

# THE ROYAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL.

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
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
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## "FOREST PLANK" ROADS.

By MAJOR P. G. JOHN KEENAN, N.Z.E.

ONE of the great, if not the greatest, factor of success in offensive operations at this stage of the War in France, is undoubtedly "roads." Happy indeed is the Corps Commander who, having completed his arrangements for a "push," is assured by his C.E. that the roads forward are completed; and that guns and ammunition will be up to support the advance, together with engineer stores to consolidate the position when torn from the enemy, and last but by no means least—that food and water will be forthcoming for the troops in their new front line.

The many difficulties in the way of efficient repair of the wonderful pavé roads of France, immediately behind the front line, are obvious. Road metal is scarce, and the difficulty of transporting it by motor lorry over heavily congested roads, puts ordinary methods of road-making out of the question. Hence, the forest plank road, which has, so far, stood all tests satisfactorily, where it has been well and truly laid.

It should be clearly understood that the writer lays no claim whatever to the method; but having served on several fronts since 1914, he has found none to compare with it, up to October, 1917, when he helped to lay down several hundred yards of it at —.

### MATERIALS REQUIRED.

Rough forest planks, 10 ft. by 10 in. by 3 in.

Split pit props of at least 6-in. diameter.

Nails, 6-in.

Sandbags.

### TOOLS REQUIRED.

Hammers, heavy.

Saws, rip.

Tapes, tracing.

Mauls, heavy.

Picks and shovels.

The best plan is to divide your working party of Pioneers or Infantry into three:—

1. Drain-cutting party.
2. Formation.
3. Carrying party.

Wherever possible, lay the plank road over the remains of the old pavé, which ensures some sort of a foundation. There were two methods in use at —.

- (a). Single roadway, 10 ft. wide, with crossing points about every 200 yards.
- (b). Double roadway, 20 ft. wide.

As for many reasons that are obvious, the double road is the best, and in the end saves time, it has not been considered worth while to bother with (a).

#### FORMATION.

No. 1 Party is put on to cutting the side drains 5 ft. wide and 5 ft. deep, on either side of the formation, leaving a berm of 5 ft. on each side of the roadway, thus making a total width of formation of 30 ft.

No. 2 Party drains all shell holes into the side drains, and fills holes with rammed earth, or preferably—with filled sandbags. This party also beds the bearers flush into the formation, in readiness for the Sappers to nail down the planks to them.

No. 3 Party is employed carrying planks—two men to each plank—from the dump, which should be pushed up as near the job as possible, by lorry.


#### METHOD OF LAYING.

The planks are laid at right angles to the bearers, with no camber. The ends of planks in the centre of the road should be flush, and a split pit prop should be securely nailed down the centre of the road to keep traffic on its proper side. It is also advisable to do the same on the outside edges of the planking. It checks side slipping in wet weather. All nailing should be on the skew. Wire nails are better than spikes, as the latter split the planking.

The planks should be laid flush, otherwise the road will be kicked up by horse traffic.

The advantages of this method of road building are many. It is strong and durable—it is quickly constructed, and easily repaired—and, what is very important, is the fact that the materials are always available from the Forest Control Officer.

A plan and cross section, showing details of construction, are added. The writer's company constructed 250 yards of this double roadway, including side-drains and guard rails, in three days, working daily from 4 a.m. until 2 p.m., often under heavy shell fire; and the road was used by every kind of wheeled transport, including heavy howitzers, drawn by tractors. It stood the severe test satisfactorily.



## WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.

By A. B.

WITH reference to the article "Weights and Measures," which appeared in the February number of the *R.E. Journal*, giving the actually scaled weights of Field Company vehicles on service, it would have been of greater interest if the weights had been given side by side with the authorized weights of vehicles taken from *F.S.M.*, 1915, for Field Companies, R.E.

The weights show such a wide divergence from the loads designed for the teams that it seems desirable to publish such table and to enquire what alterations in loads have been found necessary.

Vehicle.	Actual Weights Scaled.		<i>F.S.M.</i> Designed.
	Max. lbs.	Min. lbs.	Weight lbs.
Double Tool Cart ... ..	5,280	5,588	4,085' 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ oz.
Wagon, Limbered, R.E. ... ..	3,163	3,384	2,027' 10 " "
Wagon, G.S. ... ..	7,066	—	3,942' 12 $\frac{3}{4}$ " "
Pontoon Wagons ... ..	8,135	8,267	5,550' 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ " "
Trestle Wagon ... ..	8,565	—	6,032' 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ " "
Water Cart ... ..	2,832	—	2,521' 6 " "

From the above it seems that the actual weight to be drawn by a single horse varied in fact between 1,320 and 1,760 lbs., the designed weight being uniformly 1,000 lbs. or a little less.



## REVIEWS.

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### NOTES ON MILITARY EXPLOSIVES.

By MAJOR-GENERAL ERASMUS M. WEAVER, U.S. Army ; Chief of Coast Artillery.—(Messrs. Chapman and Hall, Ltd., London, 13s. 6d. net).

This book, which has a wide scope, goes into the subject very thoroughly, and in considerable detail. The best idea of its nature will, perhaps, be given by considering each of the ten parts and the three appendices, into which it is divided, individually.

#### Part I.—Principles of Chemistry.

To describe this part it is only necessary to quote the author:—"Before entering upon a study of explosives it is desirable that some knowledge be had of the fundamental chemical principles involved in the composition of explosive substances and in the changes which take place in connection with explosive phenomena. To this end a brief review will be given of the simple chemical laws, the system of notation, the meaning of chemical reactions, the relations of volumes and weights in those reactions, and problems arising thereunder."

#### Part II.—Substances used in the manufacture of explosives.

The various substances used in the manufacture of explosives are considered, their chemical structure, manufacture, and characteristics being given. In the case of Trinitrotoluol the chemical specifications and tests for Military Trinitrotoluol are added.

#### Part III.—General Remarks on Explosives.

In this part explosives are divided into three classes:—

1. Progressive or propelling explosives. (Low explosives).
2. Detonating or disruptive explosives. (High explosives).
3. Detonators or exploders. (Fulminates).

It will be seen that explosions are divided into three kinds ; explosions proper, detonations, and fulminations. The nature of each kind is considered and described.

#### Part IV.—Progressive explosives.

Progressive explosives are divided into two classes:—

1. Charcoal powders.
2. Nitrocellulose powders.

The composition and manufacture of the principal powders of each class are described. Nitrocellulose powders are divided into two further classes, Pure Colloids, and Composite Colloids—the latter including our own cordite.

### Part V.—Detonating Explosives.

These are divided into :—

- (a). Guncotton.
- (b). Nitroglycerine.
- (c). Dynamites.
- (d). Explosive Gelatin.
- (e). Picric Acid Derivatives.

Descriptions of the composition and properties are given, and the part closes with a list of the requirements enumerated by the Ordnance Board, U.S. Army, for high explosives for shell.

### Part VI.—Exploders.

As fulminate of mercury forms the active ingredient of most exploders, the greater portion of this part is devoted to a description of the manufacture and properties of that substance, together with an account of the method of loading it into caps, and a short description of such caps or primers.

### Part VII.—Service tests of explosives.

The manufacture, inspection, and tests of raw materials as well as explosives are given, and also specifications of the standard required to be attained.

### Part VIII.—Storage of Explosives.

This part consists of notes on the construction, siting, ventilation, etc., of magazines. Lists are given of those explosives which may be stored together, and those which must be kept in separate compartments. Special Storage Regulations for High Explosives are given; and the part concludes with a table of the minimum distances that should separate storage magazines from inhabited buildings, according to the weight of explosive stored. It must be remembered that the regulations given throughout the book are those in force in the United States of America, and so, probably, are not entirely in accordance with English practice.

### Part IX.—Handling High Explosives.

As each explosive in the book has been considered the precautions to be kept in mind have been pointed out. Part IX. commences by collecting and summarizing the more important precautions of a general nature to be observed in handling explosives. Safety precautions in preparing to fire demolition charges, and details of preparing a charge for firing are next given, followed by a description of the Laflin and Rand Magneto-electric Exploder, the U.S. Army Service Exploder.

### Part X.—Demolitions.

In this section the calculation of charges and the use of explosives in demolition is described for buildings, bridges (masonry and iron), iron plates, masonry tunnels, stockades or barriers, and railroads, and also for subaqueous demolitions. Calculations for land mines are also given. The part concludes with tables of the relative strengths of various explosives, and a summary of charges for hasty demolitions.

### Appendix I.—Laboratory Experiments and Notes.

This appendix gives a number of experiments and laboratory notes to illustrate the chemical principles set forth in Part I.

Appendix II.—Regulations for the Transportation of Explosives by Freight and Express.

Appendix III.—The *Rôle* of Chemistry in the War.

Appendix III. is by no means the least interesting part of the book. It is intended for the layman as well as for the student of explosives, and is reprinted from the *Journal of the Franklin Institute*, of February, 1916. In it the author shows the rôles of Nitrogen, Carbon, Hydrogen, and the Halogens.

If the average man were asked what part chemistry played in the War, his reply would probably be concerned with gases, the Halogens. How far his answer would be short of the truth may be shown by quoting a few remarks of the author on the subject of Nitrogen alone.

"Educated people are, of course, aware that fixed nitrogen in combination with carbon, hydrogen, and some few other minor elements is built up by vegetable life and, in turn, assimilated into the bodies of animals, thus supplying our food of almost every variety. . . . One thing that is not very generally apprehended by educated people, however, is that without fixed nitrogen in great abundance mankind could not wage war upon one another under modern conditions. Ever since gunpowder replaced the bow and arrow fixed nitrogen has been used by man to hurl destructive missiles at his adversaries. In fact, it should be stated that no explosive substance has ever been used in peace or in war which did not depend for its activity on the extraordinary properties of the element nitrogen, which, as the major constituent of the air we breathe, could almost be said to content itself with the inert and pacific rôle of toning down the activities of its restless neighbour, oxygen. . . . Fixed nitrogen is the first and most important element of national defence. . . . The fact that fixed nitrogen will become an increasingly important factor in the production of food simply means that, come peace or war, foresighted preparation will not under any circumstances be unprofitable or in vain."

J.D.B.

## PAGES D'HISTOIRE, 1914—1917.

Published by the Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault, 5—7, Rue des Beaux-Arts, Paris.

(Continued from R.E. Journal for April).

The 144th number of the above series contains the official communiqués issued by the Central Government to the French Provincial Authorities during the month of July, 1917; it is the XXXII. volume dealing with this subject. It is provided with a number of appendices; therein will be found the text of the speech made by Monsieur Antonin Dubost, President of the Senate, on the 12th July, 1917, at the distribution of prizes at the Lycée Saint Louis (formerly the Harcourt College); the text of the messages exchanged by the President of the French Republic with Crowned Heads and the Presidents of other Republics on the occasion of the anniversary of the founding of the French Republic; the text of speech made by Monsieur Albert Dalimier, Under Secretary of State for the Department of Beaux-Arts, on the 13th July, 1917, at the distribution of prizes at the *Conservatoire National de Musique*; the text of the speech made by Monsieur Paul Deschanel, President of the Chamber of Deputies, on the 28th July, 1917, in connection with the Franco-Roumanian Demonstration at the Sorbonne.

Monsieur Dubost in his speech reminded his audience that it is at all times a trying experience to address words to the youth of a nation, words which shall contain the germs of instruction. He found it still more so to speak to the young men of 1917!

The gates of the Lycée which were about to shut behind them had not opened, as was formerly the case, to admit them on to the pleasant paths leading to a joyous future, but it had done so to allow them to enter the blood-stained fields on which was being played the greatest drama of history. They would have at once to undertake the noblest of duties, to be subject to a new and strict discipline. They would, in a few months' time, be students in a new and terrible School, learning the most difficult of lessons. They would find former comrades describing the parabola no longer on the blackboard, but at the gaping mouth of the cannon. The young men of 1917 had a double duty to perform: to bring the present War to a victorious conclusion; to reconstruct a new France.

The hereditary enemy of France, who realized to the full that the destiny of nations was at stake, had concentrated all his hopes on one last stratagem. He relied no longer on the criminal chemistry of his gases, nor on the perfidious cunning of his U boats, but on the pernicious poison of shiftless pacifism, on the whimsical philosophies that his agents were offering as a refuge to the war-weary, to those overcome by their deep sorrow, to the vain and ignorant demagogue. He was endeavouring

to infatuate the young and inexperienced democracy of Russia with fatal doses of this virus. No doubt he will make an effort to drug France too. But the young men of France will see in this extra-military offensive but an indirect admission by Germany of her defeat, and this will be another reason to them for holding on during this last and decisive quarter of an hour. They will put on their helmets of good sense and patriotism and thus pass in safety through the poisoned clouds being discharged by German agents.

Monsieur Paul Deschanel in his speech stated that they had met together in order to give expression to their fraternal affection for Roumania. Through space, through time, Roumania and France, who are of the same race, have had the same ideals. He pointed out that Roumania had had many difficulties in her way, but she had overcome them in order to take her place as a belligerent in the Great Conflict being waged on behalf of civilization. She had entered on the War on behalf of the same ideals of right which had led the United States of America to support the cause of the Entente Powers.

The 145th volume is entitled *Le Livre Blanc Grec*; and contains the diplomatic correspondence, in two parts, relating (1) to the Greco-Serbian Treaty of Alliance and (2) to the Germano-Bulgarian Invasion of Macedonia. It is the XIII. volume of the series dealing with diplomatic *Pourparlers* and contains the text of 77 documents, of which the first 44 relate to the Greco-Serbian Treaty of Alliance. The majority of the documents bear a double date, i.e., Old as well as New Style; throughout this notice all dates will refer to the Gregorian Calendar, unless otherwise indicated.

