

MAR 1917

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DEEDS OF THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.*

(Continued from the February number of the "R.E. Journal").

CHAPTER III.

THE ROYAL ENGINEERS AND THE BATTLE
OF WATERLOO.†

It is a curious fact that once in every hundred years one nation or another of the European family seems destined to be bitten with the old Roman ambition of dominating the Continent.

Another point in which history keeps repeating itself is that our own country invariably plays an important if not a decisive rôle in frustrating this particular ambition.

At the close of the 16th century Philip II. of Spain was aspiring to universal dominion, and it was Drake who "singd the King of Spain's beard" at Cadiz, and subsequently, under Lord Howard of Effingham, as Lord High Admiral of England, helped to scatter the self-styled Invincible Spanish Armada in 1588.

In 1704 the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene shattered on the field of Blenheim once and for all the political structure that King Louis XIV. had for many years been endeavouring to consolidate in Europe.

In 1815—just a hundred years ago—the *coup de grâce* was given by the Duke of Wellington's Army at Waterloo to the greatest military genius of modern times, a genius who came nearer than any other man has ever done to the realization of Universal Empire, a feat that has been accomplished once and once only in human history—by Julius Cæsar.

Now that another Cæsar or Kaiser is pursuing the same object, and that Great Britain has once more descended into the arena to assist in frustrating the attempt, it will be interesting to recall the part played by our Corps in the last decisive campaign which settled the fate of Napoleon a century ago.

The Royal Engineers were not represented on that occasion by any complete unit of the Corps, but twelve of our officers received the Waterloo Medal. Two of these medals—those granted to the C.R.E. and the Brigade-Major, R.E., Lieut.-Colonel Carmichael

* Compiled in the R.E. Record Office.

† From *The Sapper* for June, 1915, being a Centenary article on the Battle of Waterloo.

Smyth and Major John Oldfield—are to be seen in the R.E. Museum at Chatham. Another relic of Waterloo in the Museum is a Cross of the Legion of Honour, picked up on the field after the battle by Colonel Carmichael Smyth. By far the most interesting relic of Waterloo in the Museum, and probably the most valuable single item in the whole collection, is the map of the country round Waterloo which was used by the Duke of Wellington during the campaign.

The story of this map is so closely connected with the Corps that it may be of interest to follow its history from the day on which it was mounted on canvas in the drawing office of the Brigade-Major, R.E., in Brussels to the day when it found its final resting-place in the R.E. Museum, some four years ago. During the occupation of the Netherlands in 1814-15, after Napoleon's abdication and removal to Elba, Lieut.-Colonel Carmichael Smyth, who was C.R.E. of the Army of Occupation, under the orders of the Prince of Orange, had a number of reconnaissance sketches made of the country south of Brussels and adjoining the French frontier.

Napoleon made his dramatic escape from Elba on the 26th February, 1815, landing with 1,000 men in France on the 1st March. The news of this coup reached England about the 8th March, and early in April the Duke of Wellington took over the command of the Army in the Netherlands from the Prince of Orange. The Duke soon after his arrival secured the appointment of Sir William De Lancey, who had served under him in the Peninsula, as his Quartermaster-General. De Lancey reported his arrival in Brussels early in May.

The Quartermaster-General in those days was responsible for military operations, as well as for ordinary military movements, the General Staff as now understood not having yet been evolved. The R.E. assisted the Q.M.G.'s Department by making the maps required in military operations generally.

It was on the evening of the 15th June that the news that Napoleon had crossed the Sambre and was moving against the Allied Armies, reached the Duke's headquarters in Brussels. De Lancey spent that night writing the orders for the concentration of the army, and rode out early on the following morning to Quatre Bras with his Chief.

Now that it was clear where Napoleon's attack was going to be developed, maps were at once requisitioned from the C.R.E. One map of the open country south of the Forest of Soignies, traced from the original reconnaissance sketches made during the winter, had been already sent out to the Prince of Orange, who commanded the First Corps, and a second tracing was in course of preparation.

Lieut.-Colonel Carmichael Smyth joined the Duke's headquarters in the field as his C.R.E. on the 16th, and sent in to the Brigade-

Major's Office for the plan of the country round Waterloo, which—as the C.R.E. knew—was being traced. The tracing had not, however, been completed, and as the matter was urgent, Major Oldfield forwarded the original sketches of the officers which had been pieced together and mounted on canvas. This map, now in the R.E. Museum, was entrusted by Major Oldfield to Lieut. Waters, R.E. This officer placed it in the sabretasche attached to his saddle and rode out with it to Quatre Bras.

When he arrived at Quatre Bras he found the battle in full progress, and was ridden over by a charge of French cavalry. "Upon recovering himself," writes Major Oldfield in his diary, "he found the cavalry had passed him, and his horse was nowhere to be seen. He felt alarmed for the loss of his plan. To look for his horse, he imagined, was in vain, and his only care was to avoid being taken prisoner, which he hoped to do by keeping well towards our right. The enemy, being repulsed in his charge, was returning by the left to the ground by which he had advanced. After proceeding about 50 yards, he was delighted to find his horse quietly destroying the vegetables in a garden near the farmhouse at Quatre Bras. He thus fortunately recovered his plan; and with it rejoined the Colonel."

Our troops were successful in holding their own against all the attacks of Marshal Ney that afternoon, and bivouacked that night on the field of battle. Soon after daylight next morning the Duke went over the position and made a few changes in the disposition of the troops in view of a possible renewal of the attack by the French. At about 6.30 a.m. he sent his Staff Officer, Sir Alexander Gordon, escorted by a squadron of the 10th Hussars, to find out what Blucher and the Prussians were doing on our left. Gordon and his escort returned with jaded horses soon after 10 a.m. The Duke, after all his work in the saddle, had dismounted and stretched himself on the ground near the cross roads, which gave the name of the Four Arms or Quatre Bras to the place. Around him, resting on the ground, were Lord Fitzroy Somerset (afterwards the Lord Raglan of the Crimean War), Sir Edward Barnes, the Adjutant-General, Sir William De Lancey, the Quartermaster-General, and others of his principal officers.

As soon as the Duke had heard Gordon's report of Blucher's defeat at Ligny and retreat on Wavre, he called on the C.R.E. for the plan. Colonel Smyth took it from Major Oldfield (to whose custody it had been transferred on his joining headquarters) and handed it to the Duke. The latter handed it on, with a few words of direction, to De Lancey, who, seeing one of his officers, Lieut. Basil Jackson, close by, called him up and ordered him to go to Sir Thomas Picton to tell him the orders were to make immediate preparation for falling back upon Waterloo. It was no doubt at this

juncture that the Duke made those pencil marks on the plan which are still visible, showing that the sunken road just north of the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, and south of the village of Mont Saint Jean, was the main position to be occupied. At about noon the retreat commenced, and throughout the afternoon our troops were closely followed by the French, led by Napoleon in person. That night our troops bivouacked in the rain on the ground in the position indicated on the map in De Lancey's pocket.

There is no need to give any account of the battle on the following day—perhaps the most famous single battle in the whole range of English history—except to follow the fortunes of the map. Towards 3 o'clock the Duke and his staff were watching one of the great French attacks on the centre of the position. "We were," says the Duke, "on a point of land that overlooked the plain. De Lancey was with me, and speaking to me, when he was struck. I had just been warned off by some soldiers (but as I saw well from it, and two divisions were engaging below, I said 'never mind'), when a ball came bounding along *en ricochet*, as it is called, and striking him on the back, sent him many yards over the head of his horse. He fell on his face, and bounded upwards and fell again. All the staff dismounted and ran to him, and when I came up he said, 'Pray tell them to leave me and let me die in peace.'" The Duke had him conveyed to the rear to the farm of Mont Saint Jean, about half a mile off, whence he was subsequently removed to a cottage in the village of the same name, where he was joined by his young wife from Brussels a couple of days later, and nursed by her until his death, about nine days after the battle.

Before he was carried off the field the plan of the battlefield was taken from his coat pocket and handed to the Deputy Quartermaster-General, Sir Charles Broke, who handed it over to Major Oldfield at Cateau Cambresis, on the advance to Paris a few days later. Major Oldfield returned it to the C.R.E., in whose possession it subsequently remained. Sir Walter Scott met Colonel Smyth subsequently in Paris during the occupation of that city by the allied troops from 1815 to 1817, and heard from him the story of De Lancey's death, and of the map which had been pieced together in the C.R.E.'s Office in Brussels. "The plan itself," writes Sir Walter, "a relique so precious, was rendered yet more so by being found in the breast of Sir William De Lancey's coat when he fell, and stained with the blood of that gallant officer. It is now in the careful preservation of Colonel Carmichael Smyth, by whom it was originally sketched." Sir Walter Scott is not quite correct in saying that it was "originally sketched" by Colonel Smyth, but in his capacity as C.R.E., it was, of course, put together under his orders.

Some of the papers of Sir James Carmichael Smyth found their way into the open market some four years ago, and surely no more

appropriate place for this precious relic, as Sir Walter Scott justly called the Waterloo map, could be found than the R.E. Museum.

The pencil marks of the Duke and the bloodstains of one of his favourite staff officers connect it with the most glorious episode in our military history ; but its original construction by R.E. officers in the field and in the R.E. drawing office in Brussels, the vicissitudes it went through in Lieut. Waters' sabretasche on the 16th June, the endorsement of authenticity made on it by Major Oldfield in 1846, and finally its preservation by Sir James Carmichael Smyth connect it very closely with the Corps of Royal Engineers, and are a standing witness against the common belief that we have no special interest as a Corps in the most famous campaign in English history.

CONSTRUCTION OF AEROPLANE SHEDS IN THE FIELD.

By CAPT. G. C. GOWLLAND, R.E.

THE following short account of some aeroplane sheds erected in Egypt may be of interest. There is nothing new in the design, but it is a good illustration of an active service project of a type that was set for promotion examinations in pre-war days.

The project was for four aeroplane sheds at a post 120 miles from rail-head. Camels were the only form of transport available at the time, and owing to the state of the road, ten days had to be allowed for a camel convoy to get through from rail-head to the site of the sheds. Each shed had to be 40 ft. long with a clear span of 40 ft. Height of walls 12 ft. 6 in.

The first calculations were rough. Trusses were spaced at 10-ft. interval and a dead load of 20 lbs. per f.s. calculated for. This gave an idea as to what stresses had to be dealt with. 20 lbs. per f.s. was considered too low a figure owing to the violent wind storms that were prevalent in the locality of the sheds. A second calculation was therefore made on the assumption that the sheds would be subjected to 100 miles per hour gale. The members were then calculated to stand somewhat less than the stresses set up by a 100 m.p.h. gale. The actual trusses will take a dead load of rather more than 40 lbs. per f.s.


During construction the sheds were subjected to a severe test in the shape of an extremely violent gale, but showed no sign of collapse. The stresses having been decided on, the material available locally had to be fitted to suit these stresses.

No timber over 13 ft. in length was available, therefore all members had to be built up. The scantlings available were 9 in. \times 1 in., 8 in. \times $\frac{3}{4}$ in., 4 in. \times 2 in., all in 13-ft. lengths, while a limited quantity of 9 in. \times 2 in. and 9 in. \times $1\frac{1}{2}$ in. was procurable, this latter being best quality deal. The Principals and Ties were made up of 9 in. \times 1 in., while the 9 in. \times 2 in. was kept for the short struts. The pillars supporting the trusses were built up of 8 in. \times $\frac{3}{4}$ in. The details of this are shown on the working drawings.

The scheme for the erection of the hangars was proposed on 6th April, and the sheds were wanted by the beginning of May, as after the middle of May rain was likely to render flying impossible. The first train for the South left on 9th April, so there were $2\frac{1}{2}$ days


—AEROPLANE SHEDS—

—ERECTED IN URGENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE FIELD.—



—SECTION—END ELEVATION—
—OPEN END—


—END ELEVATION CLOSED END—




—ELEVATION OF APEX—



—ELEVATION OF FOOT OF TRUSS—




—PLAN OF FOOT OF TRUSS—




—SIDE VIEW OF POST—

—HALF SECTION—



—PLAN—



—SIDE VIEW SHOWING FRAMING—

to design, estimate for, buy, and despatch the timber and ironwork required for the sheds.

A programme showing the progress of the work is shown below :—

6th April.—The General Staff ordered the scheme to be put in hand. On this day timber merchants were interviewed and some idea was obtained of the timber available.

7th April.—Plans got out, the design being made to fit in with the material available. The amount of wood, ironwork, corrugated iron, etc., was estimated and its weight calculated for purposes of transport. Tracings, etc., were made of the working drawings and specifications, etc., written.

8th April.—All material bought and loaded on the train, the total weight being 30 tons. At the same time a transport company of 250 camels was entrained, these latter being sent up to transport the material from rail-head to the site.

It was found impossible to make the steel fittings, straps, bolts, rods, etc., in time to go up by train on 9th April. Detailed drawings of these were got out and the steelwork was made by a local firm. All steel fittings were finished and loaded up by 12th April, when the next train left for the South.

9th April.—At 8 a.m. the camels and 30 tons of material left by train for the South.

11th April.—The material, etc., arrived at rail-head. The Officer in charge of Transport had to give his camels 3 days' rest as they were very cramped after the journey. Meanwhile plans and instructions as to the buildings were sent forward by a light motor car. This enabled the foundations, etc., to be dug previous to the arrival of the material.

15th April.—240 camel loads of material left rail-head for the site of the sheds.

26th April.—The camel convoy arrived at the site of the sheds. The material was taken over by a Military Works party and building operations begun.

2nd May.—The sheds were completed.

TRANSCRIPT.

NOTES ON CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS.*

From the "Journal of the Military Service Institution, U.S.A."

The summary of the information of various kinds given in documents captured from the Germans would be impossible owing to their number, and in the case of many of them inadvisable, but the following notes on a few of them, and of information from some other sources, should be of value.

I.—GERMAN ORGANIZATION OF TRENCHES.

