

Points. He has never really accepted discipline. Has never got on well in the barrack room. Still unduly dependent on his home, etc.

1.5 Has he a satisfactory attitude towards service? How has he accepted his obligations?

Points. He has never accepted National Service as a duty. Feels he would have been more use to the war effort in his civilian job, etc.

1.6 Had he opportunity to identify himself with his unit before committing the offence? Had he any reason for being disgruntled or disaffected?

Points. He had only been with his unit a week. He was transferred from a unit he had fought with for some time and had not had time to find new "pals," etc.

1.7 Has he ever held N.C.O. rank or had a trade rating?

1.8 Is there any previous record of Army crime?

1.9 Are his job and position in the Army consonant with his work and station in civil life?

Points. A technician in civil life, doing unskilled work in the Army, etc.

2. *Offence.*

2.1 Was he, at the time of his offence, under any strain from his environment either in his unit or from his home?

Points. Under heavy shellfire. Sole remnant of his section. Wife unfaithful. Bad news from home. "Pal" recently killed, etc.

2.2 What is his present attitude to his offence?

2.3 Does he seem anxious to make good? And has he got it in him to do so?

2.4 Does he claim that at the time of the offence he was suffering from nerves or any other such condition?

Points. He suffered from a mental blackout or from loss of memory. He was so shaky that he could not control himself, etc.

2.5 What is his attitude to his detention?

3. *Home and Family.*

3.1 Does he come from a good home, was he brought up under satisfactory circumstances?

Points. Brought up in an orphanage and felt that he was not wanted. Unsettled atmosphere during youth owing to parental quarrels, etc.

3.2 Have his relations with other members of his family been normal and satisfactory?

Points. Quarrels with his father. Does not correspond with other members of his family, etc.

3.3 Is there any history of illness or abnormal behaviour in his family?

Points. Relations in a mental hospital, etc.

3.4 Has he any present domestic difficulties?

Points. Unfaithful wife. Family disrupted through war, etc.

4. *School.*

4.1 Did he have any difficulty with school learning?

Points. Illiterate. Only reached a low standard. Had difficulty in learning to read and write, etc.

4.2 Did he have the education one would expect considering his parents' station in life?

Points. Parents were well off but he only went to an elementary school, etc.

4.3 Did he develop normal interests and activities, taking part in school life, sports, etc.?

Points. Never took part in sports. Always went out alone or stayed in the house, etc.

4.4 Did he show normal signs of self-reliance and independence as he grew up?

Points. Never left home when he started work. Always used to go out with an elder brother, etc.

4.5 Did he go to any special kind of school—e.g. for backward boys, industrial school, or Borstal?

5. *Work.*

5.1 Has he a satisfactory work record? Did he get normal promotion and betterment?

Points. Frequent changes of job. Often got the sack. Used to ask for his cards on any pretext, etc.

5.2 On what kind of work was he employed?

Points. Always employed on unskilled labour, etc

5.3 Has he normal interests and hobbies for a man of his class? Are they of the sociable or solitary type?

Points. Spends all his leisure time in breeding white mice, etc.

5.4 Has he any record of civil crime?

6. *Demeanour.*

6.1 Is his general attitude normal considering his circumstances?

6.2 Is he able to comprehend all that is said to him and the nature of the interview.

6.3 Does he show any noticeable nervousness or emotional reaction?

7. *Medical.*

7.1 Has he ever suffered from any nervous illness or any severe physical illness?

7.2 Is there any severe illness especially of a mental nature in his family?

7.3 Has he any complaints at present that might take him to a doctor?

7.4 Is there any evidence of addiction to alcohol or any similar abnormality?

APPENDIX V

(*See* page 49)

DESERTION TABLES*

(1st September, 1939–31st August, 1945)