The documents to which this volume relates were laid before the Greek Parliament at its sitting of 17th August, 1917; they afford a glimpse of the influences which were at work and betrayed Greece into a course of conduct that ended in her ceding a part of her soil, a part of her army and a great part of her Sovereignty into the hands of the King of Prussia.

From the first document in the volume we learn that M. Lambros A. Coromilas, the Greek Foreign Minister, and M. Mathias Boschkovitch, Serbian Ambassador at Athens, being duly authorized by their respective governments, drew up on the 5th May, 1913, the Heads of Agreement to be embodied in a Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia as follows:—

1. The Governments of Greece and Serbia undertake to enter into and to sign a Treaty providing for a defensive alliance between the two countries within 20 days of the date last mentioned.

2. A stipulation must be contained in the Treaty that the two Governments will act in mutual support of one another, so that Greece and Serbia may acquire a common frontier to the W. of the river Axios (Vardar) and that the delimitation of the new frontiers must proceed on the basis of effective occupation.

The general line of the frontier to be as follows:—

Starting from the Kamena Planina Chain (Kamna), which delimits the high Schkoumbi, S.W. of Lake Ochrida, the line will follow the S. bank of the lake, will strike the W. bank of Lake Prespa at the village

of Kousko, and cutting across the latter lake will be drawn to Dolni Dupliani on the E. bank ; thence, it will pass to the E. of Rahmanli, follow the water parting between the rivers Erigon (Tscherna) and Moglénica, striking the river Axios (Vardar) about 3 kilometres S. of Ghévghéli.

The Greco-Bulgarian and Serbo-Bulgarian frontiers must be settled on the principle of effective occupation and to secure a balance of power between the three States in question.

The Serbian frontier N. of Ghévghéli will follow the course of the river Axios (Vardar) to its confluence with the Brégalnitza, continuing to a point near the former Turco-Bulgarian frontier.

The Greco-Bulgarian frontier will pass to the S. of Kilkitch, to the N. of Nigrita, by Orliaiko and thence by Lake Achinos (Tachinos) and the river Angitis (Anghista) to the sea at a point E. of Port Eleuthérai.

Fuller details of this frontier line will be set out in the Treaty.

3. The Governments of Greece and Serbia bind themselves to act in harmony and mutually to support one another in the negotiations about to take place in connection with the partition of the territories to be ceded by Turkey ; they will reciprocally lay claim to the frontier lines between Greece and Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria, Serbia and Bulgaria indicated in the preceding paragraph.

4. In the event of a dispute arising with Bulgaria on the subject of the frontiers outlined in para. 2 and on its being found impossible to come to an amicable understanding, the Greek and Serbian Governments shall be at liberty jointly to propose to Bulgaria that the difference between them shall be submitted to mediation or to arbitration. Should Bulgaria refuse to accept the procedure of a pacific settlement and assume a threatening attitude or attempt to impose her claims by force, the two Governments bind themselves, in order to secure the integrity of their territories, to lend each other military assistance and only jointly to conclude peace on terms to be mutually agreed.

5. A military convention will be entered into without delay with the object of preparing and assuring the necessary measures for defence *to meet the case of an attack on the two States, without provocation given, by a third Party.*

The Treaty of Alliance, which was strictly secret, embodying the above Heads of Agreement contains 11 articles and was duly signed on the 1st June, 1913, by M. Jean Alexandropoulos, Greek Ambassador at Belgrade, and M. Mathias Boschkovitch, Serbian Ambassador at Athens ; the documents ratifying this Treaty were duly exchanged by the two Governments at Athens on the 21st June, 1913. Serbia secured thereby full use of the Port of Salonika for 50 years and certain other commercial advantages.

A military convention was drawn up on the 14th May, 1913, and signed *ad referendum* by Capt. Jean Metaxas, General Staff, on behalf of Greece, and by Colonel Peta: Pechitch, General Staff, and Colonel Douchan Toufegdjitch, on behalf of Serbia. This convention was not ratified, so another one was drawn up on the 1st June, 1913, by Capt. Xenophon Stratigos, General Staff, on behalf of Greece, and Colonels Pechitch and Toufegdjitch, on behalf of Serbia ; documents ratifying

the latter convention were exchanged at Athens on the 21st June, 1913.

There are 13 articles in the military convention which was ratified, as follows:—

1. *In case of war between one of the two Allied States and a third party* under the circumstances contemplated in the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia, or in the case of a sudden attack by large bodies of Bulgarian troops—at least two divisions—on the Greek or the Serbian Army, the two States, Greece and Serbia, promise to afford each other military support, Greece with the whole of her land and sea forces and Serbia with the whole of her land forces.

2. At the outbreak of hostilities and by the time that operations begin Greece must have an army of 90,000 combatants concentrated in the region between Mont Pangaion, Salonika, and Gouménitsa, and Serbia an army of 150,000 combatants concentrated in the region Glévéghéli, Vçless (Kioprulu), Koumanovo, Piroi. In addition Greece is obliged, at the same time, to have a fleet ready for action in the *Ægean Sea*.

3. The two States must bring the remainder of their military forces into the zone of operations as soon as they are mobilized and ready.

4. A diminution of the forces mentioned in Article 2, either by reason of a partial demobilization or by the despatch of troops elsewhere, is not permissible, except by agreement between the General Staffs of the two Allied Countries duly entered into in writing.

But should Greece, under the circumstances contemplated in Article 1, find that she is compelled at the same time to defend herself against some Power other than Bulgaria, she must bring to the aid of Serbia, *if attacked by Bulgaria*, a number of troops to be fixed upon by agreement between the General Staffs of the two countries at the time such necessity occurs; the number of troops being decided according to the requirements of the situation and so that the safety of Greece may not be jeopardized.

Reciprocally, should Serbia find herself in a position necessitating provision for defence against a Power other than Bulgaria, she must bring to the aid of Greece, *if attacked by Bulgaria*, a number of troops to be fixed upon, by agreement between the General Staffs of the two countries at the time such necessity occurs, the number of troops being decided upon according to the requirements of the situation and so that the safety of Serbia is not jeopardized.

5. Should either of the *two contracting parties declare war against Bulgaria or some other Power* without previous agreement and without the concurrence of the other contracting party, the latter will be released from the obligations imposed under Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the latter party must observe a benevolent neutrality towards its ally during the whole duration of the War and will be obliged immediately to mobilize, Greece at least 40,000 combatants and Serbia at least 50,000 combatants, on its own territory, in such manner as to protect its own neutrality and, in consequence, so as to secure the freedom of movement of the Allied Army.

6. Military operations against Bulgaria will be planned jointly in agreement. The plan of operations will be worked out by the General

Staffs of the two States or by their delegates. This plan may, in order to meet a change in the military situation, be modified, by agreement in writing, by the two General Staffs.

7. After the commencement of hostilities, whatever may be the progress of events in connection with military operations, whatever may be the localities through which the troops of one or the other Allied States may pass during the course of military operations, and whatever may be the towns, villages or localities that shall be occupied for military reasons by these troops, the definitive occupation of the territory beyond the frontier line between Greece and Serbia on the one hand and Bulgaria on the other, provisions relating to which are contained in the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia, and whereof the present Convention is the complement, will be dealt with on the following lines :—

Greece shall have the right definitively to occupy and annex the region situated to south and east of the line which, starting at a point on the Vardar immediately N. of Sehovo, passes between the villages of Bogoroditsa and Mazucovo, thence continues by the crest between the villages of Selimli and Dautli, Heights 535, 227, across the lake, through Heights 397, 1494, along the ridge of Mont Bélès, through Peak 1800 metres to N.W. of Karakioi, to Height 2194 (Pérelík).

Serbia shall have the right definitively to occupy and annex the region situated to the N. and N.W. of the above-mentioned line.

Greece agrees to the occupation by Serbia of a territorial zone, having a width of 6 kilometres, situated on the left bank of the Nestos-Mesta (Karassou), to the N. of Xanthi and to the E. of Buru-Golû. Serbia on the other hand undertakes to allow Greece free passage across this zone and acknowledges that the territory E. of this zone lies wholly within the sphere of influence belonging to Greece and that she herself has no claim whatever thereto.

Should it become necessary in the course of military operations for one of the two armies to occupy any territory, towns or villages situated in the zone of the other army, such territory, etc., will be immediately evacuated, on demand being made to this effect by the State entitled thereto, under the provisions of the preceding article hereof.

8. The definite objective of the military operations which may be undertaken by the Allied Greek and Serbian Armies being the destruction of the military forces of Bulgaria, in the event of one of the two armies being unable to attain this result in its own theatre of operations, it must accept the assistance of the other in the same theatre. Nevertheless, the Army which has accomplished its purpose in its own theatre of operations must lend aid to the other whether its assistance may be called for or not, in order that by the combined action of the two Allied Armies Bulgaria may be forced to accede to the demands made on her by the two Allied States and to agree to peace terms.

9. Neither of the two Allied Armies shall conclude an armistice of a duration longer than 24 hours nor tacitly suspend hostilities.

An armistice exceeding 24 hours in duration shall only be agreed to after an understanding arrived at in writing between the two Allied States; the conditions under which the armistice is to be agreed to will be eventually laid down by these Allied States at the same time.



10. Each of the Allied Armies will reciprocally enjoy, on the territory of the other contracting party, all the rights and privileges conferred on the troops of the latter (nationals) by the laws and ordinances in force, except as regards rights relating to requisitioning. The civil and military authorities of the two contracting parties must co-operate to secure the end in view.

Payments for purchases made to meet the needs of the army of one of the Allied States in the territory of the other must be regularly made in cash at the ruling market rates. Under exceptional circumstances payments may, on the demand of the competent authorities of the other Ally, be made by the scrip placed at the disposal of the Allied Army.

The rate of exchange between the Greek and Serbian currency shall be fixed by agreement between the two Allied Governments. It is to be understood that in territory taken from the enemy and occupied by the Allied Armies, both contracting parties are to enjoy, in matters relating to supply, etc., all privileges arising out of the ordinary customs and usages of War.

Each of the two Allied Armies are to enjoy these privileges only on the territory which belongs to its own zone of occupation, as indicated in Article 6 of the present Convention. The cost of transport of troops, stores, booty, etc., by railways and boats, will be borne by that contracting State in whose territory the movement takes place.

11. Booty shall belong to that Allied Army which effects the capture thereof. Where booty is captured on the same battlefield by a combined Allied force, it shall be divided proportionally in the ratio of the number of combatants of the two armies participating in the capture.

12. The present Convention is to remain in force concurrently with and during the same period as the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia.

Article 2 of the present Convention may be modified by agreement in writing between the General Staffs of the two States, after the present crisis is over and demobilization ordered.

13. The present Convention will come into force on the date on which it is ratified.

The text of the Military Convention drawn up on the 14th May, 1913, is printed side by side with the later one. The earlier convention contained only 10 articles; the main points of difference will be referred to later.

Documents relating to the negotiations between Greece and Serbia follow the texts of the Treaty and Convention already referred to above. On the 23rd May, 1913, the Greek Foreign Minister telegraphed to the Greek Ambassador at Belgrade; after acknowledging receipt of the former's despatch relating to the Note which the Serbian Government were about to address to the Bulgarian Government, he states that, in spite of the Bulgarian attack at Pangaion, Greece did not wish to take the offensive and march against Serres, but that the then situation could not be allowed to continue, as it was an extremely dangerous one, and Greece would have to act forthwith. The treaty between Greece

and Serbia, it was provided, should be signed at latest by the 25th May, 1913; therefore, the Greek Ambassador at Belgrade was given authority to sign this Treaty forthwith and at the same time received instructions regarding slight modifications to be inserted in the text of the document in question. The modifications referred to were duly incorporated into the Treaty which was signed on the 1st June, 1913.

In a telegram dated 23rd May, 1913, from the Greek Minister at Belgrade to the Greek Foreign Minister, the former forwarded the views of Capt. Stratigos on the modifications which the Serbians wished to introduce in the Military Convention drawn up on the 14th May. "Article 1 of the earlier Convention provided for mutual co-operation between Greece and Serbia only in the case of a war between Greece and Bulgaria or between Serbia and Bulgaria. Serbia desired to enlarge the operation of this article so as to include a war between the Allies and any third party. Capt. Stratigos pointed out that the proposed alteration would not be an improvement from the Greek military point of view. "The strictly defensive character of the Alliance," he said, "is to the advantage of the Serbians, who are asking nothing more from the Bulgarians than that of which they are in possession to-day, when however we raise our claim to the territory S. of the line Kilkitch-Orliako, referred to in the Heads of Agreement, a territory now occupied entirely by the Bulgarians, any advance on our part with the object of taking over this region may be interpreted by the Serbians as a provocative act. Moreover, this strictly defensive character is calculated to allow Bulgaria all initiative and liberty of action, which from a military point of view is very disadvantageous. The enlargement in the scope of the Alliance from one against Bulgaria only, so as to include any third party whatever, is prejudicial to our interests from the military point of view and only to the advantage of Serbia. Indeed, the latter only possesses land frontiers and has more neighbours than we have, with any one of whom it may at any moment enter into a conflict, in which case we would be obliged to go to its assistance; on the other hand, Bulgaria is the only Power against whom we can have a land war; it is in this event alone that Serbia can be useful to us. As far as our eventual differences with any other Powers are concerned, Powers who may attack us at sea, the assistance of Serbia would be no value." He further points out that it would be more advantageous to Greece to modify the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance to make it agree with the Military Convention rather than *vice versa*.