The following are some extracts from a German document dealing with this subject. It will be noticed what important and complicated work the German Infantry is expected, in theory, to execute: the study of trenches captured from the Germans shows, perhaps not unnaturally, that the work carried out is, in practice, by no means so complete.

"Of the works necessary to complete the organization of the position, the first to be carried out are:

The deepening of the front trench and, *afterwards*, the construction of shelters.

As a general principle it is most important that no holes or excavations, other than those which are absolutely necessary, should be dug in either the front or rear faces of the trenches, though some are necessary for storing reserve ammunition and hand grenades.

Arm racks or rifle recesses should not be constructed, for later on, when the trench is bombarded by artillery or trench mortars, rifles cannot be left in the trench without cover.

One latrine per section must be dug: positions will be selected for this purpose. The latrines should be large and very deep, so that they may be usable for a long period."

"As regards shelters, exclusive of those of the company and section commanders, sixteen per section are required: each of these should hold from four to five men, and they should eventually be joined so as to form squad shelters. The entrance should be about five feet from the traverse and dug at right angles to the front face of the trench."

"The shelters should have a covering of from 13 feet to 16 feet of earth, as the position is certain to be bombarded. The descents should be at an angle of 40° to the horizontal and not vertical, in order to prevent their being blocked by a fall of earth. Particular care should be taken to strut the entrances to the shelters, for these are the points where there is a minimum thickness of earth and they are specially exposed to artillery fire. There should be signboards indicating the positions of the shelters."

* The last number of the "Journal of the Military Service Institution of the U.S.A." contains a remarkably interesting series of notes contained in documents captured from the Germans. The Editor states that the notes are furnished from a source which, for conclusive reasons, cannot be revealed, but which is, in itself, a guarantee of their authenticity.

"There are in the front line trench just enough shelters for two sections: in the communication trenches there are enough for the remainder of the sections of the first line trenches: in the second trench there are enough for the supporting section. The design of the shelters in the communication trenches includes one entrance into the trench and another in the roof. In the second trench, which has hitherto been our principal trench, it is inadvisable to begin the construction of shelters at once, for it is essential to complete those of the advanced position first."

Remarks on the above. It should be noted that the German sanitary arrangements, as shown by the instructions given above, are by no means so thorough as those carried out in British trenches. A pit latrine is much less satisfactory and healthy than a latrine with receptacles which are emptied, and their contents buried, daily, in a deep hole well back from the lines.

With regard to the very elaborate instructions for the building of shelters, these show a wholesome, if excessive, respect for our artillery. It is doubtful if so many and such deep shelters are advisable. When the attack comes it is difficult to get the men out rapidly from underground, while men left in a shelter are like rats in a trap: they must surrender or be easily destroyed by bombs, as many of our successful raids on German trenches have clearly proved.

II.—ORGANIZATION OF POSITIONS.

(Extracts translated from a German document).

"As a result of a visit of inspection by the pioneer general attached to General Headquarters the following points were discussed:

The higher command insists that a hostile attack, even though undertaken with superior forces, should be resisted to the uttermost, ground being maintained by the troops in their respective sectors. To this end it insists that, in addition to the principal position now occupied, there should be at least one alternative position. This position should be sufficiently far in rear to force the enemy to reform for a fresh attack and to occupy fresh artillery positions; but on the other hand in close enough proximity to command the first position, in order

(1) Either to prevent the enemy, who has set foot in it, from establishing himself there and gaining ground to the flanks, or

(2) To facilitate the recapture of the position later on. Each system of defence must be organized in depth; the following type is the simplest:

(a) A fire trench with obstacles, as a first line.

(b) A support trench, from 50 to 100 meters to the rear, more thoroughly organized for defense and provided with obstacles.

(c) Numerous communication trenches between the first two trenches.

It is necessary to classify the communication trenches, even those leading up to the second line, in order that those to be used, when going into and coming out of the trenches, may be kept distinct and marked by notice boards.

It is necessary, on principle, to hold the fire trench: if a heavy bombardment forces the occupants to withdraw temporarily to the support trench, there must be no doubt as to the possibility of occupying the fire trench before the enemy can reach it. If, owing to exceptional circumstances, this is not possible, the support trenches must be defended. It is also advisable to prepare for defense certain portions of the communication trenches."

"Farther back, in rear of the support trenches, behind the more exposed portions of the front, block trenches, of such length as may be necessary, should be constructed in order to limit the progress of the enemy and facilitate the recapture of the position. Yet farther in rear, between the principal position and the second line of defense, it is desirable to establish intermediate supporting points; these also should check the enemy in his advance and facilitate the recapture of the positions."

"The different parts of a defensive system should receive a uniform nomenclature in such a manner as to show by their names the part they are called upon to play: relieving troops and new commanders will thus quickly find their way about."

"*Obstacles*—As far as possible fixed obstacles with iron posts should be employed: recourse to *chevaux de frise* and rolls of wire is only to be had in case of necessity. Nevertheless these latter must be held in readiness so as to improvise obstacles. Obstacles must be so arranged in front of the support trenches as to permit of easy egress therefrom, in order that the principal trench, if lost, may be retaken. To this end it is recommended that they should be arranged checkerwise, which admits of passage through them."

"*Shelters*—These must be bomb-proof and must be protected against earth-slides, as also their entrances. After a bombardment the exit is often obstructed by debris of wood, sand-bags, and even hurdles. There must, therefore, be several entrances. Isolated shelters are constructed to hold not more than two squads. A sufficient number must be built in all to shelter the entire permanent garrison of the fire trench * * * For commanding officers special bomb-proof shelters will be constructed * * * All commanding officers' shelters must be adequately connected up with the front firing line and the reserves."

"It is very important to have covered communications which will, in case of attack, permit of strong reserves being moved forward, or to a flank, and will afford protection against shell fire for a considerable time."

Remarks on the above. This document has been quoted at some length because it is typical of many. It is chiefly interesting because it shows to what lengths the German excessive desire for elaborate organization is apt to lead, viz. an instructional verboseness which is both unnecessary and causes a waste of time to the hard-worked regimental officer. The document itself is considerably longer, but nearly all that has been omitted is in the nature of repetition. It deals merely with the commonplaces of defensive organization and to a moderately trained officer its substance could have been adequately given in a dozen lines. It again provides evidence of the great amount of attention paid by the Germans to bomb-proof shelters.

III.—GERMAN MINENWERFER EMPLACEMENTS.

(From the examination of a prisoner, a minenwerfer N.C.O.)

Emplacement for a heavy or medium minenwerfer. On the right of the communication trench there is a shelter for the men. This is formed by a gallery 23 to 26 feet below the surface, with two outlets. Opposite this shelter a communication trench, provided with light cover, leads to the emplacement. In the middle of this communication trench there is a shelter for ammunition, a gallery 20 to 23 feet below the surface. The emplacement is formed of three rows of tree trunks 4 to 6 inches in diameter. On the left of the emplacement there is a small recess for tools. On the right there is an ammunition recess in which about a dozen shells are always stored. Behind the minenwerfer there is an exit (generally masked by a tent-square), by which the minenwerfer, after being dismounted, is introduced into or removed from the emplacement by night, when it is necessary to change its position.

The shelter sometimes consists, on the other hand, merely of an underground chamber placed at the end of a gallery opening on to a communication trench. This chamber is provided with an opening through which the projectile passes. This elongated opening, placed at a certain distance from a communication trench, is the only indication by which the existence of such a shelter can be ascertained from a photograph.

Emplacement for a light minenwerfer. The shelter is formed of one or two rows of tree trunks. As the minenwerfer never remains permanently in one position, the shelter is generally provided with light cover only, as is also the case of the shelter for the personnel. The shelter for the ammunition is formed by a gallery 10 to 13 feet below the surface.

Remarks on the above. German minenwerfer emplacements are constructed with considerable skill, but err on the side of elaboration. Concealment is of more importance than the safety of the gun or even the personnel, for once the emplacement is definitely located its destruction for all practical purposes is inevitable and a new position must be chosen. The two last-mentioned forms of emplacement are, therefore, preferable to the first, on the ground that, as they can be made quicker and with much less labor, and can be as well or better concealed, they fulfil essential conditions and alternative positions can be more rapidly constructed.

IV.—DISPOSITIONS TO BE MADE WITH THE OBJECT OF REDUCING CASUALTIES IN THE TRENCHES.

(Extracts from a German document).

"The two following features have characterized, of late, the attitude of the enemy on our front.

Artillery activity has been chiefly displayed by night instead of by day.

Trench mortar fire has continually increased in intensity."

"Our losses are unfortunately still too heavy. Suitable steps must be taken to meet successfully this new method of fighting on the part of the enemy.

In the first place losses will be diminished by allotting as small a garri-

son as possible to the trenches: the strength of these garrisons must be reduced, especially at night, to the minimum indispensable for the service of security and for carrying out the necessary work.

Further, every possible step must be taken to deprive the enemy's fire of its efficacy. This end can only be attained by a more methodical organization of the means of offense and defense."

"The situation varies in each sector: hard and fast rules cannot, therefore, be laid down, but the following conditions must always be observed:—

(1) The enemy must be subjected to continual observation, and this can only be done by having at our disposal a sufficient stock of illuminating material. * * * The officer commanding the corps pioneers must take the necessary steps to ensure that deficiencies in this material are constantly made good.

(2) The communication between the infantry and the batteries, or guns, told off to oppose the trench mortars must be close enough to enable every request for fire made by the infantry to be immediately complied with. There is room for great improvement in this respect. * * *

(3) Artillery commanders must continually increase the efficacy of their fire against the principal positions of the enemy's trench mortars by constantly improving their means of observation, especially by the provision of observation from a flank, and by eliminating all sources of error in shooting."

"Special precautions must be taken to effect withdrawal from the trenches when it is intended to open artillery fire on the enemy's trench mortars, which fire can only be delivered when the position of the latter has been exposed. If withdrawal is deferred till the hostile trench mortars have opened fire, the infantry runs the risk of incurring heavy losses in the course of a hasty retirement."

"In case the infantry should think fit to withdraw in haste from a section of trench, in view of our artillery opening fire, all arrangements must be made for immediately carrying out the order which emanates from the fire trench. * * * To this end infantry must practice withdrawing from the trenches quickly and in silence."

Remarks on the above. The most interesting point about this document is the indirect evidence it provides of the efficacy of our trench mortar fire. The losses caused by it are admittedly "too heavy." It does not speak very highly of the accuracy of German artillery that front trenches should have to be cleared so constantly, and often hastily, to permit of the German batteries opening fire on our front line. As we rarely, in like conditions, withdraw troops from the fire trench, it argues a greater irregularity of range in the German shooting or an increasing distrust of their ammunition.

V.—THE GERMANS IN OPEN WARFARE.

(Information obtained early in the war from conversations with a German machine-gun battery commander, an expert in both musketry and machine guns. They are the views apparently held in the German army before the war, on which their training has been based, and there is no reason to suppose that there has been inclination, or even opportunity, to modify them to any great extent.)

(1) MUSKETRY.

(a) *Range*.—The Germans consider it unnecessary to teach men to fire at distances beyond 400 meters. The plan of attack is to get within this range without opening fire.

(b) *Fire control*.—Judging distance is practiced by officers only, and no attention is devoted to indication of target, concentration, etc.

(c) *Concentration*.—To concentrate the fire of a platoon or company on one spot at 1000 yards range is considered to be a great waste of ammunition. The nearest the Germans do in this way is to fire by battalions on large areas of ground, using independent fire. On the Aisne this officer's machine-gun battery came under concentrated fire of our infantry at 1000 yards, and his men suffered heavily from it, but they could not see our men to reply.

(d) *British musketry*.—Our musketry, this officer said, was marvellous. They had counted on being able to rush us by weight of numbers, and found themselves quite unable to do it because our fire was "so straight and so quick."

(e) *Rate of fire*.—When asked if the Germans went in for rapid fire, he replied that only some of their men were practiced, and they only averaged eight to nine rounds per minute. (Their straight bolt is not so easy to work, nor is their clip so easy to put in.) They do not seem to realize that we train our men to fire fifteen well-aimed shots a minute.

(2) MACHINE GUNS.

Each battalion has a company of four and sometimes six machine guns. Every man in this company is an expert in the gun. Each gun is considered to be worth fifty men or more. Their fire is considered to be the most valuable form of discharging bullets.

Training.—The Germans never worry about different elevations, combined sights, or traversing, and never fire on a 30-yards range, which is considered useless for training purposes. Machine gun competitions are looked on as far more valuable than rifle competition.

Tactical employment.—In the attack the machine guns are brought up with the supports and, until the war had been going on a month, it was not thought worth while to "dig in" the guns as their tactical employment was essentially with the infantry.

(3) THE ATTACK.

The first line is looked on as "cover" from bullets for the second and third lines, to enable these two lines to get closer with the minimum of loss.

They reckoned on their third line with their machine guns being able to get within 400 yards. They have, however, never been able to do this over open ground against the British because their first line was down too soon—sometimes at 800 to 1000 yards. As this officer explained, they had never had a chance against the British.

They consider mass formation to be the only way to get up close, both ranks of each line being close together. If their third line is held up they have standing orders to "dig in" at once, and for this purpose the third line carry shovels and small picks.

REVIEW.

PAGES D'HISTOIRE, 1914—1916.

(Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault, Paris: 5, Rue des Beaux-Arts).

Continued from the R.E. Journal, February, 1917.

With the appearance of the 88th number the main title of the series has been altered by the editors to *Pages d'Histoire*, 1914—1916.

The 86th, 89th and 97th numbers contain the official communiqués addressed by the Central Government to the Provincial Civil Authorities in France; they are the XVI. to XVIII. Volumes (inclusive) of the series which deal with these matters. The 86th number contains the communiqués issued between 1st—31st October, 1915, the 89th number the communiqués issued in November and December, 1915, and the 97th number the communiqués issued in January and February, 1916; each of these numbers contains, in addition, appendices relating to the more important events which occurred during the period covered by the communiqués in them.