TABLE 1.—DESERTERS STRUCK OFF ACTIVE ARMY STRENGTH

	Jan.	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*April*	*May*	*June*	*July*	*Aug.*	*Sept.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*	*Total*	*Monthly Average*
1939 . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	209	275	322	270	1076	269
1940 . . .	435	469	402	507	624	416	1028	978	1163	2033	1752	1622	11429	952
1941 . . .	2915	1870	1490	1590	2001	1875	2081	1503	1516	2019	1817	1426	22103	1842
1942 . . .	2285	2027	1734	1711	1460	1425	1682	1369	1879	1508	1307	1449	19836	1653
1943 . . .	1506	1294	1488	1138	1228	1149	1160	1316	1281	1231	1222	1138	15151	1263
1944 . . .	1548	1377	1242	1414	1349	1324	1340	1742	1965	1610	1856	1603	18370	1531
1945 . . .	2129	1720	1568	1212	1192	1256	1142	1135	—	—	—	—	11354	1419

TABLE 2.—DESERTERS REJOINED AND RESTORED TO ACTIVE ARMY STRENGTH

1939 . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	224	161	174	112	671	168
1940 . . .	186	189	213	235	275	229	449	513	462	838	842	790	5221	435
1941 . . .	1297	1364	1260	1088	1192	1187	1447	987	1104	1414	1230	1008	14578	1215
1942 . . .	1601	1794	1537	1688	1281	1280	1465	1124	1342	1239	1081	1382	16794	1400
1943 . . .	1182	1291	1722	1253	1175	1171	1114	1056	1066	1016	998	885	13929	1161
1944 . . .	1075	1213	1029	1044	1132	1135	1075	1203	1474	1655	1449	1302	14786	1232
1945 . . .	1609	1814	1948	1526	1336	1269	1080	1009	—	—	—	—	11591	1449

* *See* page 49.

APPENDIX V—*continued*

TABLE 3.—DESERTION-PERCENTAGE RATES

1939 . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	·032	·034	·026	—	·031
1940 . . .	·040	·040	·033	·039	·046	·029	·065	·057	·066	·113	·093	·084	—	·059
1941 . . .	·147	·093	·073	·077	·096	·089	·099	·071	·071	·093	·083	·071	—	·088
1942 . . .	·103	·091	·077	·076	·064	·062	·073	·059	·081	·064	·055	·061	—	·072
1943 . . .	·062	·053	·060	·046	·049	·046	·046	·052	·050	·049	·048	·045	—	·050
1944 . . .	·062	·055	·048	·056	·053	·052	·052	·069	·077	·063	·073	·063	—	·060
1945 . . .	·083	·067	·060	·046	·045	·046	·042	·042	—	—	—	—		·054

TABLE 4.—SUMMARY

	Deserters struck off			Deserters rejoined
	Number (1)	Monthly Average (2)	Percentage rate (3)	(4)
1939 (Sept.–Dec.) .	1076	269	·031	671
1940 . . .	11429	952	·059	5221
1941 . . .	22103	1842	·088	14578
1942 . . .	19836	1653	·072	16794
1943 . . .	15151	1263	·050	13929
1944 . . .	18370	1531	·060	14786
1945 (Jan.–Aug.) .	11354	1419	·054	11591
Total (*a*) .	99319	(*b*)1379	—	77570

(*a*) From 1st September, 1939, to 31st August, 1945.
(*b*) Flat overall monthly average.

General Notes.

1. All figures are based on monthly returns from United Kingdom Record Offices and represent the numbers struck off strength of the Active Army on account of desertion and restored thereto on rejoining the Active Army either by voluntary surrender or having been apprehended. The figures are global and comprehensive for all regiments/corps of the British Army; no breakdown by commands/location is available.

   There were, however, certain inaccuracies in accounting during the war years, due primarily to lack of precise definitions, and it was not until January, 1947, that accuracy began to be achieved.

2. A man is declared a deserter from the 22nd day of absence; it does not follow, however, that he is struck off Active Army strength by the Record Office in the same month as he is declared a deserter. Delay in documentation within units and in G.H.Q., 2nd Echelons in commands abroad and the time-lag effects, notably from abroad and under war conditions, in transmission of such documents to Record Offices militate against speed in accounting.