The Serbians also asked for a modification of the latter part of Article 6 of the Military Convention of the 14th May, 1913, which provided as follows:—"The Greek Army shall have the right to occupy the territory situated to the south and south-east of the line Gradec, along the ridge of Mont Bêles—through Peak 1800 metres N.W. of Karakioï, to Height 2194 Pérelik; the Serbian Army, the territory to the north and north-west of the aforesaid line. The line suggested by the Serbians was one which "starting on the Vardar 3 kilometres S. of Ghévehéli, passes between the villages of Bogoroditsa and Mazukovo, to the N. of the village of Selimli, to the S. of Dautli, thence through Heights 535 and 420, by Hissar-Tépé, Heights 127, 217, 490, 576, along the crest of Kroussa

Balkans to Height 645 (on) Butkova Lake to the river Strouma, then through Peak 1800 to N. of Karakioi, and Heights 2194, 4038, 8994 and 8475. The Serbian Army shall have the right to occupy the territory north of the above-mentioned line." The line finally agreed upon is defined in Article 7 of the Military Convention of the 1st June, 1913. With regard to the proposed line set out above Capt. Stratigos states that the Serbians give as a reason for claiming the above frontier line that, in case of a successful war against Bulgaria, Greece would be sufficiently indemnified by an extension of her frontier on the East. He continues: "Such a proposition, which may be open to discussion under other circumstances must be rejected to-day, not so much because we would be deprived of a great stretch of rich lands but rather on military grounds. Since by accepting the line proposed by Serbia, we should find ourselves, even after a successful war against Bulgaria, deprived of a natural and strong frontier to the N. of Salonika, such as Mont Bélès provides. Should Mont Bélès and, towards the E., the defile of Dâmir-Ilissar, be in the hands of another State, such State would possess the advantage of being able to concentrate its army against us in the Struma valley and to advance, without meeting any obstacles, into the plains of Serrès and on Salonika. The occupation of Milovitsa and of the defile by us would, on the other hand, compel him to concentrate more to the north and would materially retard his advance; the occupation of these places would be of incalculable advantage to us and would facilitate our subsequent operations in this region. Another very great disadvantage, which we would experience in the event of the proposed line being adopted, is that the use of a great part of the Salonika-Serrès railway from Kilindir to the Hani-Derven over the Struma would be lost to us. The construction of a new railway from Salonika to Serrès continued across the proposed frontier presents great difficulties owing to the configuration of the ground."

On the 26th May, 1913, the Greek Ambassador at Belgrade sent a further telegram to the Greek Foreign Minister containing the modifications demanded by the Serbians in the Military Convention of the 14th May, 1913—as submitted by Capt. Stratigos.

Capt. Stratigos pointed out that:—(1), The Serbians insisted on the enlargement of the scope of Article 1 of the Convention on the ground that, *in the event of a conflict with Bulgaria alone, Serbia would not require an alliance with Greece*; (2), the Serbians now demanded that the Greek contingent referred to in Article 2 of the Convention should, in the first instance, consist of 100,000 combatants (in the original Convention a Greek contingent of 90,000 combatants was provided for); (3), the Serbians wished to add a second paragraph to Article 4 to provide for the contingency of one of the Allies declaring war against Bulgaria without previous agreement with the other.

Capt. Stratigos also stated that a new article was being added dealing with matters relating to supplies, method of payment for expenditure incurred, exploitation of the resources of occupied territory. He was generally favourable to the acceptance of the modifications proposed; the question of the enlargement of the scope of the Convention to provide against a conflict with any third Power being one affecting the

whole policy of Greece, he asked that further instructions might be given him on the subject.

On the 27th May, 1913, the Greek Foreign Minister telegraphed to the Greek Ambassador at Belgrade in reply to the communications relating to the Military Convention. The Serbian modifications to Articles 1 and 4 were accepted, but the Greek Government held out against the increase of the contingent required in Article 2. Capt. Stratigos had succeeded in obtaining a modification in the frontier line proposed by Serbia and instructions were issued that this line should be fully and clearly defined. It was pointed out that the Serbian demand for a stretch of territory, having a maximum width of 10 kilometres along the Nestos for the construction of a railway to a port on the Ægean Sea to be acquired by them would be of very considerable value to them and therefore, as a *quid pro quo*, it was suggested that Serbia should cede half of Doiran Lake to Greece.

On the date last mentioned, the Greek Foreign Minister addressed a telegram to King Constantine, then at Salonika, informing him that Serbia was desirous of acquiring a seaport on the Ægean Sea and suggested that the proposal be accepted subject to Greece having free right of access thereto and running powers over any Serbian railway constructed thereto. It was suggested that the strip of territory to be acquired by Serbia for this purpose should lie between Xanthi, Yenidjé and Gioumouldjina; these towns to remain outside the Serbian zone.

The continued attacks of the Bulgarians made the situation serious and on the 30th May, 1913, the Greek Foreign Minister telegraphed to the Greek Ambassador at Belgrade that should Serbia still insist on having a stretch of territory in order to have access to the Ægean Sea, the latter was authorized to enter into an agreement as follows:—  
“A band of territory, up to 10 kilometres wide, starting from a point to be fixed on the line Karakioi-Pérelík to the Ægean Sea, passing between Xanthi and Gioumouldjina, is conceded to Serbia, Greece being assured free passage across the same as well as all other facilities.”

The next telegram in the volume bears date 24th July, 1914 (*i.e.*, nearly 10 months later than the previous one); it is addressed by the Greek Foreign Minister at Athens to M. Venizelos, the then Greek Premier, who was at the time at Trieste. It contains the information that the German *Chargé d'affaires* had called at the Foreign Office at Athens and had read, in the strictest confidence, the text of a despatch which his Government had addressed him on the European situation. In this despatch it was stated that the possibility of an armed conflict between Austria and Serbia could not be excluded from the German purview, and in these circumstances the Wilhelmstrasse intended to stand by the Ballplatz. It was probable that Bulgaria might take advantage of the opportunity, which was thus afforded her, to secure the ends she was seeking. It was not known what attitude Turkey would take up. It was desirable that Greece should hold herself aloof from Serbia. Under the existing circumstances, it was suggested, an Alliance with Turkey was impracticable, but it was thought probable that an understanding might be arrived at by Greece on the subject of mutual neutrality. The Greek Foreign Minister goes on to say that,

whilst assuring the German *Chargé d'affaires* that Greece would do its best to secure the continuance of peace, he explained the difficulty of her position in the event of Bulgaria participating in an attack on Serbia. He had reserved his reply to the suggestions made to him until he could consult the Premier and the King of Greece.

On the day following (the 25th July) the Greek Ambassador at Belgrade telegraphed to M. Venizelos, then at Munich, saying that the Serbian Premier had asked him to ascertain: "Whether the Serbian Government may rely on military assistance from Greece: (1) in the event of Serbia being attacked by Austria and (2) in the event of Serbia being attacked by Bulgaria." It was further notified that the Serbian Ambassador at Athens was raising the same questions. It was also intimated that the Serbian Premier had stated that Montenegro would stand by Serbia in the event of an attack on her either by Austria or by Bulgaria, and that Roumania was interesting herself with a view to preventing a war between Austria and Serbia and would decide upon her subsequent conduct later should hostilities break out. Latest information from St. Petersburg indicated that Russia would support Serbia by force of arms, but the decision of the Czar was awaited on this point.

On the 25th July, the Greek Ambassador at Berlin telegraphed to the Greek Foreign Minister at Athens and informed him that he had had a long interview with Von Jagow (the German Foreign Minister) who had informed him that the relations between Austria and Serbia had reached a critical stage and that the German *Chargé d'affaires* had been instructed to apprise the Greek Foreign Office at Athens of the views of the Imperial Government. The Greek Minister stated that he had informed Von Jagow that, should Bulgaria think fit to intervene in the quarrel, Greece would immediately also come into the conflict. Von Jagow thereupon particularly emphasized the dangers of an intervention on the part of Greece for the purpose of restraining Bulgaria. These dangers were, according to him, the possibility of Turkey coming in against Greece, owing to Serbia being occupied with defending herself against Austria, and the further possibility, which had to be reckoned with, of Roumania standing out whilst Serbia was being attacked by Bulgaria. Von Jagow stated that Roumania had coquetted with the Triplice and was not therefore likely to come in against Austria. The Greek Ambassador had pointed out to Von Jagow that Greece could not countenance any action on Bulgaria's part tending to upset the balance of power in the Balkans secured by the Treaty of Bukharest. Since, should Bulgaria be allowed to aggrandize herself, she would become so powerful that in a few years' time she would launch an attack against Greece. Von Jagow was further informed that if he really desired that the Balkan Powers should not intervene in the quarrel, he ought to address himself to Sofia with the object of compelling Bulgaria to remain quiet.

Owing to the reticence of Von Jagow, on the subject of the probable conduct of Bulgaria, it was conjectured that Austria and Bulgaria had decided upon common action. Von Jagow, at the same time, expressed the opinion that the military party in Turkey showed a very friendly disposition towards Greece and that this circumstance should not be lost sight of.

M. Venizelos telegraphing, on the 25th July, from Munich to the Greek Foreign Minister at Athens stated: "As regards our attitude, in the event of hostilities between Austria and Serbia, whilst reserving our opinion as regards the action to be taken under the Treaty of Alliance, it is necessary to leave no doubt in the minds of your questioners as to our intention of not remaining inactive with our arms crossed in the event of a Bulgarian attack on Serbia. *It would be impossible for us to tolerate such an attack, which would result in an aggrandisement of Bulgaria, and which would at the same time nullify the Treaty of Bukharest. The question is not merely one concerning our duty to our ally Serbia, but as an imperative necessity we must act for our own preservation.*"

Replying on the 26th July, from Munich, to the Greek Ambassador at Belgrade, M. Venizelos stated that he must consult with the King and Government of Greece before giving definite answers to the questions of the Serbian Premier. He asked that his personal views should be communicated strictly confidentially to the latter as follows:—(1), As to the eventuality of a war between Austria and Serbia, M. Venizelos hoped that such a war, which would be a veritable calamity for everyone, might be avoided, thanks to the conciliatory attitude of Russia and Serbia; but should war unhappily break out, Greece would weigh all the circumstances of the moment and take such action as might be likely to prove effective; (2), as regards the eventuality of an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria, M. Venizelos would advise the King and Government of Greece to oppose Bulgaria with the whole strength of Greece, in order to safeguard Serbia from the Bulgarian danger and to give effect to the provisions of the Treaty of Bukharest.

The Greek Foreign Minister replied to the Greek Ambassador at Berlin on the 28th July, stating that he had informed the German *Chargé d'affaires* at Athens that Greece would be compelled to oppose Bulgaria by every means in her power should the latter participate in a war between Austria and Serbia; the most elementary principles of self-preservation and security rendered it impossible for her to tolerate an attack by Bulgaria on Serbia, since this would reopen the questions settled by the Treaty of Bukharest. The Greek Ambassador at Berlin was directed to make similar representations at the Wilhelmstrasse at the earliest opportunity.

When the rupture between Austria and Serbia took place M. Venizelos was still at Munich. In consequence, he sent a telegram, on the 29th July, to the Greek Foreign Minister containing general instructions for his guidance in the emergency that had arisen, pointing out that should it be possible for Greece to remain neutral in a war limited to Austria and Serbia, nevertheless Treaty obligations imposed the duty on Greece immediately to mobilize 40,000 men.

However the adoption of this course at that juncture was not likely to prove, in the judgment of M. Venizelos, advantageous to the common interests of Serbia and Greece, since the adoption of such measures would provoke a general mobilization on the part of Bulgaria, and probably precipitate events of a serious kind. The Greek Foreign Minister was requested to explain to the Serbian Government the reasons for the passive attitude being assumed by Greece and to reiterate

the assurance that Greece was firmly resolved to mobilize without loss of time should Bulgaria call out her army. He was to add that the Greek attitude would correspond absolutely to that which the Serbian Government decided to adopt, in the common interest, at the time of the crisis between Greece and Turkey.

The Greek Premier was of opinion that the co-operation of Greece and Roumania might produce a beneficial effect at Sofia and it was suggested that the two Cabinets should present identical Notes without delay, containing an intimation to the Bulgarian Government that, should it mobilize its army, Greece and Roumania would immediately follow suit. M. Venizelos sent directions for the necessary steps to be taken in concert with Bukharest, to give effect to the foregoing suggestion.

The Greek Premier further stated that in the event of the War spreading to other Powers, Greece ought at all costs to avoid ranging herself against Serbia; as the adoption of such a course would be opposed to the vital interests of Greece, as well as being a breach of her Treaty obligations.

On the 2nd August, the Greek Foreign Minister sent a telegram to the Greek Ambassador at the Serbian Court, who was at the time at Nisch, informing him of the decision taken by Greece in relation to the attitude she proposed to adopt in connection with the Austro-Serbian Conflict. He was directed to acquaint the Serbian Premier that Greece held the independence and territorial integrity of Serbia to be the essential factor in the balance of power in the Balkans and that Greece was firmly resolved to uphold the provisions of the Treaty of Bukharest. The Greek Government felt that it would be fully carrying out its obligations by maintaining an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards Serbia, whilst, at the same time, remaining prepared to deal with Bulgaria should she attack Serbia. It was considered that a participation in the War by Greece would prove more harmful than useful to Serbia, as Greece could only furnish a comparatively small force to co-operate with the Serbian Army, and intervention on her part might result in decisive attempts being made by Austria against Salonika, the only port available for supplying Serbia. Moreover, the immediate entry of Greece into the War would seriously diminish the forces she would have available to put into the field against Bulgaria should the latter be drawn into the conflict later.