The 87th number is entitled *Les Terres Meurtries*; it contains 10 articles which give a description of the country on the French eastern frontier (illustrated by seven sketch-maps), in which fighting has been in progress since the autumn of 1914. These articles also refer to the characteristics of the people dwelling in this zone and to many of the incidents which have occurred there during the present War.

The author of the original articles states that the French plan of campaign was based on the assumption that the neutrality of Belgium would be respected, and for this reason the defences of the French eastern frontier were not carried sufficiently far northwards of Verdun. In this the French made a psychological error, which was, he says, aggravated by an inexcusable military mistake in the neglect by the authorities to provide the Spada gap with defence works. The enemy, being well aware of this point of weakness in the French system of defences, battered at this point of the French line and pierced it. Writing with particular reference to the Meuse barrier, he continues: "Of the whole French defensive system that part of the wall with which we have covered the Lorraine front, the flanks of which we rested on neutral countries, and which we thought to be impenetrable, is the only part of our front which the enemy has reached, attacked, and, at certain points, broken through. Everywhere else, the German effort, as great and as unforeseen it was by us, has not been able, in spite of its fury, to overcome any other of the obstacles to their advance put up by us."

The 88th number is entitled *Documents Authentiques sur le Complot*

Austro-Allemand aux États-Unis and is a French translation of the White Paper, dealing with Austro-German intrigues in the United States of America, presented to the two Houses of the British Parliament on the 22nd September, 1915. In an introduction to this volume the editors state that for many months the Press had been publishing details concerning the Germanic intrigues in the United States of America. In the meantime the American and Austro-German governments had been discussing peace propositions, and a delicate situation had arisen. The editors point out that a veritable state of war existed between the United States of America and Germany at this time; the fact that war had not been declared made it none the less costly and murderous, with this peculiarity that the losses which resulted from this state of things alone injuriously affected the riches and lives of American people, without imposing any corresponding disadvantages on the German people.

War, Clausewitz has said, is an act of violence by which we compel our adversaries to conform his acts to our will. It is possible, as is well known, for two States to be at war with one another, although their armies may not be fighting one another, and although neither of the States may have declared war against the other. Violence exercised with the object of securing definite ends constitutes by itself a state of war; the outrages committed by the Austro-Germans against Americans fall in the category of acts of violence of this nature.

In the volume under review will be found some of the incriminating correspondence of the principal Teutonic intriguers during their sojourn in the land of the Stars and Stripes. Evidence was produced at a judicial enquiry ordered by the Washington Government proving that some of these gentry, among whom were numbered Dernburg, the German ex-Minister, von Papen, the German Military Attaché, and Boy-Ed, the German Naval Attaché, had flagrantly abused the hospitality extended to them by the United States of America, and, in consequence, no course was open to the American authorities other than to request that the German Government should recall their accredited representatives involved in the intrigues made public; and this was done. The Austro-Hungarian Government had been obliged earlier still to recall Dr. Dumba, its Ambassador at Washington, owing to the disclosures contained in the correspondence found in the baggage of the American journalist, James F. Archibald, on the 30th August, 1915, when the ship conveying the latter from America put in at Falmouth; this is the correspondence which is published in the number under review. Incomplete as is this correspondence, it affords most valuable evidence concerning the secret operations of German and Austrian agents on the American continent.

The 90th number is entitled *Voix Américaines sur la Guerre de 1914—1916* and contains extracts from articles which have appeared in the American Press in connection with the present War. There are 10 articles in this volume. One of these taken from *The World* (New York) of the 23rd October, 1915, deals with the execution of Nurse Cavell. It is stated that the German psychology in the Cavell affair is as incomprehensible to the American mind as is the German psychology in the *Lusitania* affair; the execution in question was worse than a crime.

In an article from the *New York Times* of the 3rd October, 1915, the situation in Germany at that date is briefly discussed. This situation is described as being similar to that where a chess-player who, having failed to win the game by a few daring moves, finds himself in a difficulty owing to the state of the board being such that he has no longer any piece left which he is free to move; whilst, at the same time, his adversary is handicapped by having no plan of attack, except that of exchanging pieces.

There are only two ways in war of beating an enemy: by killing his men or by making his troops prisoners. The arithmetic of the present War has from the beginning of the conflict been quite clear. Germany and Austria with a combined population of 115 millions have provoked a quarrel with other Powers whose total population amounts to 235 millions; that is to say, it is a struggle in which the eventual fighting strength is as 1 to 2. This disproportion is bound to tell in the long run.

The German Great General Staff recognized long ago that victory could only be sought on the lines of a *victory by strategy*; the arithmetic of the situation taught them that a simple competition in carnage would not answer their purpose. Hence the German plan of campaign, involving an early invasion of France *via* Belgium and the development of a subsequent magnificent and heroic effort to obtain a decisive success in Russia. The German plan has failed; and now the pressure exerted by the Entente Powers in the western theatre has become a serious menace to Germany. A miracle, and a miracle alone will allow her to escape from the impending disaster.

In an article from *The American Review of Reviews* of October, 1915, which appears in this volume under the title *Le Caractère français à l'Épreuve*, Dallas MacGrew, who has been with the American Ambulance in France, writes in highly appreciative terms of the French. He has seen much of the French officers and men, from both of whom he has learnt the true spirit animating the sons of *la grande France* at the present juncture.

In an article which appears in this volume, under the title *Les Allemands aux États-Unis*, Mr. Lucius Swift, a barrister of Indianapolis, makes an interesting examination into the growth of German power and the development of the new German mentality; the original of this article is a paper read before the Literary Club of Indianapolis on the 4th October, 1915. He calls attention to the fact that William II. has claimed that Germans were the salt of the earth; he also tells us that Germans in the United States of America, having accepted their Kaiser's *dictum* as the expression of the truth, have not been slow in pushing this view down the throats of Americans.

Germans in Germany and Germans and their descendants in the United States of America have, Mr. Swift tells us, expressed genuine surprise that Americans have no sympathy for the German Government in the present War, and, indeed, that they go so far as to hold the German Government to be a distinct menace to the liberty of the world. On the other hand, Americans are surprised that Germans should desire to claim their sympathy: specially in view of the fact that they find

people of German descent, who, whilst enjoying all the advantages of American citizenship, continue to believe in William II. and are praying now for his triumph, because they look upon him as a sort of Moses who is leading Germans to the Promised Land. And to crown all things these German-Americans openly express the view that Prussian organization is preferable to American liberty. The growth of Prussia and the German Empire are traced from the time that an ambitious Hohenzollern purchased the Mark of Brandenburg from the Emperor Sigismund for half-a-million crowns. Considerable attention is paid by Mr. Swift to the reign of Kaiser William II. ; he points out that, in spite of appearances, the latter is no fool. William II. has set himself a definite task and has devoted himself strenuously and without intermission to its accomplishment. He has desired that he and his descendants shall continue to govern the Germans ; at the same time, he has resolved that, in the execution of the High Office of Supreme Lord of the German Empire, succeeding generations of rulers shall continue to employ the methods of the Middle Ages. For five and twenty long years William II. has sown the seeds of despotism ; his people have been poisoned by this canker. A feudal spirit prevails everywhere in Germany and has the approbation of the German-Americans ; they exhort the Germans of Germany to continue under this yoke.

The Zabern affair is referred to by Mr. Swift, and also the torpedoing of the *Lusitania* by orders of the German Kaiser. Leaving these subjects, he says : " It is with relief that one turns from this sovereign (*i.e.* the German Kaiser) to recall a classic example of the American political ideals." He recalls that, in 1783, after the last of the British and German soldiers had left American shores, Washington took leave of his generals at New York and returned to his estate to live the life of a simple farmer. The American General had commanded a great army to secure the liberation of a people, a rôle in marked contrast with that played by William II., whose aim and object in commanding a great army has been to enslave the people of Europe.

Dealing with the subject of German *Kultur*, Mr. Swift says, " Germans in America to-day disparage Treitschke ; they argue that this author's works are no longer read in Germany." Nevertheless, this well-known professor had a great vogue for 30 years ; he was listened to with deep attention and his opinions were often quoted. " It is useless," says Mr. Swift, " now that it is too late, and the faith in his doctrines has become so large a part of the German creed to disavow this prophet of German *Kultur*." He continues : " There is a wide difference in the ideals of the Anglo-Saxons and those of the Teutons." It is well put by Münsterberg, who says : " The Anglo-Saxon system is dominated by the individualistic influence ; the Teutonic ideal is governed by the will which seeks to rule the individual." That is to say, in the Anglo-Saxon system the welfare of the individual is the paramount consideration, whilst according to German conceptions individuals must blindly, in all things, obey the State as the representative of national civilization. It follows that Americans are unable, without sacrificing their own political ideals, to come to an understanding with the German-Americans. Americans can alone be in sympathy with those who

represent the principles for which they have stood throughout their history. They well recognize that if Germany comes out top dog from this struggle, it will be America's turn to fight an adversary such as the world never before has seen.

An analysis and extracts are given in this volume from an article by Ex-President Roosevelt, which appeared originally in the *Metropolitan* (New York) for October, 1915. It deals with the question of the hyphenated Americans and their international obligations. This article concludes with the expression of opinion that every man in America who attempts to influence the policy of his nation in a manner not in conformity with the interests of the United States of America, but in a manner to favour the interests of the nation of which his ancestors or he himself was formerly a member, is an unworthy citizen and a bad patriot, who should make haste to quit the country in which his presence is only a menace to integrity and to honour.

The last article in the volume is taken from the *New York Nation* of 28th October, 1915; in it Mr. A. G. Keller deals with Colonial Prussianism. He is of opinion that the bureaucratic methods of the Germans and the strong caste prejudices of the Prussians do not conduce to success in the administration of a Colonial Empire.

The first number is entitled *La Prospérité Économique de l'Allemagne sa Place au Soleil et la Guerre*. Its author, Monsieur Gaston Cadoux, deals first with the Pangerman dream and begins by stating that, in his opinion, the falseness of the allegations by means of which Pan-Germanists have perverted German mentality cannot be too often exposed. Economists and statisticians cannot, in his opinion, use language too strong in terms for the purpose of denouncing the lies told to the German masses concerning the imperious necessity for Germany to break, by force of arms, the political and economic ramparts by which, it was falsely alleged, she was being hemmed in by her enemies and for her to conquer fresh territory, in Europe as well as outside it, which, it was falsely urged, had become indispensable to her existence owing to the immense growth of her population.

Monsieur Cadoux has carefully examined German records and compiled statistics therefrom, which show conclusively that Germany had a very considerable place in the sun; his figures, at the same time, disclose the untruthful nature of Pangerman assertions. From the day that the Germans abandoned their old standards and adopted new ideals, the be all and end all of which became the attainment of material and utilitarian ends, Prussian influence has asserted itself throughout Germany in the system of education which came into force in the Empire. This system of education caused the growth of a sort of mystic belief in the predestination of the German race. During the past half-century the German race has been nourished on the paradoxical teachings contained in Gobineau's *Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races* and on Nietzsche's *Theory of the Superman*. Thus it is that Germans have become imbued with the mischievous ideas for which the world to-day is paying the penalty.

"In the schools and in the barracks," says M. Cadoux, "the Prussian element, essentially brutal and reactionary, has caused, in the XX.

Century, the hard dominating spirit of the Teutonic kind to come to life again after it had been crushed out. This spirit owes its re-birth to a political influence which, based on an electoral system excluding the mass of workers, has completely destroyed the democratic and humanitarian aspirations of 1848. Thus it is that the Prussians have caused the German peoples to oppose Europe by insisting that they, as an elect and superior race, were a kingly people, with the Kaiser as their prophet."

The numerical importance of the German race is next examined. Monsieur Cadoux shows that Germany has no foundation, on the basis of her population, for the claim advanced by her to supremacy in Europe. Out of a population, in 1910, of 423 millions of European extraction in Europe, the people of purely German descent numbered only 73 millions, i.e. about 17.25 per cent. of the whole. "It is hardly to be expected," says Monsieur Cadoux, "that 350 millions of human beings of other than German extraction will meekly submit to Teuton domination."

Dealing with the question of vital statistics, Monsieur Cadoux calls attention to an interesting article which appeared in 1910, in a German publication, *The Economic Forces of Germany*, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the *Dresdener Bank*. In this article the following figures represent the increases of population in the countries named below:—

	Population in 1910.	Increase between 1875 and 1910. Per cent.	Excess of Births over Deaths in 1910. Per 1,000.
Germany	64,926,000	52	13.6
Great Britain and Ireland	44,902,000	37	11.0
France	39,600,000	8	1.8

In reply to Germany's complaint that her own territories are being overcrowded and it is necessary for her to acquire new colonies in order to find room for her surplus population, Monsieur Cadoux quotes figures from the 1911 Atlas by A. L. Hickman; these figures show that the average numbers (over a period of 10 years) emigrating from European countries have been as follows:—

	Per 100,000 of Population.
Ireland	1,960
Scotland	610
England	450
Italy	700
Denmark	250
Switzerland	160
Austro-Hungary	138
Germany	94
France	22

Further, so far as Germany is concerned the same publication shows that the emigration from Germany has in recent years been decreasing rather than increasing; from 1881 to 1890, 1,362,400 Germans left Europe; from 1891 to 1900, only 530,000 left the Fatherland, whilst in 1912 the figures dropped to 18,500. At the same time, there has

also been an increase of foreigners immigrating into Germany; in 1900, 778,737 foreigners were living in that country; in 1905, 1,028,560; and in 1910, 1,259,873.

The German colonies, judging from figures published in the official *Statistical Annual of the German Empire*, do not appear to have proved very attractive to the Teuton. In the 30 years, 1884 to 1914, the total number of Germans in the German colonies had only increased by 19,108. The number of Germans in these colonies, in 1914, amounted to 23,952.