3. The "Desertion Rates" in Table 3 represent the number of men struck off by Record Offices as deserters (*See* Table 1) expressed as a percentage of the average overall total other rank strength of the Active Army for the month in question; no account is taken, in this respect, of the numbers shown in Table 2.

APPENDIX VI

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BROAD — 1939 —
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

12 MONTHLY MOV
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

ART OF DESERTERS

F THE STRENGTH AS DESERTERS AFTER 21 DAYS ABSENCE
BROAD — 1939–1945 SHOWN IN .....
NTLY CONVICTED BY COURTS-MARTIAL SHOWN IN —·—·—·—



1942 1943 1944

12 MONTHLY MOVING AVERAGE RATE PER CENT OF STRENGTH
(IE THE RATE FOR APRIL, 1940 IS THE AVERAGE OF THE MONTHLY
PERCENTAGE RATES FOR THE PERIOD. OCTOBER, 1939 TO SEPTEMBER 1940

CHART OF D

BRITISH OTHER RANKS STRUCK OFF THE STRENGTH
AT HOME AND ABROAD — 1939 —
NUMBERS SUBSEQUENTLY CONVICTED



12 MONTHLY MOV
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PERCENTAGE RA

To face page 118

ART OF DESERTERS

F THE STRENGTH A DESERTERS AFTER 21 DAYS ABSENCE
BROAD - 1938 - E-5 SHOWN IN .....
ENTLY CONVICTED BY COURTS-MARTIAL SHOWN IN —- —- —- —



AVERAGE RATE PER CENT OF STRENGTH
PRIL, 1940 IS THE AVERAGE OF THE MONTHLY
S FOR THE PERIOD. OCTOBER, 1939 TO SEPTEMBER 1940

COMPARATIVE CHART OF ABSENCE AND DESERTION HOME FO

ACTUAL NUMBERS OF COURT MARTIAL CONVICTIONS — 59 MONTHS

FROM 1st SEPTEMBER 1939 TO 31st AUGUST 1945

LEGEND — HOME FORCES / OVERSEAS COMMANDS



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ND 'DESERTION' HOME FORCES AND OVERSEAS CO

MARTIAL CONVICTIONS — BY MONTHS

TEMBER, 1939 TO 31ST AUGUST, 1945

——HOME FORCES

-·-·-OVERSEAS COMMANDS



APPENDIX VIII

(*See* page 62)

THE WAR OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1
17*th April*, 1944

Ref. BM/LC/875(AG3(O))

CONFIDENTIAL

Headquarters,
All Commands (including A.A. Command).
Northern Ireland; London District.
Army Selection Centres.

Subject:—Selection of men for Special Training Units and Command Labour Companies

1. This memorandum is intended to provide guidance for the classification of young soldiers for Special Training Units and to modify and amplify the terms of War Office letter 20/Misc/2458 (A.G.3.c), dated 26th January, 1944. The circulation of this memorandum is limited as it is important that its contents should not be generally known.

2. It is proposed to improve the grading of the various groups of delinquents dealt with in Special Training Units and Labour Companies. There will be three types of Special Training Unit and Labour Company, to deal with the corresponding types of delinquent personnel. Selection will depend on the combination of the prospect of redemption and the severity of the delinquent history. The six types of men are suggested below, and so far as possible they will be sent to appropriate units.

3. *Special Training Units* are established to deal with young men between the ages of 17½ and 21 years who commit offences which cause them to become a nuisance to their units. The type of man involved is described in general in A.C.I. 1486 of 1943, and has failed to respond to such measures as can be applied by his unit. Suitable men below 21 years will be transferred to S.T.Us., of which there will be three types corresponding to the following three types of men (in exceptional circumstances very immature men whose prospect of redemption is really good may be admitted to an S.T.U. up to the age of 24).