On the 4th August, the Greek Ambassador at Berlin telegraphed direct to King Constantine informing him that Kaiser Wilhelm had sent for him and had handed him a telegram which he had just received, through the German *Chargé d'affaires* at Athens, from His Majesty (i.e. King Constantine) and had desired him to communicate the following information:—

"The Kaiser desires Your Majesty to be apprised that an Alliance has this day been concluded between Germany and Turkey; Bulgaria and Roumania are also taking Germany's side; the German warships in the Mediterranean are joining up with the Turkish fleet so as to act combined. From this it will be seen that the whole of the Balkan States have ranged themselves on the side of Germany in the Conflict

begun against Slavism. The Kaiser, in communicating the foregoing information to Your Majesty, urges you, by appealing to a Comrade, to a German Field Marshal of whom the German Army is proud, and to a brother-in-law, further reminding you that it was thanks to the support of His Imperial Majesty (the Kaiser) that Greece was allowed definitely to retain Kavalla, to give orders for the mobilization of Your Army and to take Your place by the Kaiser's side, in order to march, hand in hand with Him, against Slavism, the common enemy. The Kaiser added that He makes this last pressing appeal to Your Majesty, at this most critical moment in the history of the World, and He is convinced that Your Majesty will respond to this appeal. Should Greece refuse to range herself with Germany, then all relations between Greece and the German Empire will be broken off.

*"Finally, His Majesty informed me that what He asks you to do to-day is to put into execution those measures so often discussed between Your Majesty and Himself."*

The Kaiser, at the time, also stated that He and the German people had never been very favourably disposed towards the Bulgars.

A second telegram sent on the same day by the Greek Ambassador at Berlin to King Constantine is included in the volume. Therein it is stated that the former, after his interview with the Kaiser, had had a long talk with Von Jagow, who had, under the seal of secrecy, confirmed the information relating to the Alliance formed between Turkey and Germany and had stated that though the Turkish troops would be under the command of the Sultan and Turkish Generals, yet General Liman would direct their operations. It was also intimated that an understanding existed between Turkey and Bulgaria and that these two countries would act against every other State which did not adopt their policy. Von Jagow expressed the opinion that the safety of Greece was to be secured by her marching with the other Balkan States against Russia and Serbia.

It is stated in this telegram that negotiations between Austria and Bulgaria had taken place at Vienna and that compensations would be sought in Serbia and in Albania in the event of Italy maintaining the reserved attitude she had taken up since the outbreak of hostilities, although it had not yet been decided what would be Bulgaria's share in the event of the success of the Central Powers.

The Greek Ambassador concluded his message to King Constantine by asking him to weigh carefully the consequences likely to follow upon a refusal on his part to yield to the Kaiser's appeal.

On the 7th August, the Greek Foreign Minister transmitted to the Greek Ambassador at Berlin King Constantine's reply to the first of the telegrams of the 4th *idem*, in which the King of the Hellenes stated : "The Kaiser is aware that My personal sympathies and My political opinions draw Me to His side. I shall never forget that it is to Him we owe Kavalla. After mature reflection, however, I find it difficult to see how I can be of any use to Him, should I immediately mobilize My Army. The Mediterranean is at the mercy of the combined British and French fleets. They would destroy Our Navy and Our Merchantmen, they would take our islands from us, and above all they would prevent the



concentration of My Army, which can only be effected by sea, since railway facilities are not completed. Without being able to render Him assistance, we would be wiped off the map. I am compelled to acknowledge that neutrality is forced on us; this should be useful to Him, together with the assurance that His friends among My neighbours will not be touched, so long as they do not jeopardize Our interests in the Balkans."

In a telegram dated 7th August, the Greek Ambassador at Berlin informed the Greek Foreign Minister that the news from Constantinople communicated by the latter to the former was correct, but that sight was not to be lost of the fact that Turkey required at least a month for completing her mobilization. It was further stated by the former that Bulgaria had decided to attack Serbia, that Roumania would not intervene to prevent her doing so, whilst, at the same time, Turkey would not attack her (*i.e.* Bulgaria). Therefore in the event of Germany and Austria being victorious against Russia, Bulgaria was certain to be aggrandized at the expense of Serbia and Roumania, and at the expense of Russia. It was urged that the *only means by which Greece could secure her ends, would be by her joining Bulgaria in an attack on Serbia, which could never recover herself should Germany and Austria be victorious.* It was further pointed out that in view of Italy's attitude towards Germany and Austria, if Greece could arrive at an understanding with Vienna, Berlin would offer no objection to her (Greece) being compensated in Albania, the separate existence of which, once Serbia had disappeared as an independent State, would no longer be a matter of solicitude to Austria.

The foregoing telegram suggests that the Greek Ambassador at Berlin had become a convert to the German Code of Ethics on matters connected with treaties and international relations.

On the 9th August the Greek Ambassador at Berlin addressed a further telegram to King Constantine, in which he conveyed the information that Von Jagow had communicated to him that the Kaiser quite understood the attitude of neutrality taken up by the King of Greece for the present. The German Foreign Secretary had, however, urged that Greece should come to an understanding with Sofia and Constantinople as early as possible, adding that Serbia constituted the "bear's skin." Germany made yet another effort to detach Greece from her alliance with Serbia; the tenour of a conversation on the subject between Zimmerman, the German Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and the Greek Ambassador at Berlin is contained in a telegram dated 11th August which appears in the volume under notice. Further, a telegram dated 12th August indicates that Germany had also brought strong pressure to bear at Athens; she even threatened a rupture of diplomatic relations with Greece should she mobilize her army against Bulgaria.

The next communication in the series under notice is a telegraphic circular dated a month later—13th September—than the telegram last referred to. It is addressed by M. Venizelos, to the Greek Embassies and Legations at the Entente Courts and at Bukharest. Therein it is stated that the German Ambassador had, at an interview with the Greek Premier, informed him that Bulgaria and Turkey had arrived

definitely at an agreement in relation to a participation in the War. Turkey was to lend Bulgaria two Army Corps for combined operations against Serbia, and she had agreed at the same time to maintain four Army Corps in Thrace as a threat against Roumania to prevent her from attacking Bulgaria. Neither Bulgaria nor Turkey had, it was stated, any intention of attacking Greece.

M. Venizelos had replied that it was impossible for Greece to stand by as a passive spectator, whilst Turkey and Bulgaria attacked Serbia; apart from the question of the protection of her own interests, she was under a definite obligation to go to the assistance of Serbia. He expressed the opinion that the foregoing communication was made to him by the German Ambassador in order to obtain a promise that Greece would remain neutral and to enable the German Government to use this promise as an inducement to Bulgaria and Turkey to undertake an attack on Serbia.

The diplomatic representatives addressed were requested by the Greek Premier to communicate, confidentially and without delay, the contents of the telegraphic circular in question to the Foreign Ministers of the States to which they were accredited and to telegraph the views of these Ministers thereon to him (*i.e.* to M. Venizelos).

On the 31st October, 1914, the Greek Ambassador at Berlin telegraphed to M. Venizelos, at that time holding office as Foreign Minister as well as Premier, informing him that he had had a long interview with Zimmermann who had announced himself satisfied with the fact that Russia had declared war against Turkey, and he hoped that France and Great Britain would be compelled to do the same, as in this War some part of the military forces of the two latter Powers, as well as Russian troops, would be diverted from their principal objective, Germany and Austria. Zimmermann was further expecting that Turkey would preach a Jihad in Asia, in India and in Africa; the unrest in the Islamic World, it was hoped, would cause embarrassment to France and particularly to Great Britain.

Zimmermann again assured the Greek Ambassador that Turkey would not attack Greece and that the interests of Germany were such as to require that Turkey should confine her attention to Russia, and he further advised that Greece should remain a passive spectator of the conflict.

Zimmermann further stated that he did not think that Bulgaria would come into the War against Serbia just then; should she do so later, the interests of Greece would be best served if she refused to intervene. On being informed that Treaty relations subsisted between Greece and Serbia, Zimmermann retorted, as might well have been expected, *that treaties had very little value*, and in support of this view instanced the treaties to which Germany and Austria and Italy, and the two former and Roumania were parties. The last words of the German Under Secretary of State at this interview were: "Try to render your ties with Serbia as loose as possible."

The document following the communication last referred to is dated 10th March, 1915, that is to say there is an interval of over four months between the two; it is the communiqué which the Gounaris Cabinet

furnished to the Press on the day it came into power. In this document it is stated: "Greece, after her victorious wars, is in imperative need of a long period of peace in order to work for the prosperity of the country; for the organization of the public services, that of the land and sea forces, the development of public wealth, the provision of guarantees against all attacks, the security of those things which have been acquired by so many and great sacrifices. The pursuit of these, at the same time, permit of a programme serving the interests of the State being put into execution and allow the adoption of a policy conforming to the traditions of the Nation.

"At this juncture, neutrality has been forced on Greece since the beginning of the European crisis. But Greece has had and always continues to have the duty imposed upon her to fulfil her obligations as an ally, as also to act in pursuit of her own interests, but so as not to incur risks as regards the integrity of her territories.

"The Hellenic Government, being ready to do its duty to promote the interests of the Fatherland, is convinced that the patriotism of its people will provide the surest safeguard."

Three days later (13th March, 1915) the Greek Foreign Minister telegraphed to the Greek Ambassador at the Serbian Court, at that time still at Nisch, informing him that in view of the terms of the official communiqué published on the advent to power of the new Cabinet, he had instructed the Greek diplomatic representatives in London, Paris and St. Petersburg to give formal assurances to the respective Governments to which they were accredited that the New Cabinet would continue to pursue the policy inaugurated in Greece since the outbreak of the present conflict. The recent crisis had been brought about, it was explained, by differences as to the immediate action to be taken by Greece, but did not affect the fundamental points of Hellenic policy.

Another long gap in the dates of the communications appearing in this volume occurs at this point in the history of Greek politics. We learn from a telegram, dated 30th July, 1915, addressed by the Greek Ambassador at Bukharest to M. Gounaris (Premier and Foreign Secretary), that the British Ambassador at Bukharest had made a communication to the former concerning a formal announcement made to Bulgaria by Germany to the effect that Greece had definitely decided to remain neutral in the event of an attack by Bulgaria on Serbia.

In consequence, on the 2nd August, 1915, M. Gounaris addressed a telegraphic circular to the Greek diplomatic representatives at Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, Nisch, Berlin, Vienna and Sofia instructing them to reiterate the views of the Hellenic Government, so frequently made known, that in the event of an attack by Bulgaria on Serbia Greece could not remain passive and indifferent; it was explained that the Bulgaro-Turkish understanding only served to strengthen the bonds between Greece and Serbia.

Shortly after the foregoing instructions had been issued M. Venizelos once more found himself Premier and Foreign Minister and, on the 3rd September, 1915, telegraphed to the Greek Ambassador at Berlin notifying the concern of the Greek Government at the prospect of a combined attack by Austro-German forces on Serbia and at learning that

more intimate relations were being formed between the Central Powers and Bulgaria. If these closer relations were to have no other effect than that of providing a free passage across Bulgaria for Germanic forces, the Hellenic Government would, it was stated, have no cause for alarm. But if, profiting by the arrival of Germanic forces, Bulgaria should attack Serbia, Greece could not quietly stand by and witness the probable annihilation of her Ally by Bulgaria. M. Venizelos again emphasized the point that Greece could not afford to see Bulgaria victorious in a struggle with Serbia; and even went so far as to suggest that the German Government could hardly have an interest in bringing about a widespread conflagration in the Balkans. Further, he expressed the hope that the German Government would hold Bulgaria in check and dissuade her from attacking Serbia.

M. Venizelos was succeeded by M. Zaimis as Greek Premier and Foreign Secretary shortly after the date of the foregoing telegram. On the 8th October, 1915, M. Zaimis in his turn sent a telegraphic circular to all Greek diplomatic representatives informing them that, although a change of Cabinet had taken place in Greece, the policy of that country remained unaltered. On the 12th *idem*, M. Zaimis addressed a telegram to the Greek Ambassador in Serbia (then at Nisch), in which the latter was informed that the Serbian Ambassador at Athens had left a copy of a despatch from his Government at the Greek Foreign Office. In this despatch, the Serbian Government urged the view that the attack by Bulgar forces on Serbia, then imminent, constituted the *casus fœderis* contemplated in the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia; this Government, in consequence, wished to be informed whether the Greek Army would be ready to operate against Bulgaria and whether the Hellenic Government was prepared to issue instructions to its General Staff to get into touch with the Serbian General Staff for the purpose of working out a combined plan of operations. "The Greek Government is unable with deep regret," says M. Zaimis, "to accede to the demand thus formulated by the Serbian Government. First of all, in the then state of things, it feels that the situation is not one within the *casus fœderis*." The Treaty of Alliance, it was argued by M. Zaimis, was drawn up to meet the case of a conflict affecting mutual interests in the Balkans alone and cannot be invoked in support of a situation involving a general conflagration. In spite of the general terms of Article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance, the contracting parties, said M. Zaimis, had in view the single hypothesis of an isolated attack by Bulgaria on one or other of them, as is borne out by the articles of the Military Convention which is a complement of the Treaty. Further, Serbia had broken off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, because the Entente Powers, the former's European Allies, had done so, but she had not previously come to an agreement on the subject with Greece, her Balkan Ally. The situation was, in the opinion of M. Zaimis, one outside the letter and the spirit of Treaty of Alliance.

The Greek Government, M. Zaimis continued, is not only convinced that, under the circumstances, no contractual obligations have to be fulfilled by it, but it is also persuaded that armed assistance, offered spontaneously at the moment, would ill serve the common interests of

the two States. It is for this reason that Greece had decided to remain neutral in the face of the general European Conflict. The common interests of the two States required that the Hellenic forces should be held in reserve with a view to their better utilization at some future time.

Although regretting that it could not afford Serbia material assistance the Hellenic Government desired to assure its Ally that Greece remained a faithful friend and would continue to give Serbia all the assistance and facilities compatible with her international position.