The sums deposited in the Savings Banks of a country are perhaps a truer index of the economic conditions of that country than anything else, since these sums represent, to a great extent, the accumulation of riches by the masses. How prosperous was the condition of Germany before the War is shown by the following figures relating to the Savings Bank Deposits extracted by Monsieur Cadoux from the publication, *The Economic Forces of Germany*:—Germany (in 1910) 16,780,568,000 marks; France (in 1910) 4,514,500,000 marks; Great Britain and Ireland (in 1909) 4,422,300,000 marks.

In the matter of her foreign trade also Germany had every reason to be satisfied. The relative increase of foreign trade of Germany and of her more important competitors in the 20 years, 1891 to 1911, are given by the following figures:—

Great Britain	65.9 per cent.
United States of America	69.8 per cent.
France..	105.1 per cent.
Germany	143.1 per cent.

Monsieur Cadoux's detailed examination into Germany's economic situation provides, it is thought, a volume of evidence sufficient to convict the leaders of the nation of having cynically sacrificed the welfare of the masses, not for the purpose of realizing a great national ideal, but in the material interests of a small minority of reactionary capitalists and to satisfy the unworthy vanity of this minority.

The 92nd number contains a translation of Dr. H. A. Gibbons' article dealing with the massacre of Armenians in Turkey; the title given to the volume is *Les Derniers Massacres d'Arménie*.

In a preface to this article Dr. Gibbons states that, in a war of the magnitude of the one being waged at the present time, in which the men actually fighting have come from every inhabited quarter of the globe, it is naturally too early in the day for anyone to endeavour to form a definite opinion on the thousand and one problems to which the conflict has given rise; there are, however, certain matters on which it is neither politic nor wise to suspend judgment. To this class belong the massacre of Armenians in Turkey. "The crime has," says Dr. Gibbons, "been clearly proved; the responsibility for the same can, even to-day, be definitely established; an appeal can still be made to humanity on behalf of what remains of the Armenian race dwelling within the Ottoman Empire. The crimes committed against the Armenians constitute the blackest page of modern history." Dr. Gibbons deals with this matter in four short sections. In the first section he

tells us that, in 1915, the Ottoman Government commenced to put into execution a systematic plan, carefully prepared, for the extermination of the Armenian race and that, within six months, nearly a million Armenians were massacred in cold blood. In the second section, Dr. Gibbons states that the Armenian race has never been and is not at the present time any menace to the security of Turkey. There is absolutely no justification for the accusation of disloyalty levelled against them by the Turks to explain the massacres and deportations carried out since August, 1914. In the third section, it is pointed out that the preservation of the Armenian element is absolutely indispensable in the interests of the welfare and prosperity of the Ottoman Empire. It has been proved, in the course of centuries, that Christians and Mohammedans can live together in peace and harmony in those parts of Turkey which are their common motherland. In the last section, Dr. Gibbons explains that Germany could, had she so wished, have prevented the work of extermination carried out by the Turks. She, however, preferred not to interfere; indeed, there are substantial grounds for the belief, which exists, that the German Government viewed with favour, and even encouraged, the removal of Armenians from Asia Minor in order to facilitate her own political and commercial schemes in the Ottoman Empire.

The volume concludes with a list of the sources of information drawn on by Dr. Gibbons for his article.

The 93rd number is a reproduction in French of the Second German White Book. The editors point out that the true import of parts of the German White Book cannot be appreciated without explanatory notes; in consequence, at their request Monsieur F. Passelecq, an eminent Belgian barrister, has prepared a critical analysis of the contents of the publication in question. This analysis precedes the despatches, etc., reproduced in the number of the series under review and is itself really a review of the German White Book. Monsieur Passelecq tells us that the Second German White Book was published under the direction of the German Foreign Office in March or April, 1915, under the title *Aktenstücke zum Kriegausbruch*. It was preceded by an edition not so complete as the work just referred to. The earlier edition contained German and French versions of the matters contained therein, with the titles respectively of:—*Deutsches Weissbuch, Aktenstücke zum Kriegausbruch, mit nachträglichen Ergänzungen*—*Livre Blanc, traduction autorisée, Documents sur les préliminaires de la guerre augmentés de documents nouveaux*; neither the name of the printers nor the date of issue is given. The Foreign Office edition of the German White Book contains 43 numbered despatches, etc., under 12 different headings, as follows:—

1. Memorandum laid before Reichstag on 3rd August, 1914.
2. Austro-Hungary and Serbia.
3. Extracts from German diplomatic correspondence.
4. A Belgian diplomat on the efforts made by Germany to avert war.
5. Exchange of views between Germany and Great Britain.
6. Interviews of Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey.
7. Extracts from the history of the period preceding the War.

8. Documents found at Brussels, I.
9. Documents found at Brussels, II.
10. British espionage at Brussels.
11. Fresh documents relating to the violation of neutrality by Great Britain.
12. Documents found at the residence of Grant Wilson, Secretary to the British Legation.

A translation of the great majority of the documents which appear in the German White Book have already been published in Number 25 of the *Pages d'Histoire* series (*vide R.E. Journal* for June, 1915), and these are therefore not included in the volume now under review.

Monsieur Passelecq's analysis is extremely interesting and very complete. He points out that a common distinguishing mark of German official publications is that they are incomplete and intentionally so. Of all the official publications issued by belligerents the Germans are the greatest sinners as regards the omission, etc., of important documents; they appear to have carefully excluded everything in the nature of evidence likely to destroy their case. Monsieur Passelecq is not satisfied with generalizing on this matter, but gives specific instances to support his statement. He expresses the opinion that the true and principal reason for the publication of the Second German White Book lies in the fact that it was desired, in official quarters, to remove the painful impression created by the speech of the Imperial Chancellor, at the meeting of the Reichstag on the 4th August, 1914, when he attempted to justify the violation of Belgian neutrality in language which caused consternation throughout the German Empire, owing to its cynical frankness. Since then every effort has been made to destroy the true meaning of the terms used by the Imperial Chancellor on this occasion.

In this White Book an attempt is made by the German Government to show that at the time Belgium was complaining that her territories had been violated, she had already abdicated her position as a neutral and had surrendered herself and her sovereignty into the hands of Great Britain.

Three means are employed by the German Government to prove its case:—

1. It omits systematically to disclose to the public the replies made by Belgium to German demands and to the official accusations of Germany.

2. It makes public a *dossier* made up of documents found at Brussels in which the question of the invasion of Belgium is dealt with; these documents are *fortified* by *translations* and notes which have been subject to *skilful* (!) editing.

3. It completely distorts parts of the text of the documents published.

Monsieur Passelecq states that he does not intend to discuss the question of the violation of Belgian neutrality; the subject has been amply discussed, among others in the following publications:—

De la Violation de la neutralité belge, by J. Van den Heuvel (Le Correspondant of 10th December, 1914), *La Belgique neutre et loyale* by E. Maxweiler, *La Violation de la neutralité de la Belgique*, by P. Hymans

(No. 20, *Pages d'Histoire* series), *L'Allemagne avant la guerre : les causes et les responsabilités*, by Baron Beyens, *La Neutralité belge*, by H. Welschinger, *La Violation de la neutralité belge et luxembourgeoise par l'Allemagne*, by André Weiss.

It is pointed out by Monsieur Passelecq that the neutrality of Belgium was not *one of election*, but an *imposed neutrality*. Belgium, therefore, had no liberty of action; on receiving the German ultimatum she was bound to appeal to the other guarantors of her neutrality for protection, and she did so.

Cases of omission, falsification and mistranslation are fully dealt with by Monsieur Passelecq, with the aid of photographic reproductions. One of the most glaring attempts at deception practised by German officialdom was the substitution of the word *convention* for *conversation* appearing in a minute prepared by General Ducarne in relation to a discussion which he had with Colonel Barnardiston on the subject of a possible invasion of Belgium by Germany. This substitution of one word for another in the minute in question was made the basis of an allegation that a Secret Treaty of Alliance had been entered into between Great Britain and Belgium published broadcast in a pamphlet printed in German and French—labelled *Kriegs-chronik* on one side and *Journal de la Guerre* on the other. When this fraud was exposed, a second edition of the above pamphlet was published with certain corrections, in order no doubt that this edition could be produced to deny the truth of the charge as to substitution of words, mistranslations, etc. The bad faith of the German Government is shown by the fact that nothing was done to call attention to the corrections made, which could only be discovered by a careful comparison of the two editions, followed by an enquiry as to the necessity of the alterations.

A study of Monsieur Passelecq's analysis in the original will well repay the time spent on it.

This number concludes with an appendix containing articles from various sources collected by the editor of this number of the series in order to add to the completeness of the volume. These articles contain an extract from the Imperial Chancellor's speech at the Meeting of the Reichstag on the 2nd December, 1914; an extract from the *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of 28th August, 1915; an extract from a German-Swiss newspaper dealing with the purport of the "Barnardiston documents"; an extract dealing with the reasons which prompted the Belgian General Staff and the British Military Attaché to study the problem of the German invasion of Belgium; General Bernhardt's views on the violation of Belgian neutrality and the French plan of concentration; the defence of Belgian neutrality, and the causes which determined Belgium to act as she did.

The 94th number is a diary of the War, and covers the period 1st July to 31st December, 1915.

The 95th number is entitled *Voix de l'Amérique Latine*. Gomez Carrillo deals with *The German Peril in Latin America* in a preface to this volume. This preface opens with a cutting sent to Mr. Carrillo by a friend who occupies a very prominent position in the Argentine

Republic. This cutting reads: "In the *Daily Mail* one reads that at a luncheon given at the Travellers' Club, at New York, to Mr. Alfred Noyes, he showed his hosts an atlas recently published in Germany, in which large tracts of territory in South America belonging to Brazil and to the Argentine Republic are coolly represented as being German colonies." It would appear that many other publications of the sort referred to in the *Daily Mail* have found their way to South America, but prior to the War no importance was attached to them. The War has, however, opened the eyes of the peoples of the South American Republics and some of them have begun to make enquiries as to the chances of the continuance of the independence of these Republics should Germany triumph over the combination of powers battling against her efforts to dominate Europe.

Mr. Carrillo tells us that so far as he is personally concerned he could never have believed that any European Power would have had the madness to dream of converting the Argentine, Uruguay and Chili into colonies were it not for the documentary evidence showing how real the peril of such a catastrophe had been owing to the designs of Pan-Germanists. He points out that from the time of the appearance, in 1903, of Wilhelm Sievers' work *Süd-Amerika und die deutschen Interessen* up to the outbreak of the War no year has passed without the appearance of some works dealing with German aims in South America. The earlier works speak of German influence only, but the authors of the later works do not hesitate to write openly regarding the German desire for the acquisition of new colonies in the New World. An extract is given from the preface of Sievers' work in which no room is left for doubt as to the aims of Germany; he openly advocates a German alliance with Russia—"who has," says Sievers, "no interests in South America"—in order that the United States of America should be held in check and the commercial competition of Great Britain defeated. Attention is also called to Rienner's *Ein pangermanische Deutschland*, in which its author boldly claims that South Americans would welcome the assistance of German power and capital as a material and moral force wherewith to combat their natural enemy, the United States of America.

The most significant and striking statement dealing with Pangerman aims, it is pointed out, is that contained in Friedrich Danger's *Reines Deutschtum*. This work contains the following advice:—"A policy that is far-seeing should provide for the employment of adequate means for directing emigration in such a manner that the vital interests of individuals may conform to those of the State. Such a policy is one where, by the resolute application of the forces to hand, the necessary Treaties can be negotiated with other States on such terms that emigrants shall be received on a footing which corresponds with the views of our Government. States divided internally, such as the Argentine Republic, Brazil, and, more or less, nearly all those miserable republics of South America, should be induced by honeyed words or by force to give attention to very significant hints."

Gomez Carrillo does not hold the German nation as a whole responsible for the extravagant ideas of Germans which he exposes. But, he tells us, his Latin soul naturally makes him a fanatical admirer of

the culture which is the incarnation of France and causes him to pray unceasingly for the triumph of the Allies.

This volume contains 25 articles contributed by leading citizens of the various South American Republics. The perusal of these articles creates but one impression on the mind and that is that the majority of the residents in the Southern Continent of the New World are strongly in sympathy with the cause of the Western Entente Powers and are keenly alive to the peril in which they would be placed did the Central Powers emerge victorious from the present conflict.

The 96th number is entitled *Problèmes de Guerre*; it contains two papers read by Professor Alglave at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, Paris. The first of these papers is entitled *Le Droit de la Guerre autrefois et aujourd'hui* and was read on the 21st December, 1914; in it Professor Alglave deals with the customs and laws of war in remote ages and traces the changes which have taken place in these customs and laws since the dawn of civilization up to recent times. He points out that it has been due, at times, to utilitarian reasons, at others, to philosophical reasons that the evolution in the customs and laws of war that we see have taken place. In the 18th century there took place a change analogous to that which was introduced 18 centuries earlier under the influence of Christianity and stoicism. The author of this new policy was Jean Jacques Rousseau, a Frenchman resident in Geneva; he was the creator of the main principles which have been incorporated into the code of ethics accepted by civilized societies in modern times. Rousseau's creed is based on the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people; the Germans have never accepted this doctrine.

Rousseau held the view that: "When two peoples are in conflict with one another, the two States to which they belong are at war, but not the individuals composing those States. The two States constitute entities, bodies completely distinct from the individuals composing them." These views were a complete negation of the former ideas on the subject.

Later Kant, the German philosopher, propounded similar views, but his views do not prevail in the modern Germany of to-day.

Professor Alglave deals next with the atrocities committed by German soldiers in the course of the present War. With the progress of time has come yet another change in the customs and laws of war, which unfortunately shows a retrogression in manners on the part of one of the groups of belligerents. He concludes in the following terms: "The German desires that all citizens shall be the slaves of the State; we ourselves desire that citizens, even during a war, shall be free, representatives of liberal ideas and not instruments of the drill-sergeant and of militarism."

The second paper is entitled *Comment on paie en temps de guerre* and was read on the 21st January, 1915. The subject is subdivided into three sections: Individuals, the State, the Nation.