(a) Those with no record of serious delinquency in the Army and in civil life, and with no sentence of detention, but who, by reasons such as restlessness, hostility to authority and unsatisfactory reaction to discipline associated with a reasonable emotional stability and intelligence, are likely to benefit considerably by a period of supervision and discipline of the "benevolent parental" type; and who are regarded as redeemable. *These men will be sent to No.* 3 *Special Training Unit.*

(b) Those (i) whose Army conduct is unsatisfactory and (ii) who have either or both a record of detention in the Army or of delinquency in civil life, but of whose redemption there is still a reasonable prospect. *These men will be sent to No.* 2 *Special Training Unit.*

(c) Those who may have a history of delinquency in the Army and/or in civil life and of several periods of detention, and in whom the prospect of redemption

is poor in view of their history and personality. They will be more difficult to handle and some of them after trial may turn out to be incapable of reform by Special Training Unit methods. *These men will be sent to No.* 1 *Special Training Unit.*

4. Labour Companies are in general for men who are persistently troublesome and delinquent and who do not react to Unit discipline and to detention. Three types of Command Labour Company will cater for three groups of delinquents above 21 years of age. No man below 21 years of age will be sent to a Labour Company in the first instance.

(a) Men of 21–28 years and somewhat older men with a degree of emotional immaturity appropriate to such an age. They may have served periods of detention in the Army or in civil life; but their history and personality indicate them to be eminently redeemable and suitable for the type of handling described in 3 (a) above. *These men will be sent to No.* 1 *Labour Company.*

(b) Men whose history, personality and attitude to service make the possibility of redemption with full military efficiency rather doubtful; and men who by reason of age are ineligible in para. 4 (a). *These men will be sent to No.* 2 *or* 3 *Labour Company.*

(c) Men who are considered to be incapable of redemption, in view of their history, personality and attitude to service. *These men will be sent to No.* 10 *Labour Company.*

5. Definite objective criteria cannot be laid down for the selection of these various types of delinquents. The prospect of redemption and probable response to disciplinary measures cannot be assessed in terms of psychological tests or the number of entries on A.F.B122. Only by careful psychiatric assessment of the history and the personality can this be determined. Technical instructions will be issued to Psychiatrists for their guidance.

6. The above criteria should assist in achieving some degree of uniformity in the types of men recommended for the various types of unit. They aim only to provide a foundation or skeleton upon which the Psychiatrists who advise the Commandants and P.S.Os. of A.S.Cs. can work. These categories and criteria are fluid and will from time to time be adjusted.

7. Should the Commandant, A.S.C., disagree with the Psychiatrist's recommendation, he will forward full particulars including psychiatric report S.P. Sheet 200, copy of A.F.B122, and Unit Commander's opinion as expressed in Appendix "A" to A.C.I. 97/44 to the Commandant, H.Q., A.S.C., for onward transmission to the War Office (A.G. 1D). A final decision will be given in such cases by the War Office.

(*sgd*) W. HENNETT, Lt.-Col.
for Director of Personal Services.

Copies to: Headquarters,
Home Forces.

Officers Commanding,
Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10 Labour Companies.

Commandants,
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Special Training Units.

APPENDIX IX

(*See* page 66)

SPECIAL TRAINING UNITS

(Specimen Chart)

DISTRIBUTION OF TRAINING PERIODS (200) MONTHLY

Military Training	*Educational*
16 Drill	16 Military Education
26 Route March and Military Tactics	8 London Regional Board Lectures
4 L.M.G.	4 Padre's Hour
4 Rifle	
1 Sten	
3 Bayonet	
1 Anti-Gas	
1 Piat	
1 2 in. Mortar	
1 Grenade	
2 Miniature Range	
60	28

P.T.	*Administration*
16 P.T.	1 Fire Drill
8 Road Run	8 Baths
3 Obstacle	4 Pay Lectures
	24 Daily Room Inspections
	4 Commandant's Weekly Drill Parade
	4 Commandant's Weekly Room Inspection
	24 Interior Economy and Administration
27	69

16 Recreational Training

Summary

Military Training	60
P.T.	27
Recreational	16
Educational	28
Administration	69
	200

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