Within a month of the date of the preceding communication M. Skouloudis had succeeded M. Zaïmis as Greek Premier, and on the 8th November, 1915, he, following the example of his predecessors, sent out a telegraphic circular to the Greek diplomatic representatives informing them that the foreign policy of his Cabinet was that of the one it had succeeded. Other telegrams were sent on the date mentioned, wherein it was repeated that Greece intended to maintain her attitude of a neutral and expression was given to her sincere good-will towards the Entente Powers. Serbia was also informed that Greece would "continue to *provide her all facilities and every support compatible with our vital interests.*"

The Greek *Chargé d'affaires* in Serbia telegraphed, on the 15th November, 1915, to M. Skouloudis that he had communicated to the Serbian Premier the gist of the instructions sent him on the 8th October and 8th November, 1915, regarding the continuance of a policy of neutrality by Greece, i.e., that no changes were to take place therein by reason of changes in the Cabinet. It is stated that the Serbian Premier had expressed his thanks for the information, and, at the same time, had added that the vital interests of Greece were identical with those of Serbia and he still hoped that Greece would intervene before it was too late.

The Greek *Chargé d'affaires*, on this occasion, also telegraphed the text of the reply of the Serbian Government to the case made out by the Zaïmis Cabinet for the non-intervention of Greece in the telegram sent to the Greek Ambassador on the 12th October, 1915. The Serbian Government naturally did not accept the interpretation put on the Treaty of Alliance by M. Zaïmis in his despatch to which reference is made. It pointed out, on the other hand, that the spirit and the text of the Treaty which guaranteed the integrity of Greek and of Serbian territory in no way indicated that the Treaty ceased to be inoperative as suggested by Greece, should Bulgaria act in alliance with another Power. On the contrary the text of the Treaty proved in a conclusive and logical manner that Greece was bound to come to the aid of Serbia *should the latter be attacked, without any provocation on her part, by Bulgaria or any other Power.* The Serbian Government had no doubt whatever that Bulgaria, in attacking Serbia, had no other object than to deprive the latter of the territories acquired under the Treaties of London and of Bukharest, and to prevent Serbia and Greece from having a common frontier. The object of the Treaty of Alliance with Serbia was to provide a guarantee for the maintenance of the situation created by the Balkan Wars, and the Treaty in question was entered into in order to ensure that Serbia and Greece would reciprocally come to the assistance

of the other for the purpose in view. Article 1 of the Treaty made no reference whatever to the number of enemies, one or many, by which Greece and Serbia must be attacked to render the Treaty operative; it referred to *an attack* in general terms and not to the *number of Powers attacking*. It was hardly likely that if the question of one or a number of enemies had been before the framers of the Treaty that they would have provided for assistance being reciprocally provided by Greece or Serbia to the other only in the case where the smallest danger was threatening either of these States, and not in the case where the greatest danger threatened them. If the contention of the Zaïmis Cabinet was correct the Treaty would become inoperative just at the time that its provisions would be of most value to one or other of the parties thereto. The Serbian Government was of opinion that the attack on Serbia by Bulgaria had no other object than to alter the situation in the Balkans. Although an episode in the European War, the attack was an event eminently affecting the Balkan situation; it was submitted that the important question to be considered is not what may be the nature of the attack, but rather with what intention was it made and what were likely to be the probable consequences of such an attack. It would be immaterial if the territorial *statu quo* in the Balkans were secured by a purely Balkan War or by a combined European-Balkan War. In either case Serbo-Greek interests would, with an upset in the balance of power in the Balkans, equally suffer irreparable injury.

In breaking off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, previous to arriving at an understanding with Greece on the subject, Serbia had no desire to consider the attack of Bulgaria in the light of a matter of European rather than Balkan interest; she only desired to emphasize that the Bulgarian mobilization was directed against herself. The reason why Greece was not consulted before the rupture of relations was due to the fact that Serbia had no choice in the matter. The rupture had become inevitable owing to the aggressive attitude of Bulgaria.

Further, it would seem, it was pointed out, that in ordering a general mobilization of its army without previous consultation with Serbia, Greece herself had acted in the same manner as Serbia had done. Moreover, the Hellenic Government had practically admitted that it might intervene in the present Serbo-Bulgarian Conflict, and therefore by its own showing the question of its intervention was not dependent upon the number of adversaries, one or two, Serbia might have to deal with. Greece admitted the possibility of her being required to intervene only where Serbia was being attacked *simultaneously* by two adversaries, but not where the two adversaries *acted in combination*. From the military point of view Serbia's difficulties would be the same in both cases; she would be obliged to fight on two fronts. In each case the military difficulties so far as Greece was concerned would be the same.

Then the Hellenic Government considered that the intervention of Greece *must take place at the opportune moment*. It was evident that intervention would be more opportune whilst Serbia and Greece were able to join forces and act combined than in the case where Serbia might first be defeated by Bulgaria or Greece isolated by a Bulgaro-German coalition.

The Serbian Government also called attention to the repeated assurances that had been given by Greece that she would act should Bulgaria first attack Serbia. An intervention on the part of Greece which was *too late* would be equally fatal to Serbia and Greece alike, and for this reason the Serbian Government was making a last appeal to the Hellenic Government to intervene immediately.

The next telegram in the series bears date 10th April, 1916, that is to say, an interval of nearly five months elapses concerning which no light is thrown on the situation in Greece. On the date last mentioned, the Greek Ambassador at Paris telegraphed to M. Skouloudis informing him that the refusal of the Hellenic Government to facilitate the transport of the Serbian Army across Greek territory as requested by the British and French Ambassadors had caused considerable annoyance to the French Government and that under the circumstances M. Briand was not prepared to entertain the question of the loan of 150 millions asked for by Greece. M. Skouloudis was also informed that the French newspapers were suggesting the necessity of the adoption of coercive measures against Greece.

On the following day, M. Skouloudis replied to the Greek Ambassador at Paris stating that he was painfully surprised at M. Briand's statement; the Hellenic Government had not solicited a loan of 150 millions as the price for the violation of her neutrality, and the French Government had no justification for attaching such a signification to the Greek request for a loan. Financial assistance was asked for from the Western Powers owing to the economic disorganization in Greece. Complaint is made by M. Skouloudis that essential considerations were being overlooked and that Greece was being chastised by M. Briand merely because she refused to lend herself to a serious violation of her neutrality. Greece was not in a position to resist the pressure put upon her by a coalition of great Powers and she had been obliged to put up with a great deal *volens volens*. For instance, the French transport *Jean Corbière*, having Serbian troops on board proceeding from Corfu to Salonika, had passed through the Corinth Canal, thanks to her innocent guise. The Greek Ambassador at Paris was instructed to have an official and amicable interview with M. Briand and to explain to him that Greece, placed between two groups of Powers, was obliged to submit to the recriminations, protests, and ill-humour of one of these groups each time the violation of her neutrality took place to the supposed advantage of the other; under these circumstances, says M. Skouloudis, the Greek Government cannot take up any other attitude than the one it has adopted.

The text of a *Note verbale* from the Serbian Government to the Hellenic Government, communicated by the Serbian Ambassador at Athens on the 20th April, 1916, is the next document included in the series. It relates to the transfer of Serbian troops from Corfu to Salonika. The Serbian Government appealed on the ground of humanity to the Hellenic Government to permit their transport overland as far as Patras.

On the following day, M. Skouloudis telegraphed to the Greek Legations at Paris and in London. He conveyed the information that a request had been made by the Serbian Government asking that Serbian troops

might be permitted to proceed to Salonika overland *viâ* Patras, in order to avoid the risk of the destruction of transports by U boats, and that the Hellenic Government had found it absolutely impossible to accede to this request, and, moreover, was not prepared further to discuss the question. This information was forwarded for the personal information of the Greek representatives, and these were not to make use of it unless the subject was first raised by the British or French Foreign Minister.

On the 27th April, 1916, Skouloudis sent a telegraphic circular to the Greek Legations in London, Rome and Petrograd and therein conveyed the information that the British and French Ambassadors had called to see him in order to support the request made on the 20th *idem* by the Serbian Minister for permission for the conveyance of Serbian troops overland to Salonika. He stated that the Greek Government absolutely refused to allow the use of its railways for the conveyance of foreign troops. M. Skouloudis entered into the reasons that prompted Greece to act as she had done. "The conveyance of troops as requested would constitute," he says, "a most flagrant and most startling case of the violation of our Sovereignty and of our neutrality and would rightly be considered by the opposing belligerent group as a hostile act. It would interfere with the ordinary passenger and goods traffic. In spite of assurances to the contrary it would result in the establishment of cantonments close to our towns and the capital, leading to inevitable friction with the local authorities, causing inconvenience in matters of supply to the civil population, and creating serious difficulties in connection with the maintenance of order and in relation to the public health. It would finally lead to constant interference by foreigners with the public services and give rise to arbitrary acts and restrictions on the liberty of the subject, of which we have had a sad experience at Salonika and in Corfu.

"It was owing to the fact that the public appreciated the dangers to which the independence of the country was exposed," he continued, "that demonstrations were organized against the proposed conveyance of foreign troops overland. Although the public have put up with a great deal patiently, they have now been fairly roused and do not see the necessity why Serbia should be allowed the use of Greek railways for military purposes. Entente ships are journeying in the Mediterranean from Alexandria to Salonika, from Salonika to Marseilles, from Marseilles to Corfu, without experiencing much loss from the enemy's submarines."

It was felt that, under these circumstances, the civilized world would unanimously uphold the Greek Government in its refusal and as unanimously condemn as a monstrous abuse of force any attempt on the part of the Entente Powers to push aside Greece's refusal.

A request was made that the result of the interview following on the foregoing despatch should be telegraphed to M. Skouloudis.

On the same day M. Skouloudis communicated the contents of the foregoing despatch to the Greek *Charge d'affaires* at Paris and requested him to communicate the contents thereof to the French Foreign Minister as coming from himself. It was felt by M. Skouloudis that an official discussion would be useless in face of the obstinacy shown by the French Foreign Minister.



The foregoing despatch is the final one in the First Part of the Volume. The situation disclosed by the documents published does not altogether redound to the credit of Hellenic statesmanship. At a time that Greece was seriously threatened by Bulgaria she sought, and urgently sought, the aid of Serbia and entered deliberately into a Treaty of Alliance providing for reciprocal military support. It must have been brought home to her from the reports of Capt. Stratigos, to which reference has been made earlier, that Serbia interpreted the Treaty, whilst it was still in an embryonic condition, to provide for something more than a defensive alliance to keep Bulgaria alone in check. Had Greece doubted the wisdom of entering into an engagement of the far-reaching character that Serbia had made it evident she intended the Treaty to be, it would have been more honest of Greece to have frankly informed Serbia at the time that the parties were not *ad idem* and that, therefore, there was no binding contract between them. However Greece was in dire peril at the time that the negotiations for the Treaty were in progress and could not do without Serbia's aid; an impression is therefore created from reading the despatches in question that Greece was ready to make the fullest use of Serbia when she herself was in need of help, but on one pretext or another she attempted to avoid fulfilling her treaty obligations when Serbia was heavily pressed and hard put to it to keep her enemies at bay, and found it necessary to call for reciprocal treatment from Greece. The telegrams published further show that the relationship of King Constantine to Kaiser Wilhelm had a decided influence on the conduct of Greek foreign policy.

The first document published in the Second Part of the Volume is a telegram dated 10th May, 1916, addressed from Serrès by the Commandant of the Greek 6th Division to the General Staff at Athens. Therein it is stated that a Bulgar Commandant had informed a Greek officer that in view of an understanding between Mackensen and the Hellenic Government permission had been granted for Germano-Bulgarian forces to be moved up to any point of tactical or strategical importance, at least 2,000 yards distant from the Greek frontier, and that, acting on this authorization, the aforesaid Bulgar Commandant had occupied the heights commanding Lehovo; that access to points on the frontier other than those occupied by the Bulgars would be allowed to the Greeks; that Bulgarian troops had been forbidden to enter Lehovo, but it was hoped that some friendly understanding might be arrived at on this question.

The second document in this part of the Volume is a telegram dated 11th May, 1916, from the Greek War Minister to the Headquarters, 4th Army Corps, at Kavalla. Therein it is stated that the understanding arrived at with the Germans and Bulgars stipulated that in the Sector Ali Boutous-Seimen-Kayassi, the Greeks were to withdraw to a distance of from 1 to 2 kilometres behind their frontier, whilst the Germans and Bulgars might occupy the frontier line, but were not to cross into Greece; the object being to form a neutral zone in Greek territory *at the moment when the Germano-Bulgarian forces might have to defend themselves against the Anglo-French forces established on Greek soil.* It is stated that the small advances of the Germano-Bulgarians N. of Vétrina and Lehovo

constitute a violation of the understanding in question and an instruction was sent that the Bulgar Commandant should be informed accordingly. The Commander of the Greek 4th Army Corps was further instructed to maintain friendly relations with the Bulgars and not to use force to eject them since the Greek Government would settle any matters in dispute. However, any attempt on the part of the Germano-Bulgarian troops to advance further into Greece was to be resisted by force of arms, if necessary. The Greek 3rd Army Corps was to conform to the instructions herein contained.

On the 12th May, 1916, M. Skouloudis telegraphed to the Greek Ambassador at Sofia informing him of the occupation of Greek territory N. of Vétrina and the heights of Lehovo and repeated the gist of the information and instructions contained in the telegram sent to Headquarters, 4th Army Corps, on the preceding day. The Greek Ambassador was instructed to request the Bulgarian Foreign Minister to arrange for the withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from Greek territory and to issue the necessary directions so that regrettable incidents might be avoided.

On the 22nd May, 1916, the German and Bulgarian Ambassadors presented practically identical Notes to M. Skouloudis, wherein it was alleged that Germany and Bulgaria and their Allies found themselves compelled to enter Greek territory in order to secure possession of the very important Gorges of Roupel, *owing to the offensive measures adopted recently by the Entente troops*. It was claimed that this step was solely a defensive measure and would be limited to what was strictly necessary from a military point of view.