The Professor deals in this paper with the measures adopted on the outbreak of war to overcome difficulties in connection with the stringency of markets owing to the withdrawal of metallic coinage from circulation, to the liquidation of running accounts, to the impossibility of

completing contracts ; he touches upon the loans raised and other expedients adopted to provide funds for the conduct of the War, the measures taken to prevent violent fluctuations in the rates of exchange, to reduce the depreciation in the value of securities representing the public funds. Individuals as well as States have been obliged during the War to live to a great extent on credit. The question is who shall eventually pay the cost of the War ; there may be some who may have made up their minds on this subject. If there be any such among the readers of the *R.E. Journal*, they should ponder over the following remark of a German professor :—" But ourselves also, we are determined to fight to the bitter end. It is not alone a question of hegemony ; the very existence of Germany as a great Power is at stake. We will spend our last farthing, expend the blood of our last soldier, and if we are beaten, you will have to deal with a nation with empty coffers, incapable of paying you the smallest sum, in fact with a completely bankrupt nation." Professor Alglave expresses the opinion that the above is an exaggerated view as to the situation which will exist when peace reigns once more.

The 98th number is entitled *La Guerre Aérienne* ; it deals briefly with the rôle of the Fifth Arm and is provided with 24 illustrations of aeroplanes, etc., and a sketch-map showing the places attacked by British and French aviators. The contents of the volume are divided into seven short chapters headed : History of Aviation ; Aviation in the Armies of the Various Belligerent Powers ; Rôle of Aeroplanes ; Explosives and Missiles used by Aeroplanes ; Attack of Aircraft by Gun-fire ; Exploits of our Aviators and those of the Allies ; Fight for the Supremacy of the Air.

The 99th number is entitled *La Conquête de l'Autriche-Hongrie par l'Allemagne* ; it has the following sub-title :—*Une Nouvelle Forme du Pangermanisme le "Zollverein."* Monsieur Adrien Bertrand, the author of the volume, discusses the subject in eight short sections ; in the first of these he deals with the "German plan." Germany is, he tells us, in the act of completing her conquest of Austria-Hungary. It is for possession of the heritage of the Hapsburgs that Prussian and Bavarian troops have painted red the banks of the Marne, the Yser and the Meuse, and that they have also sown the wide plains of Poland with the bones of their companions-in-arms.

It is said to be a fact that the German Emperor reigns in Austria-Hungary to-day ; the domination of the Dual Monarchy is what he hopes to gain from the conflagration which he has started. These designs cannot be proclaimed openly but are being pursued under cover of a proposal that the two Teutonic Powers of Central Europe shall establish closer internal relations by entering into a Customs Union ; that is to say, a *Zollverein*, it is thought, will bring about the realization of the Kaiser's dream. The creation of a Central European Empire, the *Mittel-Europa* of Pangerman visions, is a proposal which the German Emperor has only in very recent years been in a strong enough position to discuss with the Austrian Emperor ; it originated with the *Weltpolitik* of William II., which had its birth after Bismarck's fall. This *Weltpolitik* was really founded on the *Deutsche Politik* of the Iron Chancellor. Pan-Germanists have been foiled in their ambitions

regarding territorial aggrandisement owing to the difficulty experienced in crushing the Western European Powers and Russia; in revenge they have adopted the *Zollverein* as the watchword of a new policy. It is for the Entente Powers to see to it that this policy has as little chance of success as the *Weltpolitik* it is intended temporarily to replace.

The second section of the volume deals with the Pact of Konopicht. Monsieur Bertrand recalls the meeting between William II. and the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the latter's home at Konopicht, in Bohemia, on the 12th June, 1914. It was on this occasion that, it is thought, an agreement was come to regarding the great European War which was to result in the rearrangement of frontiers in Europe. The Kaiser was in a strong position in negotiating with the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand. On contracting his morganatic marriage with the House of Chotek, the late Archduke had necessarily to renounce the succession to the Austrian Crown on behalf of the issue of this marriage. He, however, seems to have cherished the idea of repudiating this renunciation should a favourable opportunity occur; it is of this situation that William II. is said to have taken advantage.

At the meeting in question William II. succeeded, under the guise of a Customs Union, in laying the foundation of the Central European Empire and of paving the way to the hegemony of his House.

The origin of the War, Monsieur Bertrand points out, is clearly indicated in Mr. H. W. Steed's article which appeared in the *Nineteenth Century and After* for February, 1916; extracts are given from this article. In brief, Mr. Steed, it may be remembered, tells us that the Austro-German plan consisted in provoking Russia to extremes. Austria and Germany hoped at the same time to reduce France to impotence straight away and had little doubt but that Great Britain would remain a passive spectator during these proceedings. Had the plans formulated at Konopicht not miscarried, the intention was, it is said, to divide the Austro-Hungarian monarchy into three parts, as follows:—

1. A newly-constituted Kingdom of Poland stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea was to have the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand as its first king; his eldest son, Maximilian Charles was named as his successor to the Crown of this Kingdom.

2. Hungary, with which was to be incorporated Bohemia, Serbia, Bosnia and the Croatian and the Slav countries in the south, was to form a second kingdom; Prince Ernest, the murdered Archduke's second son, was nominated king of these territories.

3. The remainder of Austria was to constitute a third kingdom; the Archduke Charles Francis Joseph—the present Emperor of Austria—it was intended should remain the heir presumptive to this residue of the dismembered Dual Monarchy.

This newly-constituted kingdom of Austria was eventually to enter the folds of the German Empire as a Confederate State, in order to form a greater Germany.

Lastly, to complete the new organization in Middle Europe a military and economic alliance, on a narrow and perpetual basis, was to be formed, of which alliance Greater Germany, the reconstituted Kingdom of Poland and the new Bohemian-Hungarian-Slav Kingdom were to

be members. These were to be the partners of the *Zollverein* of the XX. Century.

This Teutonic Alliance was intended to act as the arbiter of the destinies of Europe ; it was to dominate the Balkans and thus to control the route to the east. Count Tisza was very probably aware of the Pact of Konopicht. It is said that " After the assassination of the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand, his private papers at his Bohemian home were seized by an Imperial Commission. On learning at Kiel of the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne, William II. exclaimed that it was necessary to commence afresh his negotiations in relation to the Austrian situation. No time was lost in taking steps to hurry matters forward. Tisza was ready. War broke out."

William II. was, it is said, bent on war ; he was convinced that over-production in the industrial world of Germany made war a necessity. Germany had been working towards war for half a century. Austria-Hungary was also ready. The Krupp house controlled the Skoda factories ; Austria had the best heavy artillery in the world. Tisza, aided by his accomplice, Count Forgatch, prepared the way for a stroke of the Bismarckian order which must unfailingly lead to a conflict of arms.

The third section deals with the problem of the Central European Empire, the "*Mittleuropa*" of Pangerman dreams. The deep-laid designs of William II. having miscarried, owing to the victories on the Marne and the Yser and to the fact that Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy are standing shoulder to shoulder, Germany cannot at once expand at the expense of her enemies. She, however, hopes to do so at expense of friends ; hence, the idea of a Customs Union. The Customs Union, nevertheless, still involves the hegemony of Germany. It is said that there will be no opposition to such an Union on the part of the Austrians, with whom William II. is a greater favourite than was the late Emperor Francis Joseph. The Hungarians too are not likely to offer any strenuous opposition now that the Kaiser's troops have chased the Russians back from the Carpathians. It is the accord in the Dual Monarchy on this subject that constitutes the gravest danger for the Entente Powers. The creation of a *Zollverein* in Middle Europe cannot be prevented, all that can be done is to circumscribe the peril created by its existence. Towards this end, measures should, it is urged, be adopted to restrict the extent of territory which Germany desires to bring into this combination. Put in other words, in the Kaiser's latest proposal the problem connected with the dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy and the building up of a new confederation on its remains reappears in a somewhat different guise. If William II. should decide to annex Austria and Hungary, the Entente Powers, it is said, can do nothing to prevent this being carried out so long as Austria and Hungary aid and abet in its accomplishment. Austria and Hungary are the nebulae round which is to grow the *Mittel-europa* of the States to be freed from the yoke of the Entente Powers.

An Austria-Hungary, diminished by the Trentino, the provinces of Istria and of Dalmatia (become Italian), Bosnia and Croatia, the Roumanian regions of Banat, Transylvania and Bukowina, Poland (constituted an independent State), and Bohemia would not, in federation with

Germany, form a Power so formidable as to give the Latin and Slav Powers in alliance any serious alarm. "Germany's whole interest," says Monsieur Bertrand, "is then to maintain in its integrity the hold of the Teutonic Powers on all that is contained in the present Dual Monarchy, in order to annex its subject peoples to the Central European Empire of Pangerman visions. The whole interest of the Entente Powers is to effect the liberation, by their arms and in the cause of the eternal principle of nationalities, of the down-trodden peoples on the fringes of the Dual Monarchy."

Political union of the Teuton Powers would assuredly follow their entry into a Customs Union, and thus would be realized in a practical form the dogmas of the *Welthandel*—world commerce—directly issuing from the *Weltpolitik*. It is said that the journey made by William II. to Vienna, in December, 1915, was for the purpose of discussing with the late Emperor Francis Joseph his altered plans consequent on the impossibility of obtaining fulfilment of the engagements in the Pact of Konopicht. The outcome of this meeting was that progress was made both in relation to the *Zollverein* question and the problem of Poland.

The success of the Kaiser's generals, about the period under discussion, in liberating Galicia and in crushing Serbia led Austria to think that her own ambitions had been realized, the objects of the War attained. William II. magnanimously offered to hand over Russian Poland to Austria, but Prussian Poland was to remain, as formerly, a part of the German Empire. But Hungary has been quick to recognize that the substitution of a Triple Monarchy for a Dual Monarchy will weaken and not strengthen the position of the Emperor-King. However, Hungary, with a population equal to that of Austria and richer in possibilities, stands to gain by this arrangement; she would become the predominant partner of the Triple Monarchy. Austrian Poles would, it is said, be satisfied with such a solution of the problem; they have enjoyed considerable political liberty under the Hapsburgs.

At first, the latest plans of William II. did not please his own people; but the idea of a *Zollverein* has now been made acceptable to them. The inauguration, when peace reigns once more, of such a Union would be but a step towards the adjustment of the whole situation to Germany's advantage; Dr. Helfferich will be able, it is expected, to complete the work of Field Marshal Mackensen.

The realization of Germany's latest schemes would eventually place at the disposal of William II. and his shipping magnates ports of the greatest strategic and commercial importance. Hence the necessity on the part of the Entente Powers for defeating the latest Pangerman scheme.

In the fourth section, Monsieur Bertrand calls attention to the reply made by the Imperial Chancellor to the interpellation by the social democrats at a recent meeting of the Reichstag, and particularly to the following remark made by him:—"A solid bridge has been thrown between the Central Empires which are now indissolubly united. When peace reigns once more, this bridge will no longer be required for the use of battalions on the march; it will instead serve the purposes of works of peace and of civilization."

Although no one in Vienna appears to have raised any protest against the above proposal for a close economic union between Germany and Austria, it was otherwise in Hungary. Count Andrassy, leader of the opposition in the Hungarian Parliament, did not hesitate openly to declare that Hungary was not willing to accept Germany as her feudal lord. He has summed up the situation in the following terms:—"The military and diplomatic independence of Austria-Hungary is dead. We are minors placed under the tutelage of Germany. A twelvemonth ago we lost the right to have a diplomacy of our own and an independent army; Germany dictates what we must do." These protests have been of little avail. There is still a show of resistance in Hungary to German demands, and the accomplices of William II. have to exercise caution in openly acceding to his wish that Austria-Hungary should accept the supremacy of the Hohenzollerns by entering into an immense Germanic Confederation, the capital of which is to be located in Berlin. William II. seems to have been successful in inducing the late Emperor Francis Joseph to dismiss officials in high positions who were opposing the former's schemes.

The fifth section discusses the Pangerman doctrine concerning the *Zollverein*. The Pan-Germans point out that Great Britain, the United States of America and Russia between them control 55 per cent. of the surface of the globe and can by erecting tariff barriers completely crush the States of Central Europe; it is to meet such a contingency, they argue, that the *Zollverein* has become necessary.

In the sixth section is traced the development of German plans from the time of the inauguration of Bismarck's *Deutsche Politik*; his formula being, "Prussia to rule Germany and Germany Central Europe." The first part of this programme was realized; since 1871 Prussia has been supreme in Germany. William II. followed with his *Weltpolitik*; his formula being: "Germany to rule Central Europe and Germanized Central Europe the world." The world now awaits the decision as to its final destiny.

In the seventh section the subject is further pursued and William II.'s *Weltpolitik* and the scheme for the commercial domination of the world are investigated.

Monsieur Bertrand examines the enormous growth in Germany's mercantile fleet. The following comparative figures are given:—

	1871.	1891.	1914.
Number of steamships	2,437	2,412	4,000
Total tonnage of ditto	532,000	1,000,000	3,000,000
Number of seamen employed	21,000	29,000	80,000

It may be remembered that it was in 1900 that William II. proclaimed his new naval policy: "*Unsere Zukunft liegt auf dem Wasser.*" (Our future lies on the water). This policy has already borne fruit and before the present War broke out the Germanic States had become the universal providers of the world. In the 44 years elapsing since the Franco-German War the imports of Germany had more than trebled and her exports had nearly quintupled. Had the Kaiser had but a little

patience in a few years more the conquest of the world would have been completed for him by the pacific infiltration of his people and the Germanization of the commercial and industrial undertakings in all civilized lands. But Germany was in a hurry to acquire commercial ports, such as Amsterdam, Liverpool and Antwerp, and a war was the only means of speeding up the attainment of this end.

In the last and eighth section, Monsieur Bertrand points out that economic reasons connected with over-production beyond the Rhine are the cause of the present War. Germany's hopes are now turned to the question of founding a *Zollverein* which will allow her to become rich and eventually to dominate the world.

The Entente Powers, on the other hand, are bent on liberating the peoples of small nationalities oppressed by their powerful governors. Their hopes are centred in the restoration to Italy of regions, under Austrian rule, inhabited by peoples of the Italian race; the creation of a southern Slav kingdom, with Serbia as a nucleus; the liberation of Roumanians now under the yoke of Hungary and their annexation to their motherland; the reconstitution of a kingdom of Poland; the liberation of the Czechs of Bohemia and of Moravia from the yoke of Austria and the creation of a new kingdom wherein these people may enjoy a national life to their liking. "We have made war," says Monsieur Bertrand, "on behalf of the principle of nationalities. Do not let us forget it; with this is bound up our pride, our strength and our interest."

The 100th number contains the diplomatic correspondence which appeared in the Second Belgian Grey Book. It covers the period 22nd February, 1914, to 6th April, 1915. There are 123 despatches in this number, many of them having Appendices attached to them.

The volume is divided into two parts; the first part is headed "Diplomatic Correspondence relative to the War of 1914—1916," and the second part "Protests of the Belgian Government on the Subject of the Infractions of the Customs of War and notably of the Hague Conventions." The despatches in the first part of the volume deal, *inter alia*, with the intrigue carried on by Germany with a view to ousting Belgium from the Congo region, the representations made by the Belgian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna to the Foreign Office at Brussels in relation to Austro-Serbian affairs, the final experiences of these two gentlemen before quitting, on the declaration of war, the countries to which they had been accredited; the German ultimatum to Belgium and the spirited reply made by Baron Beyens, the Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, to Herr von Jagow when the latter informed him of the demand which was being made on the former's sovereign; the German intrigue at Constantinople which drew Turkey into the War, etc.

In the second part are set out the various protests and representations made by the Belgian Government in respect of the German accusations against the civil population of Belgium; the illegal seizure of the funds in the Belgian banks; the bombardment of Antwerp by Zeppelins; the use of dum-dum bullets by German troops; the German accusation that Belgium had entered into a treaty with Great Britain in conflict with her obligation to maintain neutrality, etc.

NOTICE OF MAGAZINE.

REVUE MILITAIRE SUISSE.

No. 12.—December, 1916.

EDITORIAL NOTICE.

The editors of the *Revue* call attention to the fact that during the past twelve months they have experienced considerable difficulty in conducting their journal. They announce their intention to spare no pains to ensure the success of the issues of the current year and further that the scope of the *Revue* is to be widened.

The preponderating influence played by inventions in the technical domain during the present War is now fully recognized by everybody; the editors propose to give the readers of the *Revue* an opportunity of following the developments in the field of invention affecting armies.

The applications of features borrowed from naval science to land warfare is another important fact which has issued from the present War; events of the world-wide conflict now raging cannot be properly appreciated without an understanding of the developments in this field. This also is a matter to which attention will be devoted by the editors.

It is further hoped to continue, as far as it is possible, to place at the disposal of the readers of the *Revue* the experiences gained in the present War by those serving with the armies of the present belligerent groups.

Lastly, the editors intend to publish in the pages of the *Revue* information concerning the events of the War and to offer criticisms thereon, when necessary, in order that the lessons to be deduced from the operations may be placed clearly before the readers of the *Revue*.

It is proposed, more particularly for the benefit of junior officers, to issue a *Historical Supplement* in parts; the first part will be published with the number for February next. The Military Society of the Canton of Geneva will take part in the publication of this *Supplement* and bear a share of the cost of production. This *Supplement* will deal with problems connected with the mobilization and manning of the Swiss frontiers during the Franco-German War of 1870-71; it was written by the late Colonel Galiffe and is based on official records.

THE PART PLAYED BY THE FRENCH-SWISS IN THE MILITARY HISTORY OF SWITZERLAND.

The Heroic Epoch: From the Battle of St. Jacques to the Burgundian Wars.

The writer of the *Revue* article points out that the French-Swiss have played a relatively important, but little known, part during the early years of the foundation of the Swiss Confederation in its military institutions and have thereby contributed their share to its development.

Although many *Welches*, i.e., French-Swiss, believe that to the German-Swiss alone is due the whole of the glory attaching to the successes of the Swiss Armies in the period prior to the 19th century, yet the fact remains that since the 15th century the contingents formed for the Swiss Army by the French-Swiss have exceeded in numbers those formed by the German-Swiss. The *Welches* can truly claim to have contributed their share to the sacrifices on the field of battle by which Swiss unity has been won. The idea that the "Romand" legions of the Helvetic Republic were the last to become Swiss is founded on an error; it has been overlooked by those not familiar with Swiss history that although the "Romand" legions only joined the Confederation as *Cantons* in the 19th century, yet they had been Swiss for many centuries earlier.

Thus the year 1803, for example, marks but a stage in the historical development of the Pays du Vaud; it must not be assumed that, prior to the year named, the people of the Vaud were looked upon as foreigners in the eyes of the Swiss. Nor can it be assumed that the Canton of Ticino suddenly came into existence from nothing. The bailiwicks of the Leventine, of Bellinzona, of Val Maggia, of Locarno, of Lugano had already been successively taken by the Swiss from the Dukes of Milan at various dates since the end of the 14th century and had for a long time prior to 1803 formed a part of the Helvetic Group. Finally, in the year last named, this region took its place in the Confederation as a *Canton* with sovereign rights.

The Valais, Neuchatel and Geneva, in which an ancient friendship for and a long-established alliance with the Cantons had existed, owing to a community of secular interests and to unity of sentiments, had since 1307, 1406 and 1519 respectively participated in the good fortunes and the bad of their allies. The year 1815 represents to them the date on which they merely put on a permanent footing a condition of affairs of old standing by renewing a pact of old date on a basis more irrevocable than formerly had been the case: it was with them not a case of entering into partnership with a new and unfamiliar State.

The author of the *Revue* article relates briefly the incident connected with the march, in August, 1444, of an infantry detachment belonging to Neuchatel, under Albert Tissot, to the banks of the Birse where it arrived on the scene in time to take part in the Battle of St. Jacques on the 26th August, 1444.

The early "Romand" friends of the Helvetic League are next passed in review and a brief account is given of the military assistance that they afforded to the Confederate troops. We are also told that the first of the Italian regions to join the Helvetic League were the Leventine, Bellinzona and Domo D'Ossola.

The bonds which tied the sparsely-populated regions of the Jura bordering the Lake of Geneva and of the head waters of the Ticino to the Swiss were indeed slight, and ill-defined, except when it became a question of military aid. The *Helvetie Romande* for a long time played a subordinate or intermittent rôle by the side of the Cantons possessing sovereign rights. The *Welches*, however, were fully inspired with the hope of founding the new *liberté suisse*.

The towns and the *seigneurs* of the *Pays romand* wisely placed them-

selves under the protection of republics which were sufficiently strong to cause the most powerful monarchs in Europe to treat them with respect. Being thus allied to or subjects of important leagues, whilst only under slight obligations to them, nevertheless they were able with impunity to defy the Empire, the King of France and the House of Savoy, whenever the authority of the princes became irksome. The Communes, with their spirit of independence, and the nobles, with their egotistical particularism, were both able to turn the situation to their advantage.

The Burgundian Wars were the prelude to the definite conquest of the Pays du Vaud by the Swiss. The sons of the *Helvetie romande* were at this time found in both camps and were being kicked on all sides. During the four years of war, 1474—1477, the Swiss, faithful to their belief in the offensive, threw their armies into the neighbouring countries from the plains of Alsace to the shores of the Lake of Geneva, in Savoy and in Franche-Comté, their blows followed in rapid succession until the *coup de grâce* was given to Nancy, a *coup* which humbled the most powerful prince of this epoch. Numerous contingents from Latin Switzerland took part in this struggle under the banners of the Cantons or of their allies. It is estimated that 8,000 out of the 60,000 men fighting under the Confederate banner against the Burgundians belonged to the contingents from Latin Switzerland.

France obtained the greater share of the profit from the Burgundian Wars. Louis XI., who was responsible for starting this conflict, by drawing the Swiss into it, was able to hold forces in reserve in his own hands until the power of Charles the Bold was broken. Having got rid of his powerful enemy, he plucked away, without having himself drawn the sword, the fruits of victory from the Confederates; the Duchy of Burgundy was annexed to the French Crown. The astute Louis XI. succeeded in preventing Franche-Comté from joining the Helvetic Confederation, as it desired to do.

The Swiss only gained a few towns and *seigneuries* in Savoy by this war, but they won military renown which gave them a great reputation throughout Europe. The Peace of Friburg, which ended the war, left the *Helvetie Romande* maimed and divided against itself. The people of the Vaud were, however, quickly reconciled. When peace was signed, in 1477, Aigle and Vaudois Chablais refused to rejoin Savoy and demanded to be allowed to remain Bernese. The fact is that the House of Savoy had lost its prestige owing to the incapacity exhibited by its failure to defend the country on which it had brought the calamity of a war.

Since the Treaty of Friburg the sons of the *Suisse romande* have continued, century by century, to grow more numerous than those of the *Suisse alémanique*.

THE ITALIAN WARS.

The Suisse Romande at Marignan. Conquest of the Pays de Vaud.

During the 60 years which elapsed between the Burgundian Wars and the definite and complete conquest of the Pays du Vaud by the Bernese, the *Helvetie romande* was more and more drawn, by the Swiss, into the

incessant wars in which the Confederation became involved with its neighbours.

The Cantons, then at the zenith of their power, proud of their strength, arbiters of the fate of nations, allies of the King of France, of the King of Hungary, of the Dukes of Milan, of Savoy and of Wurtemberg, Protectors of the Holy See, possessed an army which was remarkably well organized and disciplined, considering the times. Compulsory military service gave them the advantage of enabling them to put 80,000 infantry of the best in Europe, into the fighting line. In the interval between two national wars, after having defeated the Duke of Burgundy, the Emperor of Germany and the Duke of Milan, since peace had become an expensive luxury to a people in arms, the Cantons sent their soldiers forth to fight the battles of foreigners.

The *Welches* contingents followed, with others, the fortunes of Charles VIII. of France at the Conquest of Naples (1494); the men of Leventine, an Italian speaking people, fought stubbornly against the Italians at Giornico. Then came the terrible and cruel Suabian War, which shattered, in 1499, the last links binding the Swiss Leagues to the Empire.

The Italian Wars of 1500 to 1515 followed; at first against France, and then against France and the Papal Power. Summer and winter, the passes of the Alps were choked with troops on the march towards the south, towards the Promised Land. The *Welches*, whether allies or subjects of the Cantons, did not fail to respond to the call to arms. The conquest of the present Canton of Ticino took place at this period, followed by that of the whole of Lombardy. Among the indomitable bands which brought about the fall, within six weeks, of all the Milanese fortresses were to be found the men of Neuchatel, of the Juras, of the Valais, of Friburg and of Vaud. They marched under the orders of Baron Ulrich, of Hohensax, the first Swiss General to be nominated to a Command by the Diet; they entered Milan with him, on the 29th December, 1512, in company with the pikemen of the ancient Cantons. The following year they appeared, at Novara, fighting under the banner of the White Cross; prodigies of valour were witnessed at this battle, a brilliant victory followed, the French being chased for a second time out of Italy. Two months later, some hundreds of French-Swiss formed a part of the 35,000 Confederates who besieged Dijon. The final trial of strength took place at Marignan. On the 13th September, 1515, 30,000 Swiss volunteers of Cardinal Schinner's contingent were drawn up in battle array on the plain of Zivido. These volunteers, since nicknamed the "*enfants perdus*," formed the advance guard of the force which fought at Marignan. They marched at a rapid pace against the enemy who were unable to resist the pressure brought against them, the enemy's cavalry was pushed back and dispersed. Two hundred pikemen who came to the assistance of this cavalry were annihilated by the "*enfants perdus*." Intoxicated by their success, in spite of the fire of 300 guns, culverines and wall pieces, the Volunteers were soon over the ditches of the parapets held by the enemy and after a violent struggle got well into their ranks, seizing many colours and seven or eight guns. The

white plumes of the "*enfants perdus*" now crowned the enemy's parapets. This was the modest but glorious rôle, says the author of the *Revue* article, that the Latin-Swiss played on the first day of Marignan. This was the prologue.

Next followed the attack of the three corps belonging to the Cantons, among them and in the centre, with those belonging to the Waldstätten, marched the contingents furnished by the ancestors of the present dwellers in the Canton of Ticino; there were present also those from the Leventine, from the Val Maggia, from Bellinzona and from Locarno.

On the following day the Volunteers, reduced to half their original strength, continued the fight, but this time what remained of the advance guard was driven back on the main body.

This battle of giants marks the end of the heroic period in Swiss history, which had commenced, in 1315, at Morgarten. The European rôle of Switzerland as a Power ended there.

The retreat from Marignan left an indelible mark on the memories of the Swiss people; beaten they may have been, but they remained so formidable a foe that the enemy did not dare to enter on a pursuit. The retreat is numbered amongst the memorable ones in the chronicles of war. Of the 16,000 Swiss, who gave ground, step by step, under the eyes of the King of France along the road from Milan, not a prisoner, not a colour, not a gun fell into the enemy's hands, but no less than 14,000 were left as corpses on the battle ground.

In 1536, the Bernese troops completed the conquest of the Pays du Vaud, begun at the period of the Burgundian Wars. These troops, who were commanded by General Hans Franz Naegeli, put an Italian corps to flight at Morges, relieved Geneva, seized the regions of Gex and of the Chablais; at the same time, in the East the troops from Valais advanced up to Evian. The Lake of Geneva became wholly Swiss, but it only remained so for a short time; its southern bank was lost 30 years later owing to the feeble diplomacy of the Cantons.

With the assistance of the Genevan Contingent the Bernese troops besieged the Château de Chillon, the last fortress of Savoy. Yverdon was the only town which resisted for any time. Finally the whole of the Pays du Vaud was incorporated into the *Corps helvétique*, but as a subject territory. Military spirit developed rapidly in the Vaud, and this region provided valuable contingents to the National Militia.

The Romands in the Service of Foreigners.