The German and the Bulgarian Governments had no hesitation in giving the Hellenic Government the following assurances:—

1. The territorial integrity of Greece will be strictly respected.
2. The Allied troops will evacuate Greek territory as soon as military exigencies permit.
3. Greek Sovereignty will be respected.
4. Liberty of the individual, property, and the established religion will be respected.
5. An indemnity will be paid in respect of any damage done by the troops (of the two Powers) during their stay in Greece.
6. The Allies will maintain a strictly friendly attitude towards the inhabitants of the country.

The foregoing communications were received at the Greek Foreign Office on the 23rd May, 1916, and on the same day M. Skouloudis addressed a letter to the German Ambassador at Athens acknowledging receipt of his communication of the preceding day. The substance of the foregoing communication was repeated in this letter, which concluded with a paragraph noting the German assurances.

The communication from the Bulgarian Ambassador at Athens was briefly acknowledged by M. Skouloudis on the 24th May, 1916.

On the 27th May, 1916, M. Skouloudis addressed a telegraphic circular to the Greek Legations at Berlin, Vienna and Sofia, in which he stated that German and Bulgarian detachments had, on the previous day, crossed the Greek frontier at Koula, and to the N. of Demir-Hissar and had attempted to occupy the fort at Roupel, the garrison of which had

offered resistance. Other detachments, numbering 25,000 men, had descended that morning into the Tsingueli and Vetrina Sectors and occupied the heights near Demir-Hissar and also the bridges at Struma and Demir-Hissar. The inhabitants had been seized by panic and were preparing for an exodus *en masse*.

This incursion into Greek territory was not, said M. Skouloudis, in harmony with the terms of the understanding arrived at between the German and Bulgarian and the Greek military authorities. The Hellenic Government desired to enter a vigorous protest against the action taken and insisted that orders should be given by the German Government and her Ally for the evacuation of the Greek territory invaded by their troops as early as possible. The Greek diplomatic representatives addressed were instructed to take action without delay and to report progress.

On the 28th May, 1916, M. Skouloudis addressed identical letters to the German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian Ambassadors at Athens, in which the information contained in the telegraphic circular of the preceding day relating to the incursion of German and Bulgarian troops into Greece was repeated, and the diplomatic representatives addressed were requested to transmit to their Governments the information that the Hellenic Government desired to enter a most emphatic protest at the violation of Greek neutrality and at the same time demanded the immediate evacuation of the territories invaded by German and Bulgarian troops.

On the day following, M. Skouloudis sent a telegraphic circular to the Greek Legations at Paris, London, Rome, Bukharest, Petrograd and Constantinople and to the Consulate at Berne, wherein information concerning the invasion of Greece by German and Bulgarian detachments was repeated and attention called to the fact that the Hellenic Government had entered an energetic protest and had demanded the evacuation of the Greek territory invaded by the detachments in question.

On the 30th May, 1916, the Greek Minister at Berlin telegraphed to M. Skouloudis informing him that the Great General Staff at Berlin had publicly announced the advance of German and Bulgar detachments into the Gorges of Roupel, and also the retirement of the weak Greek posts on the frontier.

On the same day, the Greek Minister at Rome telegraphed to M. Skouloudis informing him that news was current in Italy concerning the Bulgarian advance into Greece and that the information had created a lamentable impression. The Italians had come to the conclusion that in Macedonia, as also in Epirus, Greece would give way to the Bulgars whether they were assisted by Austria or not and that no reliance could be placed on Greece, her deceptive promises and her illusory guarantees. And on the 1st June, 1916, the Greek *Chargé d'affaires* at Paris informed M. Skouloudis that the impression prevailed in France that the invasion of Macedonia had taken place in consequence of an understanding between Greece and the Central Powers. Information from German sources, he stated, appeared to confirm this view.

The recent advance of the Bulgars, and the passive attitude taken up

by Greece had, said the *Chargé d'affaires*, effected a radical change in the situation. It was felt in France that Greece had abandoned her attitude of benevolent neutrality, and the Entente Powers, in consequence, considered that they had now full liberty to adopt any counter measures thought necessary; consequently General Sarraill had been instructed accordingly.

On the 3rd June, 1916, the Greek Ambassador at Petrograd telegraphed to M. Skouloudis, informing him that the occupation of Roupel and the Bulgarian advance into Macedonia had created great irritation against Greece in England and in France, as these measures appeared to have been adopted by prearrangement.

The next document in the series is an extract from the Journals of the Hellenic Chamber relating to its 53rd sitting held on the 5th June, 1916. On this occasion M. Skouloudis reviewed the events since the last sitting of the Hellenic Legislature. He stated that the War Minister had, on the 25th May, received information from the Commandant of the Greek 4th Army Corps at Kavalla to the effect that a mixed column of German and Bulgarian troops had invaded Greek territory near Roupel, Vetrina, etc., and that the Greek troops had opened fire on the invaders. In view of the fact that the invaders had definitely decided to occupy Roupel and that continued resistance on the part of Greek troops might result in a general conflict, leading to an abandonment by Greece of her policy of neutrality, orders had, he continued, been given by the Greek Government through the War Minister for the Hellenic troops to cease their resistance and for information to be conveyed to the German Commandant stating that in view of the invasion in force by the Germans the Greeks felt themselves compelled to retire and would therefore fall back carrying with them any stores, etc., which they could move. The Hellenic Government had, said M. Skouloudis, hastened to address an energetic protest to the German Government and her Allies against the acts committed.

M. Skouloudis further stated that in view of the rumours that were afloat he felt he was under an obligation to proclaim and affirm in the most categorical manner that no understanding existed between the Hellenic Government and the Central Powers on the subject of the incursion in question, an incursion which had not the acquiescence of the Greek Cabinet. In concluding his speech, M. Skouloudis announced that he ought not to omit to add that "*the character of the action taken by the Germans and Bulgarians invading Greek territory, according to the declarations which had been made on the subject, was such as to permit the Greek Government to make known that in their view the steps taken had an exclusively military object and in no way exposed the integrity or the interests of their country to any danger.*"

On the 6th June, 1916, a telegraphic circular was addressed by M. Skouloudis to the Greek Legations at Paris, London, Rome and Petrograd, wherein he attempted to justify the surrender of the fort at Roupel to the Germano-Bulgarian forces. He directed the diplomatic representatives addressed to deny as false the statement that Roupel was occupied by the Germano-Bulgarian troops by reason of an understanding on the subject with Greece. The diplomatic representatives were further

instructed to inform the Entente Powers that they (*i.e.* the Powers) ought not to allow themselves to be taken in by these calumnious rumours, rumours which the Greek Cabinet and its predecessors had denounced with no uncertain voice.

The foregoing telegraphic circular is followed by the texts of two telegrams bearing the same date (6th June, 1916); they were both addressed to M. Skouloudis by the Greek *Chargé d'affaires* at Paris.

In the first of these telegrams the *Chargé d'affaires* states that he had just had an interview with M. Briand to whom he had handed the Greek protest and explained the views held by Greece as to the interpretation to be put on her attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the Entente Powers; put shortly, the explanation amounts to this:—The assumption of an attitude of benevolent neutrality on the part of Greece towards a Power did not render it incumbent on her to take military action against the adversaries of that Power. It was further stated that the French Premier, having read the Note handed him, had entered into a discussion on the situation, of which discussion a *résumé* is given.

M. Briand pointed out that the state of siege proclaimed at Salonika was due to the decision of Greece to offer no opposition to the invasion of her territory by the Bulgarian Army, for it was the Bulgarian Army alone that had entered Greece, the Germans not having sent any troops across the Greek frontier. In taking these measures, General Sarrail had advised General Moschopoulos that the King's *fête* day should be observed as usual; it was the Greek General who had countermanded the customary celebration. M. Briand had also repeated that the attitude of Greece had caused considerable astonishment, since the Hellenic Government had frequently declared that it had received assurances that the Bulgars would not invade Greece. He took note of the Greek denial that the occupation of Roupel was a measure concerted between Greece and the Central Powers, and added, should the Bulgars advance any further General Sarrail had instructions to take all the necessary steps to safeguard the position of the troops under his command.\* The French Premier considered that the object of the Bulgars was palpable. Having possession of Serbian Macedonia, they wished to lay hold also of Greek Macedonia in order to provide for their "combination" at a future date. Holding the keys of the gates leading to Serrès, Drama, Kavalla, they could reach those places whenever they felt it to be opportune to do so. They were not advancing thereon at the moment, since their flank would be exposed to the attacks of the Entente troops.

In the second telegram, the *Chargé d'affaires* states that, in view of the serious nature of the tension existing between Greece and the Entente Powers, he considered it desirable to explain the situation as it appeared to the minds of the official and non-official classes at Paris with whom he was in contact. First of all, it should be borne in mind that M. Briand's attitude was dictated by considerations affecting foreign as well as internal relations. Since the invasion of Greek territory by German and Bulgar troops, without effective resistance on the part of Greece, and the conviction formed, in consequence, that an understanding existed

between Greece and the Central Powers, the French Premier appeared to be haunted by the recollection of the unfortunate dealings France had in the past had with Bulgaria and he feared that similar deceptions might be practised on him by the Greeks. To guard against any subsequent accusation that he had shown himself as too soft in his dealings with Greece, M. Briand had taken the initiative in adopting rigorous measures, of which the proclamation of the state of siege at Salonika was but the prelude, so it was feared. The phrase "if Ernest Renan were watching over the Acropolis all this would not have happened," coming from a journalist as it did, was sufficiently characteristic, and the semi-official Press was harping on the similar theme, saying that the Germans alone knew how to show themselves strong and that Orientals were only to be cowed by a display of force.

The suggestion that there was an understanding between Greece and the enemies of the Entente in relation to the occupation of the fort at Roupel was not credited in the "Exchange" agency telegram; a statement in the *Neueste Nachrichten* of Munich was really responsible for creating the impression that an understanding existed between Greece and Bulgaria, and that not only as regards the invasion of Greek territory, but also in respect of other matters in dispute between the two countries. The official *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* had just published some information which was being accepted as a confirmation of the report concerning a Greco-Bulgar understanding.

The French Government, although it felt that Greece might not have been able to prevent by force the invasion of its territories by the Bulgars, yet had hoped that she might have forestalled the invasion by diplomatic means. Having been disappointed in this respect, the French Government had come to the conclusion that an understanding of such a kind did exist between Greece and the Central Powers that even the occupation by the Bulgarian Army of the Macedonian regions coveted by Bulgaria caused the Hellenic Government no misgivings. It is pointed out that the outcries on the part of a section of the Italian Press had not remained without result. Further, the accusation that the raising of the new loan by the National Bank was only rendered possible by the aid given by Germano-American financiers was being widely repeated in France and naturally was having effect on French public opinion.

A somewhat mysterious official memorandum dated 20th June, 1916, prepared by the Director-General of the Greek Foreign Office, is included in the volume. In this memorandum it is stated that the official documents relating to the surrender of Roupel, forwarded by the Bulgar Government and received at the Ministry, make no mention of restitution. These documents go no further than to state that the occupation will not affect the Sovereign rights of Greece. "But," says the writer of the Memorandum, "as the Premier has informed me that there are documents in his possession promising, on behalf of Germany and of Bulgaria, the restitution of the fort, I asked him, a few days ago, to file these documents with the official correspondence in the Ministry. The Premier said that he would do so when it was opportune. I have to-day again reminded him of the necessity for filing the same, as well as that of registering the correspondence relating to the surrender of the

fort at Roupel, correspondence which has not yet been received in the Ministry. The Premier has repeated his promise to file the documents in question."

An entry in the Register of confidential letters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 1916 is also published in the volume under review : it relates to a letter received on the 22nd August, 1916, from the German Legation. Under the heading "Precis of document received" the record runs :—"That the Germano-Bulgar troops will not enter the towns of Drama, Serres and Kavalla." In a footnote the statement is made :—"This document has not been discovered in the archives of the Ministry."

M. Zaïmis had once more become Greek Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and, on the 28th August, 1916, he was informed in a letter from the German Ambassador at Athens that the Greek troops had handed over the forts and batteries in the Kavalla District of their own accord to the Bulgars and that the latter had taken up positions round the town named but were outside its boundaries.

The document that follows the foregoing letter is a report dated 10th September, 1916, from Lieut.-Colonel Troupakis, Commandant of the Macedonian Gendarmerie, to the Greek Foreign Office. This report deals with the Bulgar invasion into E. Macedonia. It gives an account of the excesses committed by the Bulgars who, according to Lieut.-Colonel Troupakis, "allowed no occasion for the manifestation of their hostile disposition as well as their criminal instincts to escape them." The details of a number of the atrocities committed by the Bulgars are set out in the report.

On the 18th December, 1916, the Greek Ambassador at Sofia sent a telegram to the Greek Foreign Minister giving details of the maltreatment of Greek subjects in the territory invaded by the Bulgars.

Eight days later the Greek Foreign Minister telegraphed to the Greek Ambassador at Berlin informing him that he had received information through Sofia of the terrible plight of Greek citizens in the provinces occupied by the Bulgars; pillage, robbery, destruction, murder were rampant there. Instructions were sent for immediate representations to be made to the German Government calling upon it to put an end to the deplorable state of things reported and for a request to be made for the administration of the occupied region to be taken out of the hands of the Bulgars in order that it might be placed under German officials.

Further telegrams were sent on the 14th January and 28th February, 1917, by the Greek Ambassador at Sofia to the Greek Foreign Minister dealing with the unfortunate condition of the Greek subjects who were under the yoke of the Bulgars in the occupied provinces.

A fairly comprehensive report, dated 9th March, 1917 (O.S.), by a higher official belonging to E. Macedonia is published in the volume. It was transmitted from Germany to the Greek Foreign Office through the Hellenic Legation in Berlin. From its perusal a very good idea is obtained of the excesses committed by Turks and Bulgars in the occupied provinces; pillage, extortion, arbitrary confiscations prevailed side by side, and, in addition, the prices of corn and prime necessities were artificially enhanced by the invaders.