From the middle of the 16th century, the *Corps helvétique* divided and weakened by religious conflicts, without any foreign politics, bound to France by the Treaty of Alliance of 1521, lost its position of eminence; its republican institutions and its warlike traditions alone survived. Kings and princes now took advantage of the passion for arms and the adventurous spirit of the Swiss. The taking up of military service in foreign lands became a characteristic of the Swiss and increased with time; the Cantons even encouraged foreign enlistments. The soldiers from the *Suisse romande* acquired a great reputation owing to their

élan, courage and good humour; they displayed military qualities which made them, in every way, the equals of their *Confédérés alémaniques*.

The author of the *Revue* article gives many details of the actions in foreign lands in which Swiss troops have been engaged since the beginning of the 16th century. He tells us that the *Pays romand* gave many brilliant officers to the foreign armies; 160 of them were promoted to the rank of General for meritorious service in the field. The names of a large number of those who thus gained distinction are mentioned in the *Revue* article.

The *Welches* having fought, elbow to elbow, with the *Suisses alémaniques* during three centuries became infected with the solid military qualities of the latter, their reasoned courage, their tenacity, their spirit of discipline, their devotion to duty. In return they passed on to their *Confédérés* some of their enthusiasm, of their alertness, of their bravery amounting even to the rashness inborn in the *Romand*. The two races, being to some extent complementary, formed an excellent combination and produced a highly-developed type of soldier who was neither French, nor Teuton, nor Latin, nor German, but the Swiss soldier.

MESOPOTAMIA AND DARDANELLES.

The article under the above heading commenced in the November number of the *Revue* (*vide R.E. Journal* for February, 1917) is concluded in the number under review. This instalment of the article is also illustrated with sketch-maps.

If the Government of India, says the author of the *Revue* article, is responsible for the check in Mesopotamia, nevertheless, it is the British Government itself that must bear the direct responsibility for the check at the Dardanelles.

On the Continent, the British have been credited with being a cool and methodical people who leave nothing to chance. The manner in which the Dardanelles Campaign was entered upon and directed has destroyed this reputation. As for the advance on Bagdad, it is suggested that the end in view so dazzled the authorities that British troops were set in motion before the preparations for an advance were completed.

Those who are familiar with the geographical and military situation in the Dardanelles are fully aware that two methods of forcing the passage into the Sea of Marmora were open, namely, (a) by surprise, or (b) by combined sea and shore operations.

It is, says the author of the *Revue* article, difficult to fathom the intentions of the originators of the enterprise, which probably were not really clearly thought out by them in the first instance. What is known is that there was neither any attempt at surprise, nor was there a sufficient force employed.

There has been much discussion on the question as to whether a surprise *coup* would or would not have had a chance of meeting with success. Many competent to express an opinion on the subject have come to a conclusion in the negative. They may be right, but it would seem that at the time Turkey began actively to participate in military operations,

i.e., at the end of October, 1914, the defences of the Dardanelles were by no means in a very efficient condition. The communications between Turkey and Germany were precarious and no very great reinforcements in men and material were available in the latter country for employment in the Ottoman Empire. It is suggested that, in view of this situation, had a powerful squadron from the British Navy, supported by a strong landing force, made its appearance on the morrow of the declaration of war by Germany in the Dardanelles it is highly probable that it would have met with a large measure of success.

Instead of adopting this course, a futile bombardment was indulged in on the 3rd November, 1914, and then a period of inactivity followed which lasted more than three months. The reason for this inactivity, it is said, is clear. At this time both Great Britain and France wanted every man they could put in the field of operations in Flanders in order to stem the tide of the German rush on Calais.

British statesmen, the author of the *Revue* article tells us, are much wanting in knowledge of military matters, but they must be aware, he says, of the fiasco, which occurred in 1807, with which the name of Admiral Duckworth is associated. An abridged account of this incident, borrowed from the *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire* (Vol. XXVII.) by Thiers, appears in the *Revue*.

The following gives an outline of the incident in question. At the beginning of 1807 the relations between Great Britain and Turkey were on a footing similar to that in existence in the autumn of 1914, but it was France and not Germany that was, at the date in question, behind the Ottoman throne. At the instance of General Sébastian, the French Ambassador, the Porte had returned his passports to the Russian Ambassador, Russia being at that time a British ally, but the Turks hesitated to break with Great Britain. The British Ambassador demanded from the Turks the reinstatement of his Russian colleague and the expulsion of the French Ambassador. He also made it known that if his demands were not at once accepted, he would withdraw from the Golden Horn and embark on a British man-of-war; a British fleet was at this time assembled at Tenedos.

The action of the British Ambassador naturally created consternation. The fortifications guarding the Dardanelles passage had been for long neglected to a great extent and no reliance was placed on them, so that the Turks felt that the British fleet could, if it so wished, sail into the Sea of Marmora. However, in General Sébastian, the French had a very clever diplomat as well as a good soldier. He used the name of Napoleon for all that it was worth; he recourted the great Corsican's victories to the Turks, told them of his presence on the Vistula, and impressed them with the advantages that they would derive from an alliance with France. The Porte was won over and refused to accede to the British demands.

In consequence, on the 29th January, 1807, the British Ambassador quitted Constantinople and proceeded to Tenedos. The winds were not, at this date, favourable for the passage by the British fleet of the Straits from the south. But on the 19th February, Duckworth forced

the straits, with seven ships of the line, two frigates and many corvets, in spite of the Turkish fire. He disposed of a small Turkish squadron which attempted to dispute his progress at Cape Nagara, by sinking all the Turkish boats and without suffering any serious loss himself. Two days later Duckworth put in an appearance before Constantinople. However, Sébastian had put courage into the hearts of the Sultan Selim and of his ministers—they had been quite ready to surrender Constantinople to the British squadron—and advised them to resist the British demands with a view to gaining time.

There happened at this time to be some French Artillery and Engineer officers at Constantinople. Under their directions formidable batteries, armed with 300 guns, sprang up as if by the wave of the magician's wand. In the meantime, the Turkish diplomats, past masters as they were in the art of prolonging negotiations, continued to bargain with the British admiral: and by the time he realized that the Turks were playing with him much valuable time had been lost. When it was too late Duckworth discovered that he had let his opportunity slip; it was only when he saw the great number of guns trained on his ships that he realized that he had been "bluffed." At the same time, he learnt that a considerable number of guns had been mounted in the works along the Straits whilst he had been negotiating with the wily Turk. Had he now attacked Constantinople he would, says Thiers, have been guilty of an act of useless barbarism; after the bombardment he could only have run south with his squadron, in order to get through the Straits into the Mediterranean. Owing to the strengthening of the defences along this passage it was most desirable that there should be no lame ducks with this British squadron and therefore the admiral could not run the risk of his ships being crippled in an engagement at the Golden Horn. After spending eleven days in the Sea of Marmora Duckworth, on the 2nd March, 1807, weighed anchor and ran along the walls of Constantinople with decks cleared for action. Finding that this did not intimidate the Turks, who were ready to defend themselves, he sailed south and dropped anchor on arriving at the Sea of Marmora outlet into the Straits. On the following day, the wind being favourable, Duckworth again forced the Dardanelles passage in an outward direction. He succeeded in his project without the loss of a ship and with only 200 casualties. He returned to Tenedos and again cast anchor there.

Such was, says Thiers, the end of this enterprise which the insufficiency of means employed and the scruples of humanity brought to an unsuccessful termination. Disappointment was keen in Great Britain in consequence of Duckworth's failure; Napoleon, on the other hand, was extremely elated. Nothing that occurred in 1914 lends countenance to the idea that Marshal Liman von Sanders and Enver Pacha would have allowed themselves to be more easily intimidated than did General Sébastian and the Sultan Selim in 1807. Therefore nothing would have been gained in the winter of 1914 by merely forcing the Dardanelles passage had the combined British and French fleets not been accompanied by a landing force.

It would be idle, says the author of the *Revue* article, to enter upon a

discussion of the question whether, on the 3rd November, 1914, the Strait could or could not have been forced.

It was, he points out, probably not chance that brought the allied fleets to the Dardanelles on the 19th February, 1915, on the anniversary of Duckworth's success, with the object of renewing the attack. The date may have been chosen purposely, it is suggested, in order to enhance the *morale* of the allied sailors by the deeds of 108 years ago, and to create despondency in the enemy ranks.

Why the allied fleets were not accompanied by a landing force is a question which must be left for history to answer.

The operations of the allied fleets and also those in connection with the landing of the divisions of the British Expeditionary Force are touched upon in the *Revue* article.

For five weeks the allied fleets continued to pound away at the Turkish defences, defences which, during the six months since the declaration of war, the Turks had been able to strengthen and to put into good order. No progress was possible in the absence of land operations. It was not till the 25th April, 1915, that the British and French Expeditionary Forces were brought on to the scene of operations. The British Expeditionary Force consisted of a Regular Division, a Territorial Division, a Naval Division, the Australasian Corps, and some Indian troops making a total of 100,000 men, whilst the French Expeditionary Force numbered 35,000 men.

The combined British and French contingents provided quite a respectable force with which to commence operations, having regard to the restricted area which the Gallipoli Peninsula afforded for the manoeuvres of an invading army. However, in view of the strength of the Turkish positions and the facilities which existed for providing reinforcements to the Turks, the allied force cannot be considered to have been sufficiently large to defeat the Turkish force in the Peninsula and to carry out further operations against the Turkish Army should it have been possible to drive the Turks out of their positions in Gallipoli. The difficulties experienced in connection with the landing at the southern extremity of the Peninsula gave a foretaste of what was in store for the invaders. The Turks put up a stubborn resistance and between the 25th April and 5th May, 1915, the British casualties amounted to 14,000 men.

On the 5th May the British attacked along the whole of their front, but without meeting with any appreciable success. The months of May, June and July were spent in fruitless attacks and counter-attacks. By the 18th July, the British casualties amounted to 50,000, yet no military advantage was gained to compensate for this heavy loss. The Anzac Corps remained separated from the main army and was in a somewhat critical position.

On the 7th August, the British received reinforcements at Suvla Bay; the Turks estimated the strength of these reinforcements at 70,000 men. Another attack was now made by the British on the front Sari Bair-Anfarta, but met with no greater success than those which had preceded it. The Turks claim that the British loss on this occasion amounted to 30,000.

The campaign now degenerated into trench warfare, which was costly if undecisive. The entry of the Bulgarians into the fray, and the invasion of Serbia by Austro-German troops helped to clear up the situation in the Balkan Theatre.

On the 20th December, the troops which had been landed at Suvla Bay and the Anzacs were withdrawn from Gallipoli. An impression was created that it was intended to hold on to Seddul Bahr, but in the beginning of January, 1916, this point was also abandoned and all that remained of the allied effort against the Turks in the Peninsula were vast cemeteries containing the remains of their dead.

As Napoleon had done, so also did Enver Pacha experience considerable elation at the defeat of the British. On the 10th January, 1916, the latter addressed the Ottoman Parliament; extracts are given from Enver's speech on this occasion. He is reported to have said that he had been confident that Turkey's enemies would be successful neither in their land operations nor in those conducted by them on the sea. Events had proved the correctness of his anticipations. He further stated that the Turkish Army had been successful in gradually drawing against itself a force of 500,000 Anglo-French troops, and he thanked the British sincerely for having given the Turks such a splendid opportunity for helping their Allies.

The author of the *Revue* article is of opinion that Enver Pacha was boasting a little too loudly in claiming that the Turks had drawn an allied force of half a million men to Gallipoli; he is of opinion that the Anglo-French force must, however, have exceeded a quarter of a million men. The British casualties have been admitted to be 120,000 men, the French casualties were much lower: the total loss of the Allies in this theatre is put at 200,000 men, who are said to have been "sacrificed" without the attainment of any positive advantage.

German officers have stated that at one time the Turks were short of ammunition and Enver has confirmed this. Had an energetic attack been made at the opportune moment it is quite probable that the Turkish front would have been broken. Perhaps the moral effect of such a victory might have resulted in a revolution in Turkey, and a reaction in favour of the Entente Powers, but such an eventuality was so remote that grave risks were involved in basing a plan of campaign thereon.

WHAT FRANCE HAS DONE FOR HER ALLIES.

In a footnote the editors of the *Revue* point out that in a war waged by a coalition, unity in direction involves a continual exchange of resources between the Allies. Each must yield up what is a surplus and receive what is necessary to supply its deficiencies. The study of questions affecting such exchanges is as useful as that of the study of the war itself.

A few weeks after the declaration of war France was deprived of one of the most populated and richest regions of her territory: the *attaque brusquée* of the Germans through Belgium led to the loss of the greater part of the French resources in coal, iron, and steel, and at the same time

gave the Germans control of many valuable industrial enterprises in the northern and north-eastern districts of France.

The extent of what it is that France lost may, to some extent, be gathered from the following table :—

49	per cent.	of her resources in coal.
80	"	" " " " coke.
90	"	" " " " iron ore.
80	"	" " " " iron.
80	"	" " " " steel.
80	per cent.	of her metallurgical industries.

Out of 112,000 workmen employed in the metallurgical industries, she lost 60,000.

The task has had to be faced in France of reconstituting, in the first place, the means of production in articles of primary importance, in order that allied countries should be as little inconvenienced as possible by having to meet her heavy demands for necessities ; and in the second place, of converting the factories remaining in her possession into munition works and of providing additional workshops. Marvellous enterprise and energy have been shown by the French leaders and people, so that in a short time France has been able not only to meet all her own requirements, but has even come to the assistance of the armies of her Allies. The following brief *résumé* gives an outline of what she has achieved :—

Russia.—French assistance has been directed to two ends :—(1) The supply of the war material in which Russia was deficient ; (2) the increase of the output of Russian factories, by the provision of a Consulting Staff of technicians and specialists.