The volume is brought to a close by the inclusion of three communications dated respectively 9th April, 5th April and 14th June, 1917. Addressed by the Greek Ambassador at Sofia to the Greek Foreign Minister, they all deal with the critical situation in E. Macedonia where the people were dying in hundreds of hunger, whilst neither Bulgaria nor Germany moved a finger to ameliorate the lot of the unhappy people brought temporarily under their rule.

Although the immediate responsibility for the crimes committed against the unfortunate inhabitants of E. Macedonia undoubtedly rests on the shoulders of the German and Bulgar Governments, yet a careful study of the documents published in the Second Part of the volume creates a distinct impression that it was largely the fault of the successive Greek Governments, in not dealing with the Bulgar menace properly, that the situation was allowed to come into existence which has brought such an infinity of misery on thousands of helpless Greek subjects.

The object of the inclusion in the Volume of the official memorandum of the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the extract from the Foreign Office Register of confidential letters is not explained; it would certainly have been in the public interest to clear up the mysteries connected therewith.

The record contained in the Hellenic White Book of the events between 5th May, 1913, and 14th June, 1917, to which the documents contained therein relate is not of a nature to give any high-minded and patriotic Greek either comfort or satisfaction.

W. A. J. O'MEARA.



## NOTICES OF MAGAZINES.

REVUE MILITAIRE SUISSE.

No. I.—January, 1918.

COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

*The Morale of Our Army.*

The author of the original article states that, having spent many months on the fronts held by the troops of the Central Empires, on his return to his Homeland he attempted to picture to himself the sort of a show the Swiss Army would be likely to put up had it to go through the dangers, trials and difficulties of War. The Swiss soldiers presented a marked contrast to those war-stained heroes he had left behind; they showed in their appearance the lack of contact with the realities of their calling. But the Swiss soldiers he met with at the Swiss frontier and on his railway journey home created a very reassuring effect on his mind. He has continued ceaselessly to keep an eye on the Swiss Army since his return to Switzerland, and to compare his military compatriots with the fighting men of the Central Empires. He has been struck with the appearance of homogeneity, the suppleness and mobility of the Swiss troops, and their splendid trim; he considers the Swiss Army, after its three years and more of training, to be comparable to the active armies that have been hammering away at each other since the beginning of the War. The troops now engaged at the fronts are rapidly trained militia, whilst the Swiss troops are practically in that condition to-day in which were the permanent armies of the belligerents when they took the field in August, 1914.

Such is the external aspect of the situation; the comparison, says the author of the *Revue* article, is far from being to our disadvantage. There remains the anxious question: What would be the War value of our Army should it have to take the field? In attempting a reply one has to fall back on suppositions. Is the Swiss Army ready in matters pertaining to *matériel* as well as regards *morale*?

For self-evident reasons the state of preparation of the Swiss Army as regards *matériel* cannot be discussed, but it can be definitely stated that the complicated questions relating to supplies of food and munitions, remounts, transports, equipment, utilization of all the resources of the country have been carefully studied, and also that precautionary measures have been adopted of a kind that should inspire confidence in the Nation.

The Swiss Army is provided with the necessities for the conduct of War; however, the questions arise: But, this being granted, is it ready in other respects to undertake active operations? Can it make good use of the expensive and up-to-date *matériel* in its possession?

The answers to these questions depend on the methods of training adopted, the instruction of the soldier for the part he may be called upon to play on the battlefield ; it is in this instruction that the keystone to the *morale* of an army is to be found.

Opinions on the foregoing matters are much divided in Switzerland. There are some who feel that all the progress which could have been made has not been made ; some there are who are distinctly perturbed regarding many matters connected with the Swiss Army.

As in other *métiers* so in the Army, nothing can make up for lack of practical experience. An army taking the field at a later period of a struggle than others naturally finds itself at a great disadvantage for a time, until, indeed, it has got over its first emotions after coming into contact with a new state of existence, until the intense tension on the nerves of the men has been relaxed. It is only on the battlefield that the training which is to develop the soldier's *morale* can receive the finishing touches. The Roumanians had to learn this cruel lesson.

However, non-belligerents can by paying attention to the practical lessons afforded by a War do much to enhance the *morale* of their soldiers. The author of the *Revue* article tells us that there is a consensus of opinion among Swiss officers that sufficient is not being done in Switzerland in connection with the training of the Army to prepare it for a War of the kind now in progress on the Continent of Europe.

Reference is made to the reports sent in by Swiss officers from the various theatres of operations which they were permitted to visit. These reports, which are, of course, confidential, describe the methods of training in vogue behind the lines on all fronts, and it is understood that recommendations have been made that similar practical methods of training should be introduced into the Swiss Army. The delay in introducing reforms is causing some to lose their patience. The Swiss Press has taken up the question ; two interesting articles on the subject entitled *Questions Militaires* and *Le Moral de l'Armée* have appeared in the issues of the *Journal de Genève* for 28th August and 8th September, 1917. The authors of these articles are officers who have not hesitated to express their opinions with considerable frankness. In both the articles it is stated that the Swiss Army is marking time and that its training is being carried out on lines in which the experiences of the present War are ignored. There is not any variety in the instruction provided for in training programmes prepared from time to time ; sufficient attention is not paid to instruction in trench warfare ; bayonet training is not carried out on practical lines ; instruction in bombing should proceed simultaneously with other specialist training.

The excellent brochures published by the Swiss General Staff should, it is suggested, form the basis of a practical manual on training, a manual which has yet to be compiled.

The discontent in the Swiss Army has provided the theme for innumerable political harangues, brochures, discussions on the part of journalists. Some have taken up the subject solely to serve their political ambitions, others have examined the question in order to seek a remedy. Numerous explanations have been given to account for the lowered *morale* of the troops ; too much " drill," the leave of absence

question, absence of tactful dealings on the part of certain officers, the military "scandals," economic difficulties, the weather, the political situation at home and abroad.

The following are held to be the chief causes of the trouble and those requiring special attention :—

1. *The continual changes in the methods of imparting individual instruction to the soldier.* The disregard that many officers show for the regulations produces, it is said, a sense of uneasiness and insecurity in the troops. The soldier, having learnt first to do a thing one way, finds that as soon as he has acquired the knack sufficiently to give satisfaction to his instructor, he has to unlearn what has been drilled into him in order to acquire skill in doing the same thing in some other way. And so it goes on, method two having to give way to method three, etc. It is a case of "yer don't know where yer are" with the Swiss Tommy. The Swiss Infantry Training Manual consists of two parts: the first relates to *training*, a subject in which no one has a right to introduce modifications. The second part deals with the *Combat* and lays down tactical principles, providing rules which are merely to act as a guide. No departure is permissible from the rules sanctioned in the first part; the infringement of a regulation is tantamount to a disobedience of orders. Yet many unauthorized innovations have been introduced in the Swiss Army, in spite of the strict prohibition contained in the *Training Manual* against a departure from the rules and methods therein contained.

Many officers in direct contact with the troops are of opinion that it is absolutely necessary that a return should be made to the methods, etc., laid down in the regulations.

2. *The attitude of the Press towards military questions has at times been responsible for the lowering of the morale of the Army.* But the fault has not always lain at the door of the journalist; had he been better informed and better treated by the military authorities he would have been enabled to keep the people better informed on military matters. Instead of keeping journalists systematically at arm's length, the military authorities should on the contrary encourage them to see things as they are, without, of course, giving away information concerning national defence which ought to remain secret.

3. *The antimilitarist propaganda is beginning to make its influence felt.* It is necessary to have courage to face facts. If measures are adopted to combat this danger with but half the energy and perseverance employed in the propagation of treason, antimilitarism would be deprived of its poison. Propagandists know that they can count on the inertia of their adversaries; they exploit with considerable skill all those factors which contain the germs wherefrom discontent is bred: a hard life, petty injustices, the abusive tongue of an officer, fatigues, stoppage of leave, the petty annoyances to which a soldier may be subject. Soldiers are got at by pacifists and the spirit of hatred and exasperation are breathed into their hearts; no one entirely escapes their pernicious attentions.

It would seem that an organization with anarchical tendencies is in existence whose ramifications extend into all countries. The democratic socialists too find that *demi-intellectuals* and anarchists are ready

to swallow their crude theories on life. Proclamations have been secretly circulated in Switzerland which are but a disguised appeal for the formation of a "Soviet" in the Helvetic Republic. Officers of all ranks are urged by the author of the *Revue* article to join forces to combat this mischievous propaganda. By maintaining proper discipline they can assist in making soldiering a tolerably pleasant form of existence. *Ennui* is the main cause of discontent in every sphere and calling of life; it is necessary to banish it from the life of the soldier. Side by side with his professional occupation, the soldier should be provided with distractions of a healthy kind. Variety should be sought after in these distractions, so as to suit the tastes of all.

4. *A wide feeling exists in the minds of the Swiss soldiers that the public are neglectful of them.* They have noticed the enthusiasm and sympathy of the public for the interned foreigners and the wounded heroes, and unconsciously this has made them a little jealous. Further, they have been subject to some petty annoyances in connection with travelling facilities at half fares, railway journeys on Sundays, etc.

5. *The Swiss soldiers are beginning to fret at having been kept so long on peace duties under active service conditions.* "A modern Army," says Alfred de Vigny, "as soon as it ceases to be at War becomes a sort of gendarmerie. It seeks its true life everywhere and cannot find it." The Swiss Army cannot escape from this destiny devoid of glory.

The author of the *Revue* article states that the views expressed above on the *morale* of the Swiss Army are somewhat gloomy, but they represent faithfully the impressions obtained by him from contact with officers and men in all parts of Switzerland. Those who repeat the cry of anguish are neither pessimists nor alarmists, but members of the army who are too devoted to their profession to maintain a silence which would jeopardize its welfare.

However, without being in a position to say what the Swiss Army is capable of doing in the field, it possesses, says the author of the original article, latent energy, dignity, patience and, above all things, high spirits. After having touched upon the ills it is suffering from and having shown that the burden of neutrality is a heavy weight to carry, it is but just to recognize the spirit of sacrifice exhibited by all ranks, that modest sacrifice which is without hope of reward human or divine.

That progress has been made by the Swiss Army in fitting itself for the field is incontestable. The men have a more soldierly bearing; the lower commissioned ranks have acquired professional knowledge and habits of command; the troops are able to march long distances and put forth a sustained effort; they have become mobile and can rapidly deploy into fighting formations, even on very accidented ground; co-operation between the several arms is no longer merely the theoretical ideal of the lecture theatre; heavy artillery, of which there was practically none in 1914, has been provided; aviation services have developed in a uniform manner; infantry and cavalry have been provided with machine guns; the Swiss medical services have applied the lessons of the present War to effect improvements in their own organization, etc.

To the question: "Are we ready?" answer given is: "Yes if we

know how to make the fullest use of the high qualities of our soldiers ; if we satisfy their legitimate wish to be properly trained for trench warfare ; if we fight, otherwise than as an ostrich with its head buried in the sand, against those occult forces which are seeking to disorganize our national defence ; if the military authorities instead of looking upon the Press as an enemy change their attitude and endeavour to obtain its collaboration. When Swiss officers have made up their minds to read and give implicit obedience to regulations ; when *incorrect drill* has disappeared, with all the chicanery following in its train, then shall we be ready as far as it is possible for an army, which has not been under fire, to be ready."

The armies of the belligerent powers possess the immense advantages arising from familiarity with the actual conditions of a battlefield ; but their quality, says the author of the *Revue* article, is certainly inferior to that of the Swiss Army. It is by the *landsturm* and hastily-trained militia that the present War is being fought. The Swiss Army is still intact ; it consists of the *élite* and the picked manhood of the Nation.

The reasons for considering the belligerent armies of to-day inferior to those with which the War was begun are stated to be :—

1. Their training has been superficial, owing to the high pressure at which it has been carried out.

2. The great admixture of elderly and very young men, of men incapable of prolonged physical exertion.

3. The existence of many improvised units and formations.

It is stated that, in spite of the vicissitudes it has passed through and the terrible losses suffered by it, the *morale* of the Austro-Hungarian Army remains at a high standard.

#### SHELL HOLES.

The *Revue* article is accompanied by two photographic reproductions from the *War Album* published by Stilke of Berlin and a sketch-map of a part of a position, consisting of advanced posts in shell holes, 1st, 2nd and 3rd lines of defence. The author of the original article states that he has no desire to open a discussion on the new principles of trench warfare, or to put forward a theory no longer open to discussion ; he merely wishes, in his article, to point out the *rôle* which shell holes are playing on the battlefield to-day. He has, in consequence, brought together the information on the subject which has been published and that which has been communicated to him by playmates of his youth who have been fighting in Flanders.

The intensity of belligerent activity naturally varies at different parts of the front. Similarly, there is great diversity in the character of the defence arrangements provided along the various portions of the front. On some portions of the front complete defences are provided, having a considerable depth and consisting of many lines of resistance. An attempt to pierce these lines would be futile. But here no such attempts are made ; the defenders wait on and observe. Occasionally small raids take place to relieve the monotony of those on guard in the trenches in such a sector.

In other portions of the front no first line exists from which a daily and nightly watch has to be kept throughout long months. It is there that one finds the battlefield with all its turmoil. Nothing remains standing, nothing is in a state of stable equilibrium. All is in a condition of perpetual motion; engagements, local scraps, raids, attacks and counter-attacks no longer allow an opportunity for the establishment of a fortified line. It is impossible, indeed rash, to attempt to dig there. The opponents watch one another in the same way that wild beasts do preparatory to a spring at each other.

On an active sector, everything is smashed about, the surface of the ground torn by artillery projectiles. Everywhere are to be seen *débris* heaps, holes in the ground, innumerable craters of varying depth and diameter. The convulsed, heaving, trembling surface of the ground resembles an angry sea.

The shell holes in which soldiers have often passed a miserable existence during these many months past, have not only become a useful adjunct to a defensive system, but they are now even an essential and indispensable part of a fortified front. Their utilization marks a new phase in the evolution of tactics, in the handling of troops, in the adaptation of the *terrain* for tactical purposes and in the utilization of the features of a battlefield. In the latest developments of field fortification, the foremost line of defences no longer consists of solid parapets and deep trenches; its place has been taken by a system of shell holes. The rigidity, regularity and continuity of the first line is a thing of the past. Lines of trenches, following the contours of the ground and having a clear field of fire to the front, have disappeared.

Belligerents are now provided with their first line of defence by the artillery fire of their opponents; there is no longer any need to cogitate as to the siting of one's first line trenches. Shell holes give shelter and protection to two, three or more men who are there able to give one another mutual support and to remain inseparable during the various stages of the combat; often, even in death they are not parted. High moral and physical qualities are required in the men who have to garrison shell holes. A will of iron and nerves of steel alone enable them to hold on and put up a fight for whole days together, subjected as they are to terrible bombardments at times and surrounded by nauseating scenes.

The shell holes play the part in a defence similar to that played by the antennæ with which some insects are provided. Shell holes nearest the enemy are utilized as listening posts, little further back are the shell holes occupied by the patrols, behind these again are the shell holes, protected by obstacles in front and on the flanks, which have often been strengthened and improved on a systematic plan during the night. The defence of positions so organized is a comparatively simple matter, since the various shell holes flank and support one another. Should any of the enemy be bold enough to occupy one of the craters here or there, the garrisons of the nearest shell holes soon bomb the intruders out.

Artillery fire is not very effective against a shell-hole defensive system; but few prisoners can be taken in the event of a successful raid thereon. In order to gain a real advantage an enemy must succeed in obtaining

possession of a complete shell-hole area; the seizure of one or two lines of shell holes alone will serve no useful purpose.

It is difficult for artillery to observe the effect of its fire against a shell-hole system, and often an artillery bombardment strengthens rather than weakens such a defensive position. The main disadvantage of a shell-hole system from a defence point of view is the difficulty experienced in pushing up supplies of food, water and ammunition for the garrisons of the individual craters.

#### NOTES AND NEWS.

*Switzerland.*—The death is announced of Colonel Eugene Fahrländer at the age of 64; the deceased officer was on the retired list. Colonel Fahrländer commanded the Swiss 2nd Army Corps from 1898 to 1909.

The sad case of Major Maurer, commanding the 137th Battalion of Infantry, is mentioned. He was tempted to give countenance to the smuggling of contraband across the Austro-Swiss frontier, and yielded to the tempter. He was tried for his offence by the Tribunal of the 6th Division and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment, degradation and dismissal from the Army, and deprivation of civil rights for two years. Unfortunately, there are other similar cases *sub judice* at the present time. The virus of corruption unfortunately has found a weak spot in the Swiss Army, but the body as a whole is too healthy for the disease to spread.

The shortage of paper has rendered it impossible for the *Revue* to publish its customary list of promotions in the higher ranks of the Swiss Army. However, the appointment of Colonel Biberstein to the command of the 2nd Division cannot be passed over in silence.

The debate in the Federal Chamber on the relations of the civil and military power did not take place; instead the deputies devoted their time to a discussion on the subject of pacifism and the abolition of the Army.

In view of a somewhat widespread movement, having pacifism for its creed, the question arises, it is said, whether the Swiss are witnessing the arrival of an era of decadence, or even the birth of an age of mysticism. In either case the results are likely to be the same; mysticism and decadence, by one road or another, lead to the same end: death.

Attention is called to the latest issues of the series entitled *Histoire Militaire de la Suisse* edited by the Swiss General Staff; the two volumes of *Der Weltkrieg*, edited by Orell Fussli, and the brochure containing *Chants de soldats* distributed to the Swiss soldiers on the frontier at Christmas.

*United States of America.*—Two modifications of an extremely important character in the laws and regulations relating to the American Army have taken place. It is pointed out that the organization of a division of three brigades and nine regiments of infantry is not suitable for European warfare. Further, a company of infantry with an establishment of 150 rank and file is too weak for a campaign in which the wastage is as high as in the present War. General Pershing has made

certain recommendations on the subject. The American Infantry Division is, in consequence, now to be composed as follows :—

	Numbers of all ranks.
Divisional Staff ... ..	164
2 Infantry Brigades, each comprising 2 regiments of infantry and 1 machine-gun battalion (3 com- panies) ... ..	16,420
1 Divisional machine-gun battalion (4 companies) ...	768
1 Artillery Brigade consisting of 3 regiments of field artillery and 1 trench-mortar battery ... ..	5,068
1 Battalion of signallers ... ..	262
1 Engineer regiment ... ..	1,666
Total	24,348

To the foregoing must be added the train as follows :—

Administrative staff and military police ... ..	337
Ammunition Column ... ..	962
Supply Column ... ..	472
Engineer train ... ..	84
4 Field ambulances and 4 field hospitals ... ..	949
Grand total	27,152

The proportion of artillery has been more than doubled in above as compared to the original establishment of this arm in the American Division ; the number of machine guns has also been increased from 54 to 168 (14 companies of 12 guns each instead of 9 companies of 6 guns each).

The establishment of the infantry company has been raised from 150 to 250 all ranks ; it is organized as follows :—

Company headquarters, 2 officers and 18 other ranks.

4 Platoons each consisting of :—

- (a). Platoon headquarters, 1 officer and 1 other ranks.
- (b). 1 Section of bombers and grenadiers, 22 other ranks.
- (c). 2 Sections of fusiliers, each of 12 other ranks.
- (d). 1 Section of automatic rifles, 11 other ranks and 4 automatic rifles.

The establishment of an infantry battalion is 1,078 all ranks ; that of an infantry regiment approximately 3,750 all ranks ; each regiment has, in addition to the 12 ordinary companies (250 all ranks), the following :—

	All Ranks.
1 Machine-gun company ... ..	178
1 Supply company ... ..	148
1 Headquarters company consisting of :—	
(a). 1 Headquarters platoon (clerks, batmen, bands- men, etc.) ... ..	93
(b). 1 Platoon of signallers and telephonists ... ..	77
(c). 1 Platoon of sappers and bombardiers ... ..	43
(d). 1 Platoon of pioneers ... ..	55
(e). 1 Platoon of gunners (in charge of the 3 regi- mental guns) ... ..	33



The American Army consists of three distinct parts :—

1. The Regular Army.
2. The National Guards of the several States, now under the Federal Government.
3. The National Army, raised by conscription.

The Regular Army is already partly in Europe ; the National Guard is concentrated in the Southern States and will probably be transferred to Europe in the spring ; the National Army is quartered in immense cantonments in various localities. Everything has been done to make the life of the men comfortable and healthy. Each of the cantonments can house about 40,000 men.

The divisions, brigades, regiments and battalions have been numbered in such a manner as to lead to their easy identification in the organization adoption.

Certain difficulties have been met with in organizing the National Guards owing to the particularism which has existed in the past, but laudable efforts have been made by the military authorities to meet the situation without creating friction.

Everything is tending towards the unification of the American Army.

The problem of finding officers has not been difficult of solution from the point of view of the provision of the numbers required. The reserve of officers, schools for officer cadets, etc., have proved to be suitable reservoirs from which the commissioned ranks can be kept up to establishment. There has naturally been accelerated promotion in the higher ranks of the American Army.

#### INFORMATION.

*The Intervention of Japan.*—The defection of Russia has revived the question of the employment of the Japanese Army in the European War. The two following facts have contributed to hasten the necessity for a decision on the subjects :—

1. The defeat of Italy, in consequence of the Russian defection.
2. The return of MM. Clémenceau and Pichon to power.

M. Pichon has always been a strong partisan in favour of the intervention of Japan. In the transfer of the Japanese Army to Europe he sees an enhancement in the moral forces and an increase in the means at the command of the Entente Powers, factors which should tend to shorten duration of the World War. Recent military and political events instead of converting him have strengthened his original views on the subject.

Should the intervention of the Japanese Army be seriously considered as a possibility, the following questions of military importance would arise :—

1. What number of troops will Japan provide ?
2. In what theatre of operations is her assistance possible and desirable ?
3. What total number of troops is Japan in a position to provide ?

The Empire of the Rising Sun possesses an army to-day equal in efficiency to that of any of the belligerents ; its reputation is such as to require no words of comment here.

In the early days of the War, before the U boat menace had reached

the dimensions it has to-day, the transport of the *whole* of the Japanese Army from the Far East to the Western Front would have been a comparatively easy matter. This is no longer the case to-day. Further, the Russian situation is such that the transfer of the Japanese Army to the Eastern Front no longer comes within the purview of practical politics. Consequently the question that has to be decided consists in determining where a *part* only of the Japanese Army can be utilized to the best advantage and not that of considering the employment of the *whole* Japanese Army in the West, South, or East.

The following are the main considerations to which weight has to be given in an examination of the situation on each of the fronts for the purpose of arriving at a decision regarding the co-operation of the Japanese Army with those of the Entente Powers.

*Eastern Front.*—In the present state of Russia this front may be wiped out from one's calculations altogether. Even in the days prior to the existing chaos in Russia it would have been a somewhat delicate experiment to have utilized the Japanese Army on the Eastern Front. However, this front no longer exists and there is little or no prospect of its being reconstituted.

*Western Front.*—In 1915, in 1916, and in 1917 the presence of Japanese troops in reserve on this front would have been of inestimable value. On many an occasion during the years in question ten fresh divisions of keen born-fighters launched at the opportune moment would have turned what proved to be but partial successes into the decisive victory for which the Entente Powers have been waiting in vain these three years and more past.

In this fourth year of War, though it would be enormously to the advantage of the situation to have Japanese troops on the Western Front, the transport difficulty is so great as to render their employment there out of the question.

Further, a great Babel reigns on the Western Front already, owing to the variety of races congregated there, and the addition of one or more Japanese Armies would increase the difficulties at present experienced from the "Confusion of tongues."

*Balkan Front.*—On this front also there is a "Salmis of Armies," Serbs and Greeks taking the place of the Belgians and Portuguese on the Western Front.

The Entente Armies on this front have not a very important rôle assigned to them. Further, Macedonia is a theatre presenting enormous supply difficulties. On the whole the Balkan Front does not appear to afford a suitable field for the employment of a Japanese force.

*Palestine and Mesopotamian Fronts.*—Of the three theatres of operations of which these fronts consist, the Armenian theatre may be left out of consideration for the same reasons that the *Eastern Front* has been eliminated.

It is on the Palestine and the Mesopotamian Fronts that the Japanese Army might, in the opinion of the contributor of the original notes, be most usefully employed. The lines of communication from Japan to these fronts are shorter and safer than to the other fronts in which Japanese troops could be advantageously employed. The intervention

of Japan on these fronts would admit of a better distribution of the British forces and their employment on fronts more accessible from their base.

The utilization of Japanese troops, although extremely difficult, if not impossible, on other fronts, is nevertheless possible in the Asiatic dominions of Turkey and their employment there seems to offer many advantages. If an early decision could be arrived at, and effect given thereto without delay, Japan could yet play an important and decisive part in securing the dominion of Right over Might.

The Editors are issuing, as a *Supplement* to the *Revue*, a French translation by M. Michel Epy of Lord Ernest Hamilton's work on *The First Seven English Divisions*. The first portion of this translation accompanies the number of the *Revue* under notice, the narrative deals with events up to and including the passage of the Aisne. The chapter relating to Troyon is also begun in this part of the *Supplement*. There are two or three curious explanatory notes by the translator, e.g. R.F.A. is said to be equivalent to "Royal Fighting Artillery" (p. 21) and R.E. is stated to stand for "Royal Engineering" (p. 88).

W. A. J. O'MEARA.

#### RIVISTA DI ARTIGLIERIA E GENIO.

October—November, 1917.

The incendiary rocket represented below is officially called Brandrohr. It consists of an iron tube closed at one of the ends with two metal caps, one of lead, and the external one of iron.




FIG. 1.




FIG. 2.

The tube is filled with termite and closed at the upper end with a plug of celluloid provided with a central hole for insertion and five perimetral apertures for vents.

As is known, termite is a mixture of dust of aluminium and oxide of iron, which when it burns gains a temperature of 3,000 C. The incendiary rockets with termite are of two dimensions; the greater is about 50 cm. in length with a diameter of 10 cm.; the smaller is 40 cm. long and a diameter of about 5 cm.

*The Scientific American da La Science e la vie* refers to the above means of specially constraining troops in dug-outs to evacuate them and to surrender. For this purpose the rocket is attached to a long pole which is introduced into a dug-out—Fig. 3—and ignited by friction at the




FIG. 3.

entrance cavity. For this rocket or incendiary tube then may be substituted flame throwers at a more limited distance.

E. T. THACKERAY.

CORRESPONDENCE.

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THE NILE BARRAGE AND THE LATE COL. WESTERN,  
C.M.G., R.E.

*To the Editor, "R.E. Journal."*

DEAR SIR,

Since the publication of my husband's (Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff) life last autumn, surprise has been expressed that the name of Colonel J. H. Western, C.M.G., R.E., is not given in connection with the Nile Barrage.

The omission is inexcusable, and much regret is felt for it by our family and myself. It should have been made clear in the book that Colonel Western, with his assistant Mr. Reid, came from India expressly to take charge of this great work. Sir Colin had the responsibility of deciding that it should be undertaken and his name became associated with it, but he would have been the first to wish that the credit of carrying through to success this very difficult job should be given where it is due.

If these few lines can be inserted in the *R.E. Journal* our regrets will at least find some expression.

Yours faithfully,

M. D. SCOTT-MONCRIEFF.

11, Cheyne Walk, Chelsea, S.W.  
March 24th, 1918.

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