I. Among other war *matériel* the following have been supplied to Russia by France :—Rifles 600,000 ; rifle ammunition 300,000,000 rounds ; large quantities of machine guns and automatic pistols ; many millions of hand grenades ; millions of rounds of fixed ammunition for field guns ; over 100 90 mm. guns, more than 100 tubes for the Russian 3-in. guns ; many hundreds of heavy guns and mortars ; hundreds of aeroplanes, and thousands of motors for same ; 1,600 motor wagons, and 100 motor buses. The monthly consignments of war material from France to Russia has equalled in weight nearly 16,000 tons and has exceeded 706,000 cubic ft. in measurement.

II. The French Government have also sent patterns and specifications in large quantities to Russia, in order to enable artillery, rifles, etc., to be manufactured in the Russian workshops. Russian engineers have also been given special facilities to visit workshops in France and to acquaint themselves with the processes which they have wished to study. Several missions of French engineers and contractors have visited Russia, the most important of them being the one which was sent under the direction of Lieut.-Colonel Pyot in connection with the manufacture in Russia of projectiles and explosives.

Italy.—The assistance given by France to Italy has been in relation

principally to the supply of essential products, armaments and transport.

I. Italy as is well known, has no coal mines. In ordinary times she looked to Great Britain for the coal required for her factories and railways. Maritime freights, however, have increased so enormously that France has had to help Italy out by supplying her with coal. France has also supplied Italy with special grades of steel. A mission of French specialists has visited Italy in order to start the manufacture of these special grades of steel in that country.

II. In addition to ammunition for heavy artillery France has furnished large quantities of ammunition for the "75" field pieces; more than 100 mortars; more than 600,000 hand grenades; more than 500,000 helmets; 40,000 sap shields; hundreds of tons of aluminium and chemicals; large quantities of aeroplanes and parts for same.

III. France has also helped the Italian railways by lending trucks, etc.

Serbia.—The main directions in which France has helped Serbia is in the matter of transport and the reconstitution of her army.

From the end of 1914 up to the evacuation of Serbian territory France furnished 2,000 rounds daily for the Serbian "75" guns.

When the Serbian Army arrived on the Albanian coast, it was France that provided the transports to carry the remnants of this army, consisting of 150,000 men and 10,000 animals, to Corfu; the transfer was carried out, in January, 1916, in perfect order and without the loss of a man, in spite of the presence of hostile submarines.

It was the French medical mission that provided for the welfare of the Serbian sick and wounded during the retreat of the Serbian Army through Albania and looked after them in the temporary hospitals formed at Corfu.

Further the French Government has sent a military mission, which was at first under General Mondesir and later under Colonel Douchy, to assist the Serbian General Staff in reorganizing the Serbian Army. Both France and Great Britain have provided the necessary equipment, stores, etc., to enable the Serbs to take the field again. At the end of June, 1916, that is six months after its arrival in Corfu, the Serbian Army had been transported to and assembled in Chalcidice fit and ready to take the field again. Some idea of the magnitude of these transport operations may be gathered from the following data:—150,000 men, 40,000 horses and 5,500 vehicles of all sorts and some 5,000 tons of stores were transported from Corfu, Bizerta, and the ports of France to Salonika, involving 76 journeys on the part of the flotilla employed; this flotilla consisted of 150 transports and war vessels.

France provided, in the space of a few months, the Serbian Army with 100,000 rifles, hundreds of machine guns, field guns, heavy artillery, 4,289 military vehicles, field hospitals totalling 7,000 beds, immense quantities of telegraph and telephone materials. Finally, the Serbian aviation service has been entirely equipped with the products of the workshops of France.

Roumania.—France has supplied the Roumanian Army with practically the whole of the war material and munitions required by it. A

French military mission has also visited Roumania for the purpose of furnishing advice on matters connected with the conduct of a modern war.

I. France has furnished Roumania with, *inter alia*, a first instalment of more than 100,000 rifles, 80 million rounds of ammunition for the same; a further consignment of 10,000 rifles per month; more than 1,000 machine guns and also ammunition for same; more than a million hand grenades; technical stores for the telegraph and telephone services, etc.; motor vehicles; 200,000 helmets; 500,000 gas helmets, etc.

France has also supplied Roumania with immense quantities of raw materials necessary to enable her to carry on her manufactures; of these the principal items have been 100 tons of brass, 500 tons of tolite, 150 tons of black gunpowder, 2,300 tons of other explosive powders, 200 tons of dynamite, 100 tons of tool steel, 500 tons of special steel per mensem for the manufacture of projectiles.

The Roumanian aviation service has also been entirely equipped by France.

II. The supply of the above stores involved the transport of 5,000 tons of stores, etc., during the months of September and October, 1916, and has been carried out in French ships. The demands on the French shipping have since the dates mentioned been increasing month by month.

III. A military mission under General Berthelot has visited Roumania to assist the Roumanian General Staff; further, the technical missions sent to Russia have also been placed at the disposal of Roumania.

In order to give a bird's-eye view of the extent of the assistance France has given her Allies since the beginning of hostilities to the 1st November, 1916, a table is given in the *Revue* article showing the proportion of the output of her workshops which has been consigned to the Allied Armies; the figures may be of interest and are given below:—

30 per cent.	of rifles manufactured, 1907—1915.
22	„ small arms ammunition.
20	„ projectiles for field guns.
20	„ projectiles for heavy guns.
13	„ trench mortars.
27½	„ hand grenades.
10	„ gas helmets.
8	„ powder.
5	„ explosives.

In view of the extent of the disorganization effected in France by the German invasion, the foregoing information furnishes some indication of the marvellous power of organization and recuperation possessed by the French people. On every front of battle there exists to-day evidences of what French genius is capable of.

A FEW WORDS ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN SWITZERLAND.

At the time that the December number of the *Revue* was going to Press the Swiss troops of the *Élite* were about to be mobilized for the fourth time since the outbreak of the War; in less than two years,

these troops have completed three periods of service totalling 13 months in all.

The author of the *Revue* article states that each new call to the Colours has, owing to the prolongation of the hostilities, added to the cares and anxieties of Swiss soldiers, in view of the seriousness of the economic situation. In consequence, the men's commanding officers find it increasingly difficult to maintain the *morale* of their units at a high level. It is suggested that the best way of keeping up the spirits of the men is to let every man, particularly those belonging to the infantry, take an active part in what is in the nature of police duties on the frontier. The sound of the distant roar of artillery, the patrolling of the frontier, often under trying conditions, are an excellent tonic for the soldier's nerves and help to build up in him the right feeling with regard to duty, discipline, obedience, self-abnegation, and also bring before him in the most impressive manner, better than the best lectures on theory, what are the necessities of the moment.

NOTES AND NEWS.

Switzerland.—A special correspondent contributes an article dealing with matters concerning the Swiss Army. He informs us that the Swiss Commander-in-Chief issued a circular on the 5th October last dealing with the application of the regulations contained in the Swiss Infantry Training Manual. In this circular it is stated that the lessons of the present War are not yet sufficiently definite to justify the introduction of new methods in attack. The only point which stands out prominently, it is said, is the fact that in modern battles technical appliances play a very considerable rôle, and what is of prime importance is the true value of each individual who forms part of an army. Therefore the chief duty of the officers is to develop and strengthen the individual character of those under their command.

The circular further points out that whereas in former times drill was the most important means of training the soldier for the battlefield, it is not so efficacious for this purpose in the case of the present-day trench warfare. The contributor of the article under review takes up the question of whether drill is the best means for obtaining and maintaining discipline. His conclusion is that perhaps an exaggerated value was formerly attached to drill; on the other hand, there is a tendency nowadays to go to the other extreme.

It is stated that the Press Bureau has recently inundated the newspapers with communiqués on a great variety of subjects. Apparently the character of the information contained in these communiqués does not entirely satisfy those responsible for the conduct of journalistic enterprises. A suggestion has been put forward by the *Semaine littéraire* that a tour should be organized so as to enable journalists to spend a short time on the battle fronts in the belligerent countries in order that contact may be re-established between the public and soldiers and so that the Press may have an opportunity to inform itself on matters, knowledge of which is essential to its existence.

The Swiss Army has been provided with a new head dress. When the new uniform was introduced in Switzerland in 1914, the question of replacing the kepi by some other form of head dress was left over for

further consideration. It has now been decided to give the Swiss soldier a helmet; the one selected is said to be light, strong, cheap and becoming.

The death is announced of Colonel Turrettini, of the Swiss Artillery, at Geneva.

Belgium.—A special correspondent contributes an article relating to various matters connected with the War. He points out that, in spite of the difficulties of the situation, the Belgian Government has managed to frame, pass and promulgate a new law relating to military service. In former times some three to five years would have been spent on such a measure in Parliament, but to-day, without any discussion or vote, the Belgian Cabinet have, on their own responsibility, done what was necessary and have received the full support of public opinion. By the new law military service is obligatory for all Belgians between 18 and 40 years of age inclusive. Men liable for military service are divided into seven groups, namely:—

1st Group:—Bachelors between 18 and 30 years of age. Married men between 18 and 22 years of age.

2nd Group:—Bachelors between 30 and 35 years of age.

3rd Group:—Bachelors between 35 and 40 years of age.

4th Group:—Married men between 22 and 30 years of age.

5th Group:—Married men between 30 and 35 years of age.

6th Group:—Married men between 35 and 40 years of age.

7th Group:—Exceptional cases.

The first two groups have already been called up for service. The remaining groups will be incorporated successively according to the necessities of the situation.

It is said that Belgians from all corners of the world are rallying to their country's call. In spite of the precautionary measures adopted by Germany, in the occupied parts of Belgium, many men succeed in making their way out of these regions and in joining their compatriots fighting on the Yser.

The question of keeping up a sufficient supply of officers and N.C.O.'s for the Belgian Army has been a matter of constant care with the General Staff. The wastage in the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks has been exceedingly heavy; particularly was it so in the early days of the War.

Schools of instruction for subaltern officers of infantry, cavalry and artillery have been established at various centres. The period of instruction for infantry officers which was two months at the beginning of 1915 has now been raised to four months.

Much has been done to improve the equipment of the Belgian Army. The artillery has been practically rearmed.

In her adversity Belgium asks for no tearful sympathy; her sons are determined to avenge the wrongs done to their country. What Belgians most desire is that their motherland shall emerge from her present misfortunes with honour and glory and that Belgium may in the future rise as a strong Power capable of securing respect for her sovereign rights by force of arms.

United States of America.—A special correspondent writes that the mobilization which was ordered in the United States of America on the 18th June, 1916, did not come as a surprise. From the time that Villa's insurgent bands entered the territory of the United States a large part of the American regular troops from the New York District have been sent to the Mexican frontier.

Owing to the heavy demands made on the Regular Army for units for service in the Colonies those remaining available for defence of the southern frontier of the United States are not in a position to provide the full numbers required for the purpose; consequently a call had to be made on the National Guard. President Wilson's policy, it is said, has been characterized by vacillation and the adoption of half measures; he decided at first only to call out the Militia of the three frontier States, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. Not only was the Militia of these three States not in a fit condition to take the field, but many members sought to be excused service for family reasons. In connection with the mobilization of the 18th June last notices calling men to the Colours were served on about 96,000 men out of the total of 117,000 in the Mobile Militia. Many of the Militiamen were rejected by the medical officers for service in the field. Delay also resulted in mobilizing the units owing to the fact that the equipment was stored in the Federal Arsenal: these in many cases were at a considerable distance from the headquarters of units. Riding and draught horses had to be purchased in large quantities; the majority were untrained and were put into the hands of inexperienced men.

The American Press is said to have written a good deal on the subject of the transportation of the troops to the frontier. The complaints were sufficiently numerous to call forth official explanations on the part of the General Staff. It is said, among other things, that inadequate arrangements were made for feeding the troops whilst *en route*.

The troops of each State have been kept together whilst on the frontier; the contingent from New York consists of a complete division. The absence of well-qualified officers of the higher ranks has made itself felt. The General Staff have taken advantage of this mobilization to carry out manoeuvre practices. The health of the troops has on the whole been good.

An outline is given of the new American law of the 3rd June, 1916, relating to military service. It provides for a peace establishment of 175,000 men—an increase of 55,000 men on the former peace establishment. These will be organized into 64 infantry regiments, 21 field artillery regiments, 25 cavalry regiments and 9 battalions of Engineers (two of them mounted). The additional numbers are to be raised gradually, within five years, by the addition of $\frac{1}{3}$ of the new units authorized under this law in each successive year.

The infantry regiments are to consist each of three battalions of four companies; cavalry regiments each of three groups of four squadrons; field artillery regiments each of either three or two groups of three batteries.

The contract of army service is to be for a term of seven years, three with the Colours, and four in the Reserve.

The law of 3rd June, 1916, purports to affect an improvement in the Reserve, which in future is to consist of the men who are relegated to the Reserve after three years' Colour service and of old soldiers, under 45 years of age, entering into voluntary contracts of service for periods of four years. An *Enlisted Reserve Corps* is to be formed for the Engineers, Supply, Medical and Signal services. The reservists are to receive a retaining fee of £5 per annum.

Many clauses of the law relate to the recruiting and organization of officers. Entry into the service is to be by examination. Officers' Training Corps are to be formed in the universities and schools; those in the universities and affiliated colleges are to be known as the Senior Division; those in the "Military Academies" as the Junior Division. In the cases of certain institutions which have been subsidized by the Federal Government, the formation of Officers' Training Corps is made obligatory.

Another innovation is the introduction of *federal pay* for the National Guard in times of peace; the scale is fixed at 25 per cent. of the rates of pay adopted by the Central Government for the Regular Army. The officers of the National Guard will in future be required to pass an examination to be conducted by a Commission appointed by the War Minister; it is hoped thus to get rid of the system of appointment by election in vogue in certain States; a system which has proved inconvenient.

A reserve of the National Guard is to be formed, but the law does not enter into the details of its organization.

The minimum number of attendances required from the National Guard has been raised to 48 (of 1½ hours' duration each) per annum in place of 24. In addition each man will be required to spend 15 days annually at manœuvres or at a musketry school.

This number of the *Revue* concludes with a Bibliography.

W. A. J. O'MEARA.